Essays in Dishonesty by Grimshaw, Shaun Brian
Essays in Dishonesty
Submitted by Shaun Brian Grimshaw to the University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
In September 2017
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper
acknowledgement.
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for
the award of a degree by this or any other University.
Signature:
Abstract
This thesis describes three different experiments investigating dishonesty. Chap-
ter one investigates the use of default values and prompts in a tax filing sys-
tem. Pre-populated fields simplify the process of filing taxes, thereby reducing
the scope for errors. Such defaults may increase the scope for non-compliance
if set incorrectly. The chapter describes an experiment investigating the effect of
correct and incorrect defaults. The results show that setting defaults that under-
estimate taxpayers’ true liability produces a fall in compliance. Nudges designed
to mitigate the adverse effect of pre-population are also described. Nudges us-
ing descriptive norms in a dynamic manner that react to taxpayer decisions raise
compliance. The chapter concludes that the use of defaults is worthwhile only if
the data is of sufficient quality.
Chapter two describes a model for lying aversion containing cost elements in
terms of the size of the lie told and in the positive deviation above a reference point
reflecting the point at which someone becomes concerned about the credibility of
the value being reported or about appearing boastful. An experiment based on a
numeracy test where subjects have the ability to cheat by paying themselves for
their performance is used to test the model. Two treatments are detailed using
modal values from initial control sessions to set different reference points. The
results show a greater propensity among subjects to report false values under
the higher reference point consistent with the model.
Chapter three details an experimental investigation into lying behaviour be-
tween two samples, one a sample of undergraduate student subjects the other
of workers recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Results from a sender-
receiver game based on a lottery draw show a higher propensity to report partially
false values among student subjects, consistent with a higher reputational con-
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Introduction
Every day, people tell little lies. They tell little lies to themselves, believing their
abilities to be greater than they truly are or that particular actions they take are
not really harmful. People also tell little lies to others, often to spare someone’s
feelings or to avoid embarrassment. Some people also tell big lies. They rebuff
having affairs to partners, deny crimes they have committed or simply misreport
facts for personal gain. In a simple rational economic framework, people should
lie so long as the benefits from the lie outweigh the costs. People are confronted
with self-serving dishonest choices everyday, yet in contradiction to the simple
theory honesty often prevails. It has been argued that a social norm of honesty
exists because it allows for a level of trust between individuals and organisations
that, without which, many of the mutually beneficial opportunities for cooperation
would not be possible (Arrow 1970). In two key economics experiments, people
have been shown to exhibit lying aversion, choosing different relative allocations
when sending a false message is required compared to when the same choice
is implemented directly (Gneezy 2005), and to not report the maximum possible
value but to report partial lies, in so much as experimental subjects reported false
values on unobserved dice rolls but did not always report the payment maximising
value (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013). These results are consistent with the
idea that people are not fully dishonest and that some degree of honesty, or at
least a desire to appear honest does exist (Akerlof 1983).
The questions as to under what circumstances people are dishonest, and
when they are dishonest what lies they tell, are therefore of particular interest.
Such questions are not only of interest to academics, but also to policy makers.
Dishonest actions may cost agencies directly, through theft or non-payment of
12
monies due, but also indirectly through erosion of the level of trust alluded to in
the previous paragraph. Information about when and how people are dishonest
may assist in the creation of better policies and improved designs of systems and
processes to reduce dishonesty and any associated negative impacts.
The following thesis experimentally examines dishonesty in three separate
contexts. The first chapter investigates cheating in a tax-compliance setting, the
second in self-reports of achievement on a numeracy test and the third in a game
where one subject in an experiment must report the value they received in a
lottery draw to another. The common feature of all three experiments is that, other
than where the subject is already receiving the maximum, a false declaration can
increase the level of payment. The chapters vary in the particular questions they
attempt to address about dishonest behaviour.
The first chapter examines the effect on compliance of the use behavioural
nudges in pre-populated tax forms, as recently published in Fonseca and Grimshaw
(2017). The chapter describes a recent change in UK tax policy whereby individ-
uals who reported their financial affairs to HMRC, the UK tax authority, through
self-assessment are being moved to a new digital tax account system. A key
innovation of the new system is that tax forms will be pre-populated with infor-
mation held by the tax authority. This measure is designed to both reduce the
level of complexity for the tax payer and the level of non-compliance through er-
ror (HMRC 2015a), but introduces a new problem in relation to the quality of the
information held by the tax authority, primarily will the use of incorrect informa-
tion by the tax authority affect compliance? The chapter investigates the effect
on compliance of correct and incorrect pre-population, both in terms of to the
tax-payers advantage in that earned income is missing from their account, and to
their disadvantage, in that the pre-populated value is too high and would lead to
an overpayment compared to the true tax due. Further to finding a reduction in
compliance associated with the pre-population of tax forms in favour of the tax-
payer, the chapter also investigates a number of behavioural prompts designed to
restore compliance levels. Interestingly, the chapter finds that a lock designed to
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increase compliance in the case where the pre-populated values is correct further
decreases compliance and that the use of a descriptive norm of behaviour was
only found to be effective when used dynamically in response to a non-compliant
filing. The chapter concludes with a warning to policy makers that pre-population
should only be used where they are confident of the quality of the information
being used.
The second chapter presents a psychological model of lying aversion based
on a utility function with two cost terms, one to represent disutility in terms of the
size of the lie, the second to represent disutility from reporting a value above a
reference point. The reference point represents a value above which an agent
in the model may feel more uncomfortable reporting an outcome, as they may
perceive such a value to be less credible, to affect their perception of honesty
or simply that the agent may wish to avoid bragging about their true state. The
chapter details a number of propositions from the model in relation to how the
value an agent will report changes with a change in the state and with the refer-
ence point. The chapter then describes an experimental test of the model using a
numeracy test containing twenty questions where subjects were given the oppor-
tunity to cheat as they were required to pay themselves for the task and therefore
self-report their outcome. Three treatments are described, a first to establish the
basic parameters of the experiment and then two further treatments each with a
separate reference point taken from the two modal values self-reported by sub-
jects in the initial treatment. In one condition, LOW, subjects were informed that
the modal value reported by previous subjects was ten. In the second condition,
HIGH, subjects were informed of the other modal value, which was that subjects
had reported twenty. The chapter details experimental results consistent with the
model and reports on a variety of dishonest behaviours observed in the experi-
ment.
A key contribution of the thesis is the novel design for the investigation of dis-
honesty presented in chapter 2. There are currently two major methodological
strands in the economics literature for the investigation of lying. One is based
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on the sender-receiver game, as used in chapter 3, with its origins in the works
of Gneezy (2005) and Sánchez-Páges and Vorsatz (2007), whereby the experi-
menter observes the true state along with sender subject and therefore can anal-
yse individual lying. The second method uses unobserved responses, such as
dice rolls or coin tosses as described in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)
and Abeler et al. (2014) which can be compared to statistical distributions or to
observed responses for the same task, such as in Mazar et al. (2008). The ap-
proach used in chapter 2 is different in that subject responses are anonymous,
but in having subjects hand in their test papers along with their returned coins, it is
still possible to examine dishonesty at the individual level. The chapter describes
that a considerable proportion of the false values reported, where subjects paid
themselves for incorrectly answered questions, arouse from calculation error. It
notes also, though, that in other cases the actual behaviour of subjects was less
clear, in that the subjects made a number of mistakes that may have been cal-
culation errors or may actually have been cheating. This design may offer an
avenue for future research into dishonesty under the condition that the intention
of the response is ambiguous.
The third chapter presents results from an on-line sender-receiver game un-
dertaken by student subjects and by subjects recruited through the Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (AMT) system. Subjects were given the ability to increase both their
own payment and that of a partner within the experiment by misrepresenting the
value of a lottery draw. As well as examining for difference in behaviour between
the two samples, the chapter describes two treatments, a first in which the lottery
draw is uniform over the whole range, and a second treatment in which the dis-
tribution of the lottery is skewed towards the lower values. The chapter reports a
higher tendency by student subjects to report self-serving false values than AMT
subjects, in particular through false values that are not the maximum value pos-
sible. The chapter also reports that AMT subjects were observed to have a lower
propensity to report the maximum value under the treatment where the value of
lottery draw was skewed to lower values, consistent with the model of Chapter 2.
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Chapter 1
Do behavioral nudges in
pre-populated tax forms affect
compliance? Experimental
evidence with real taxpayers
1.1 Introduction
Governments are turning to the marketer’s toolkit to design the way in which they
interact with their citizens (Dolan et al. 2010; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). While
nudges like default options were initially applied to consumer choice domains
like insurance purchasing (Johnson et al. 1993), there has been an increasing
recognition of the importance of the way choices are framed for nudging public
policy relevant decisions, like organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein 2003) or
retirement pension choices (Madrian and Shea 2001) - see Johnson et al. (2012)
for a review.
In an important development in the public policy sphere, defaults are being
introduced to the tax domain. In particular, the UK tax authority is now mov-
ing towards online tax filing (HMRC 2015a). Within that framework, it is using
information about taxpayers’ income and/or tax-deductible expenses from third
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parties such as employers, banks or pension companies to pre-populate the tax
form. This move follows an international trend: the State of California already pre-
populates elements of its state tax returns with the Ready Return program; tax re-
turn pre-population happens to varying degrees in over ten European Union coun-
tries, and Australia (European Commission 2012; OECD 2006). A pre-populated
field in a tax form is effectively a default.
This chapter reports the results of an online experiment designed to under-
stand the impact on filing behaviour of introducing defaults and norm-based nudges
in online tax returns. The experiment contributes to the literature on default op-
tions by exploring the potential compliance benefits from pre-populating fields in
tax returns; particularly, what the potential pitfalls are if default values are set in-
correctly. The study also explores for the first time in a tax context, the potential
for nudges that invoke descriptive norms to change compliance behaviour. The
chapter considers static nudges, which have been the focus of attention in the so-
cial norm messaging literature. The chapter also looks at a novel form of nudges
that react to users’ inputs, which are especially well suited to online environments.
Taxes are an interesting, and relatively unexplored domain of research in mar-
keting. They are a ubiquitous payment to all consumers, yet they differ from most
personal consumer payments along two important dimensions, as noted by Lam-
berton (2013): most consumer purchases have an intrinsic personal benefit, and
for the most part are something which consumers have control over. In contrast,
taxes are compulsory payments, the benefits of which are not directly experi-
enced by individuals, but rather experienced indirectly through the provision of
public goods like roads, schools and law enforcement. This might explain why
consumers often view taxes as a loss of personal freedom (Kirchler, 1998), and
why consumers exhibit tax aversion, defined by Sussman and Olivola (2011) as
“a dislike of taxes per se that goes above and beyond any associated financial
costs.”
Filing a tax return is similar to financial consumer decisions like choosing
a pension plan. Both tasks are procedurally complex and cognitively demand-
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ing; they require a reasonable degree of financial literacy, as well as knowledge
about the regulatory framework. Just as there is ample evidence of individu-
als and households making errors in their financial decision-making (Bernheim
1988; Beshears et al. 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell 2007, 2014), errors in filing de-
cisions account for a significant portion of non-compliance: the UK government
estimates it loses £6.5 billion (19%) of its tax revenues due to filing errors (Na-
tional Audit Office 2015); Andreoni et al. (1988) estimate that 7% of US taxpayers
make mistakes when filing their tax returns. Governments are starting to recog-
nise the benefits from simplifying decision processes and helping people with
their financial decision-making also apply to tax filing (Government Accountability
Office (GAO) 2005; Reeson and Dunstall 2009). Moreover, the financial case for
doing so is overwhelming.
That being said, tax filing differs from other types of financial decisions in im-
portant ways that are likely to have implications for the impact of defaults. When
a company decides which of the 401(k) plans to introduce as a default, it knows
its employees’ income but not their preferences over plans. When a government
agency pre-populates tax returns it assumes taxpayers wish to minimize their
tax burden, but it only has potentially noisy third party data about taxpayers’ true
taxable income. It may have accurate salary data from employers, but only incom-
plete data on capital earnings, like dividend payments (Bloomquist et al. 2012). In
that sense, the tax domain presents an important dimension for the use of nudges
in public policy: honesty.
The asymmetry of information between the tax authority and taxpayers about
the latter’s income introduces a number of operational and ethical concerns when
considering the introduction of pre-population. In particular, the tax authority
could inadvertently pre-populate tax forms incorrectly. This may lead to a number
of unintended consequences of a policy designed to improve compliance. One
possible outcome is that the tax authority could underestimate taxpayers’ liabili-
ties. Taxpayers may simply accept the incorrectly pre-populated values because
of status quo bias or behavioural inertia (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), or
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because they trust the tax authority’s assessment to be correct. A mistake of this
nature would potentially leave the taxpayer open to an audit and any associated
penalties from their non-compliance, since the legal responsibility for correctly fil-
ing the tax return still lies with the taxpayer. Another possible outcome is that the
tax agency pre-populates tax returns in a way that over-estimates tax liabilities.
Either over-estimating or under-estimating tax liabilities when pre-populating tax
returns raises ethical considerations given the duty of care that tax administra-
tions have towards taxpayers, and may lead to a public relations blow. It could
also lead to additional audits being needed, the cost of which would offset the
increase in overall revenue that pre-population offers.
The policy could make misreporting more prevalent by making non-compliance
a passive act, rather than an active one (Mazar and Hawkins 2015; Spranca et al.
1991). Incorrect pre-population also reveals to taxpayers what the tax agency
knows (and importantly, what it does not know) about their affairs; taxpayers may
also interpret mistakes as incompetence on the part of the tax authority, thus ex-
tending the opportunity for deliberate evasion. In the context of defaults, the con-
tribution to the literature is twofold. On one hand, we contribute to the literature
on tax compliance by looking at the psychological determinants of compliance as
a manifestation of honesty through the use of defaults. On the other hand, we
also contribute to the understanding of acts of omission and acts of commission
in the context of honesty.
Given the potential for unexpected non-compliance to emerge from the use
of incorrect defaults, it is important to understand whether or not other types of
nudges can be effective at mitigating any adverse effect of pre-population. Re-
cently, Smith et al. (2013) advocated for the use of “smart nudges”, which react to
users’ behaviour in real time. One of the benefits they propose is the potential to
correct mistakes users may make along the decision process. Reactive nudges
are of particular interest, as they are well suited to online environments such as
the one considered by HMRC; we are also interested in understanding the extent
to which they can mitigate potential errors coming from incorrect defaults. To this
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effect, we implemented a series of nudges, some of which included normative
messages about compliance. Depending on the treatment, these messages ap-
peared on screen as a function of the amounts declared by subjects on the tax
form. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to test the effectiveness
of reactive nudges on behaviour.
The following section develops the theoretical framework underpinning the ex-
periment and the resulting hypotheses, followed by the experimental design. The
chapter outlines the results and closes by discussing the relevance of the results
to the academic and policy literatures.
1.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
If a tax authority pre-populates a particular entry on a tax form, such as employ-
ment income or taxable expenses, it is effectively imposing a default action on
taxpayers. When deciding what value to enter as the default, tax agencies must
consider that the information they have about that field may be potentially un-
reliable or uncertain. This introduces a moral dimension to the use of defaults,
since taxpayers have an incentive to misrepresent their tax liabilities. Will defaults
and other forms of nudges be effective in promoting desirable behaviour in this
environment?
Gigerenzer (2010) argues that the same heuristics that guide choices in non-
moral domains are also at play in moral decision-making. The default heuristic,
which states that if there is a default, do nothing about it, has been put forward as
the prime explanation for cross-country discrepancies in take-up rates of 401(k)
savings plans with and without a default option (Madrian and Shea 2001) or sign
up rates for organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein 2003), should also determine
compliance behavior when filing a tax return with or without pre-population. De-
faults should reduce the cognitive cost of making decisions, which should in turn
help decision-makers understand more information and weigh information better
(Peters et al. 2006), and ultimately reduce the time spent performing the task.
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Kotakorpi and Laamanen (2015) study the effectiveness of pre-population on tax
filing behavior by examining Finnish tax filing data. Between 1995 and 2004, Fin-
land’s tax authority started pre-populating sections of tax forms for a subset of the
Finnish taxpayer population.
Kotakorpi and Laamanen (2015) report that taxpayers who received a pre-
populated return were more likely to report the items that were pre-populated,
and less likely to report on deductions that were not pre-populated. Kotakorpi
and Laamanen (2015) only look at changes in filing behaviour in the income and
deduction fields, and have no access to actual earnings data for those taxpayers.
This is because the Finnish government did not audit any subset of taxpayers who
were in the treatment and control groups. As such, their study cannot speak to
whether pre-population led to changes in compliance. Importantly, a large propor-
tion of taxpayers simply accepted the pre-populated returns, and chose not to file
a modified form. The authors attribute this behaviour to taxpayers avoiding the
cognitive and temporal costs associated with the complex process of engaging
with (and potentially modifying) their tax forms.
Hypothesis 1 Pre-populating income fields should lead to quicker completion of
tax filing decisions across all treatments
An important idiosyncrasy of tax filing decisions is that the tax authority may
not always know taxpayers’ true level of income. Any third-party information it
resorts to in order to pre-populate a tax form could be incorrect. As such, in-
troducing defaults in a tax context means it is possible to set the default value
at an incorrect level: for instance, the tax authority could either overestimate or
underestimate a taxpayer’s income for that year.
Setting a default at a level that underestimates a taxpayer’s income intrinsically
changes the nature of a potential misrepresentation of income by the taxpayer
from an act of commission to an act of omission. The literature on moral psy-
chology has found consistent evidence for an omission bias in decision-making:
morally reprehensible acts of commission are judged more harshly than acts of
omission that carry the same negative consequence. Harmful acts of commission
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presumably signal malicious intentions on the part of the decision-maker, un-
like acts of omission (Baron and Ritov 1994; Sánchez-Páges and Vorsatz 2009;
Spranca et al. 1991).
The action principle in moral psychology (Cushman et al. 2006) also suggests
that it is easier to passively refrain from acting morally than to actively transgress
a moral norm. Teper and Inzlicht (2011) show that indeed this is the case for
behavior in both prescriptive and proscriptive domains: participants in their ex-
periment were more likely to offer to help a fellow student with a disability if they
were asked directly than if they were passively given the option to help. Like-
wise, participants were less likely to cheat in a math quiz when doing so involved
an action rather than an omission. Therefore it should be psychologically easier
for participants to misreport their tax liabilities when doing so is a default action
than when it is an active choice. (Duncan and Li 2017) report an increase in the
proportion of payoff maximising dice rolls in an experiment where the payoff max-
imum value is pre-populated compared to no pre-population of the value. Finally,
another potential motive for non-compliance following incorrect pre-population is
behavioural inertia: taxpayers may simply accept the pre-populated values at face
value and submit the tax return as it is (Madrian and Shea 2001; Samuelson and
Zeckhauser 1988).
Hypothesis 2 Pre-populating fields in a way that underestimates tax liabilities
should lead to higher non-compliance
Defaults can influence choice to the extent that decision-makers may believe
they are a suggestion by the policy-maker, and as such imply a recommended
course of action (Johnson and Goldstein 2003). In the tax context, they carry ad-
ditional significance, as the tax authority, an expert body, and part of government,
has a duty of care towards its taxpayers. If the tax authority chooses a default
value which overestimates a taxpayer’s liability, then taxpayers may interpret the
incorrect pre-population as a signal that the tax authority does not have their in-
terests at heart (Wright (2002) and Brown and Krishna (2004) define this process
as “marketplace meta-cognition”) or a signal of incompetence, and lead to higher
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non-compliance.
Hypothesis 3 Pre-populating fields in a way that overestimates tax liabilities should
lead to higher non-compliance.
There are two approaches within the social sciences to conceptualize the de-
terminants of honest behaviour. On the one hand, there is the external incentives
approach, anchored in the economics of crime literature (Allingham and Sandmo
1972; Becker 1968). In this theoretical framework, the decision to be dishonest re-
volves around the calculus of expected utility: individuals weigh the relative gains
from the dishonesty against the probability of being caught and the associated
penalties. Therefore, increases in the expected benefit from dishonesty, either
through changes in the penalties or probability of detection should increase the
extent of dishonesty.
Independently to our own work, Bruner et al. (2015) study the role of defaults
in taxes, based on the external incentives approach. The authors develop an in-
dividual tax evasion experiment, in which subjects are presented with a tax form
in which, depending on the treatment, some fields are pre-populated. Subjects
have two types of income sources: “matched” income, which is verifiable through
third party data (e.g. salaries), and “unmatched” income (e.g. self-employment
income). Their experimental design incorporates treatments in which itemized de-
ductions are possible, to ascertain the impact of pre-population within the context
of the US tax code. Their study looks at how changes in the regulatory frame-
work, such as the audit likelihood or the presence of itemized deductions, affect
behaviour with and without pre-population. Non-compliance is measured in three
ways: underreported taxes on unmatched income, underreported taxes on the
deduction, and overall underreported taxes. The authors find that pre-populating
tax returns in a way that implies a lower tax liability increases non-compliance.
On the other hand, there is the internal incentives approach, rooted in the
social psychology literature. This theoretical framework is based on the idea
that moral actions are driven by internal rewards, which are, to some extent,
uncorrelated with the degree of financial reward at stake. People develop an
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understanding what socially normative behaviour is from an early age (Campbell
1964), as well as through group membership (Akerlof and Kranton 2002; Sherif
and Sherif 1953). Norms in turn establish a set of prescribed behaviours from
which we derive psychologically wellbeing. Neuroeconomics research supports
this account: individuals who cooperate or enforce cooperative behaviour in so-
cial dilemmas exhibit similar brain activation patterns (De Quervain et al. 2004;
Rilling et al. 2002) as those observed when people experience financial rewards
or when people consume food (Knutson et al. 2001; O’Doherty et al. 2002).
A particularly useful conceptualization of how internal reward mechanisms de-
termine honest behaviour is given by the theory of self-concept maintenance
developed by Mazar and Ariely (2006) and Mazar et al. (2008). It postulates
that individuals, when considering whether to break a social norm such as hon-
esty, trade-off the financial gains from cheating against maintaining a positive
self-concept as an honest person. According to this theory, individuals manage
this problem by finding a balance between these competing psychological de-
mands. They do so by engaging in an amount of dishonest behaviour which
brings in financial rewards but which is not enough to force people to reassess
their self-image.
In this context, descriptive norms, norms pertaining to what people in a group
or population do, can be a powerful driver of self-concept maintenance by pre-
scribing a particular mode of behaviour (Cialdini et al. 2006). Descriptive norms
can be a powerful driver of behaviour, ranging from littering (Cialdini et al. 1990;
Reno et al. 1993) , environmentally-friendly behaviour (Goldstein et al. 2008), or
energy consumption in the household (Schultz et al. 2007).
Hypothesis 4 Introducing nudges that remind participants of descriptively nor-
mative behaviour should reduce non-compliance.
Importantly, when developing the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, Cial-
dini et al. (1990) and Cialdini and Reno (1991) argue that the effectiveness of
social norm messages is critically dependent on whether they are focal in the
decision-maker’s attention, and therefore consciously salient. This approach sug-
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gests that nudges containing descriptive norm information will be more effective at
preventing non-compliance if they are reactive to users’ behaviour. Furthermore,
the fact that the message displayed by the computer reacts to user behaviour
should create a perception among users that the message is directly targeted at
them. This “personalization” of the message content should increase the effec-
tiveness of the reactive nudge, as per the literature on survey responses (Kanuk
and Berenson 1975; Yu and Cooper 1983), as opposed to static nudges.
Hypothesis 5 Nudges that are activated by non-compliant filing behavior should
lead to more compliance than always-present static nudges.
1.3 Materials and Methods
1.3.1 The Experimental Task
Participants in our study took on the role of a fictitious taxpayer. Their task was
to complete a tax form based on a profile of income and expenses for that ficti-
tious taxpayer. The profile detailed two sources of income and two corresponding
expenses that could be used to reduce tax liabilities. Table 1.1 outlines the pro-
file used in the experiment. Payoffs were denominated in Experimental Currency
Units (ECU); 1,000 ECU were worth £0.50 (at the time, $0.75).
Field Description Value (in ECU)
Self Employment Income Income from contract
with local authority
25,200
Self Employment Income Income for work done
for ACS Ltd
27,100
Self Employment Expenses Cost of Travel to
Work
2,500
Property Income Revenue from letting
a flat
20,000
Property Expenses Cost of estate agent
and legal fees for let-
ting of flat
2000 times the roll of
a 6-sided die
Table 1.1: Contents of the taxpayer profile used in the experiment
The experimental instructions (see the Appendix for a copy of the instructions)
detailed that participants would be paid according to the income in their profile
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minus any tax or fines due from their tax declaration and any potential audit. The
instructions also detailed that upon filing their tax return the “experimental tax
authority” could audit their tax return. If a participant’s tax return was audited,
the computer compared the values in the tax return with the values in the profile.
The probability with which the experimental tax authority carried out audits was a
function of the actual declared tax liability on the return, but it could never exceed
10%: the probability of audit was p=3.3% if the declared liability was greater than
or equal to 45,200 ECU, p=6.6% if the declared liability was between 22,600 ECU
and 45,199 ECU and p=10% if the declared liability was less than 22,600 ECU.
Subjects did not know the actual probabilities of audit or how it changed as a
function of declared tax liabilities. Subjects only knew that the probability varied
with the amount declared and was limited to 10%. The chosen values did not
intend to mimic the audit policy of the IRS, HMRC or any other tax authority.
Participants were required to submit a tax return based on the following fixed
(and known) parameters: a tax rate of 40% and a penalty rate applied to unpaid
tax of 50%. The values for the probability of audit, the tax rate and the fine rate
were set so that the optimal action for a risk-neutral, payoff maximising partic-
ipant was to under-report their tax liability - this matches the reality in the field
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Andreoni et al. 1988).
Although the instructions did not instruct them to do so, participants could
increase their financial payment by evading. They could do so by under-declaring
income or by over-declaring expenses. In either case, the most they could gain
would be to declare a tax liability of zero. This translates into a possible gain
relative to full compliance of £13.56 (at the time, US$20.34) for a task that took
on average 22 minutes1.
After reading the instructions, participants were asked to complete a practice
tax form based on a simple profile for which they were told they would not be paid.
Upon completion of the practice form, participants were informed of what payoffs
they would have received had they been audited or had they not been audited on
1Broken down as an average of seven minutes to read the instructions, two minutes to perform
the practice round, three minutes for the tax filing and 10 minutes to complete the questionnaire.
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their practice tax declaration.
The majority of items in the tax return were verifiable if audited. Verifiability
is essential for income amounts, as these form a direct part of the participant’s
payoff; as such the experimenter must know the value in order to be able to pay
it. Expenses, however, offer the experimenter the ability to set unverifiable items,
in that the expenses act to reduce the tax paid, so participants can increase their
payoff by raising expenses, but the experimenter does not need to know the true
value. Unverifiable expenses potentially allow subjects a greater opportunity to
evade, a mechanism found to have an effect in empirical studies (Kleven et al.
2012). The value of one of the expenses (i.e. Property Expenses) was allocated
to be equal to the roll of a six-sided die multiplied by 2000 Experimental Currency
Units (ECU). As a participant’s dice roll is unverifiable, it is rational for them to
declare the maximum allowable value for the expenses field - that is, 12,000 ECU,
equal to rolling a six. While it can never be verified as to whether an individual
misreported that expense item, non-compliance can be detected at the sample
level, since the distribution of die rolls (and therefore of declared values on that
item in the tax return) should be uniform if subjects are compliant (Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi 2013).
Once participants had completed their tax form, they saw their tax calculation
on the screen. This was done to remove any computational burden from the
participants, and it is similar to tax calculators which are available online. They
could then either repeat the process in order to change their details or submit their
tax return. After submission, the computer randomly determined if they were to
be audited and the participants saw their payoff from the experiment.
Subjects then completed a questionnaire; it included two open-ended ques-
tions about their choices in the experiment, questions regarding participants’ atti-
tudes towards tax using Likert scales, as well as socio-demographic characteris-
tics. They were informed that the questionnaire would not impact their payoff and
they were able to leave any question blank if they wished. Finally, participants
were told they had completed the experiment and given details of how to opt out
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of having their responses included in the data set, had they wished to do so.
A participant’s experimental balance was calculated at the end of the experi-
ment as the total of the two income streams in the profile minus the tax payable on
their declared liability and any fines occurred from the under-payment of tax due.
It is important to note that over-declaration of income could not raise participants’
payoffs, and the experimental instructions were clear about this. Participants’
earnings in ECU were converted to cash at a rate of 50p per 1,000 ECU; average
earnings were £29.62 (at the time US$ 44.43).
1.3.2 Experimental Design
Treatment Description
BASE No information reported and all four fields left
blank
CORR Correct self-employment income streams re-
ported, correct self-employment income pre-
populated
OVER Double counting of one income stream reported,
incorrect (value too high) self-employment in-
come pre-populated
UNDER Omission of one income stream reported, incor-
rect (value too low) self-employment income pre-
populated
UNDERGENERIC Omission of one income stream reported, incor-
rect (value too low) self-employment income pre-
populated, click of checkbox required to edit pre-
populated field (and confirmation of edit)
UNDERALWAYS Omission of one income stream reported, incor-
rect (value too low) self-employment income pre-
populated. Additional message on screen: “Most
people in your circumstances enter an income
value of more than 40,000. Values below this
amount are more likely to be audited. Click the
tickbox to confirm you wish to proceed.”
UNDERTRIGGER Omission of one income stream reported, incor-
rect (value too low) self-employment income pre-
populated. Same message as UNDERALWAYS
only displayed if subject files self-employment in-
come value less than 40,000.
Table 1.2: Treatments used in the experiment
The experiment consists of seven different treatments in a between-subjects de-
sign, summarised in Table 1.2. In the baseline treatment, BASE, the tax form was
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not pre-populated. In the CORR treatment, the tax form had the self-employment
income field pre-populated with the same total amount as in the profile, the sum of
the two values given for self-employment income, and the tax form displayed that
the information held in the tax authority database was the two values correspond-
ing to the two self-employment income streams in the profile. This corresponds
to the case where the tax authority has access to quality third party reporting and
therefore can correctly pre-populate the taxpayer’s income (Gale and Holtzblatt
1997). In the UK, third party reporting forms the basis of the Pay-As-You-Earn
(PAYE) system, such that the correct tax is paid at source and many employees
are not required to submit a year-end tax return.
In the UNDER treatment, the self-employment income field was pre-populated
with an incorrect value equal to one of the two sub-items of the self-employment
income in the profile and the tax form displayed that the information held in the
tax authority database was that single income stream. This captures the case
where the tax authority has either incomplete access to third-party data (e.g. an
employer not providing this information), or the case where the tax authority is un-
aware of that stream of income. This error in pre-population leads the tax authority
to under-estimate the tax liability of the subject. In the OVER treatment, the tax
form displayed that the information held in the tax authority database consisted of
three values, where one of these was a double-counted entry. Hence, the value
used to pre-populate the self-employment field of the tax form was greater than
the actual income level in the subject’s profile. This error in pre-population leads
the tax authority to over-estimate the tax liability of the subject.
As argued in H2, we expected a large incidence of non-compliance in the
UNDER treatment, either because inertia leads subjects not to change their pre-
populated entries, or because subjects learn of the experimental tax authority’s
ignorance of the true profile values, and engage in active non-compliance. To
test whether behavioural nudges can mitigate the negative effects of incorrect
pre-population, we consider three additional versions of the UNDER treatment.
The first was UNDERGENERIC, in which the pre-populated value was locked. In
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order to edit that field, participants had to first click a checkbox positioned next to
it. In addition, participants also had to re-check that box in order to confirm the
new value they inputted before filing the tax return.
The second version was UNDERALWAYS, which featured the following mes-
sage: “Most people in your circumstances enter an income value of more than
40,000. Values below this amount are more likely to be audited. Click the tickbox
to confirm you wish to proceed.” This treatment was intended to trigger a descrip-
tive norm of compliance and reminded subjects of the nature of the audit rule.
Social psychologists have long argued for the effectiveness of descriptive norms
as catalysts of behaviour change, e.g. Cialdini et al. (2006). See Onu and Oats
(2014) for a review of the evidence of norms applied to tax compliance.
Recently, a case has been made for the inclusion of reactive defaults. Smith et
al. (2013) propose using defaults that react to inputs by decision-makers. We im-
plement a treatment that approximates this recommendation: UNDERTRIGGER,
in which the same message as UNDERALWAYS was featured, but only if the
participant inputted a total self-employment income amount lower than 40,000.
That is the same descriptive norm is used in both the UNDERALWAYS and UN-
DERTRIGGER treatments and in the UNDERALWAYS treatment the message
is displayed immediately upon the load of the tax form, whereas in the UNDER-
TRIGGER treatment the message is only displayed after a subject has made their
submission if the level of self-employment income reported is less than 40,000.
In both cases the message must be acknowledge to allow the submission of a
value of less than 40,000.
Our choice of nudge in the UNDERALWAYS and UNDERTRIGGER treat-
ments was based on one of the mechanisms used by tax authorities to identify tax
evaders, which is to target outliers from within a given group, for instance based
on industry. For example the “DIF score” of the IRS in the USA will produce “audit
flags” for taxpayers deviate from the average behaviour of their group (Alm and
McKee 2004). As the probability of audit is endogenous with respect to the sub-
ject’s declaration in the experiment, we can use a nudge to inform subjects of the
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tax authority’s operational process. We opted for the value for income displayed
in the nudge to be below the actual value given in the profile, reflecting the pro-
cess whereby outlying declarations are subject to higher probability of audit. It
was also chosen to be above the value used for the pre-population in order for
the message to have some degree of saliency.
1.3.3 Sample and Recruitment
Our sample consisted of a pool of participants who volunteer to take part in tele-
phone and online surveys run by ICM, a market research company. ICM sent an
invitation email to its participant pool to take part in an online decision-making
experiment. As part of registering their interest to take part, participants were
asked to fill in a questionnaire, consisting of a series of standard demographic
questions. ICM screened participants on the basis of them stating to be over 18
years old, and either self-employed, or in full-time employment; this meant they
were UK tax residents. ICM then invited at random 755 people from those who
met our sampling criteria. Participants were required to have access to the web,
as well as a six-sided die; the invitation email included a number of online links
for simulated dice roll web sites for those that did not have access to a physical
die. Out of the 755 individuals invited, 554 completed the experiment2. Just over
60% of our participants were male; participants’ age ranged from 18 to 78; the
average age was 44.5 years for women and 47.3 for men. 34% of subjects were
self-employed and 66% were employees - the gender distribution was roughly the
same for both employment categories.
1.3.4 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was operationalized through a customized website designed by
the experimenters and hosted by the University of Exeter. The experiment took
2The dropout rates of those who started the experiment but failed to complete it were consistent
between the treatments. There was, some variation in the numbers completing the experiment for
each treatment, detailed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The differences in the number of subjects
arose from different proportions of those invited by ICM who accessed the experiment
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place between 9 February and 12 April 2015. ICM provided each participant with
a link to the experimental website and a unique login username and password.
We could not match usernames to actual participant data, and ICM did not have
access to participant decisions, making this a double blind experimental design.
This was made explicit to participants when they were invited to participate.
Upon login each participant read an on-screen set of instructions that detailed
the task they were required to perform. Participants were also told they would
be paid a fixed £5 (US$ 7.50) for completion of the experiment and would have
the opportunity to earn more based on their decisions in the experiment. The
instructions detailed a number of examples of the potential outcomes from various
declaration choices - the full set of screenshots is in the Appendix.
1.4 Results
We treat each individual decision in our analysis as an independent observa-
tion and make treatment comparisons using standard statistical tests. Unless
stated otherwise, we report two-sided tests throughout. We complement these
with econometric analysis, which also incorporates individual characteristics, as
well as responses to the post-experimental questionnaire.
The major part of the analysis will be based on the fields in the tax form that
are verifiable by the experimenters - therefore excluding Property Expenses. Ob-
servable Tax Liability is defined in the following manner:
ObservableTaxLiability = SelfEmploymentIncome + PropertyIncome
− SelfEmploymentExpenses (1.1)





If an individual has a Compliance value of 1, then that he/she is classified as
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Figure 1.1: Average completion time for the experimental task
Compliant. This ratio defines two types of non-compliance. If the ratio is smaller
than 1, that individual is Under-Compliant; if instead that ratio is higher than 1, that
individual is Over-Compliant. The last type is relevant because the pre-populated
amount in the OVER condition over-estimated the subject’s taxable income, and
passive acceptance of the default value could lead to subjects overpaying taxes.
1.4.1 Pre-Population and the Default Heuristic
To address the first hypothesis we analyze data on completion times for the tax-
filing component of the experiment. The median completion time in our sample
was 155 seconds, and 90% of subjects completed the filing task in 6 minutes or
less. We do not include in the analysis of completion times four outlier individuals
who took more than 90 minutes to finish.
If subjects passively accept defaults as part of their filing process, as the
heuristics approach would suggest, we should observe shorter completion times
in the treatments with defaults than the BASE treatment. Figure 1.1 displays av-
erage completion times across all seven treatments. Compared to BASE, we
either found no significant difference in completion times (CORR: z=.65, p=.514;
UNDERGENERIC (Mann-Whitney test, (henceforth MW) z = 1.73, p = 0.083),
or there were longer completion times than in BASE: UNDERALWAYS (MW:
z = 4.14, p < .001) and UNDERTRIGGER (MW: z = 2.83, p = 0.005).
Result 1 The introduction of defaults does not lead to shorter average completion
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Figure 1.2: Percentage of Compliant, Under-Compliant and
Over-Compliant subjects
Figure 1.3: Average completion time for the experimental task
conditional on subject type
times.
This suggests that, at least for some subjects, the presence of defaults led
to greater deliberation with regards to what amounts to declare. As such, it is
relevant to condition our analysis on compliance behavior.
Figure 1.2 shows the proportion of Compliant, Under-Compliant and Over-
Compliant subjects in each treatment; Figure 1.3 outlines the average completion
time for each type of subject. We note that in all but the OVER treatment, the
number of Over-Compliant subjects is extremely small, so there is no meaningful
analysis to be done in those cases, so we only report completion times for Over-
Compliant subjects in the OVER treatment.
It is noteworthy that in the BASE treatment, Under-Compliant types took on
average 90 seconds longer to complete the tax return than Compliant types (MW:
z = 3.05, p = 0.002). The same is true in CORR, where the correct amount
was already pre-populated; in fact, there is no statistically significant difference in
completion times between CORR and BASE for either Compliant (MW: z = .351,
p = 0.726) or Under-Compliant types (MW: z = 0.126, p = 0.900).
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We note that Compliant individuals take longer to file their return in OVER
than in BASE (MW: z = 2.497, p = 0.013) and CORR (MW: z = 2.654, p = 0.008).
In contrast, Under-Compliant types take as long in OVER as in BASE (MW: z =
1.416, p = 0.157) or CORR (MW: z = 1.187, p = 0.253). Interestingly, the 40%
of Over-Compliant individuals in OVER took as long as the Compliant (MW: z =
0.835, p = 0.404) and Under-Compliant types (MW: z = 0.680, p = 0.497) to
complete the tax return.
Result 2 Under-compliance requires greater deliberation time than compliance
when those behaviors are acts of commission.
The average completion times by Compliant individuals in UNDER and OVER
are not significantly different to their counterparts in BASE and CORR. The same
is true for Under-Compliant participants. However, when we break up the group of
Over-Compliant in OVER into those who did not alter the pre-populated amount
(N=28) and those who did (N=7), the average completion time of the former sub-
group is 139 seconds, while the completion time of the latter is 274 seconds.
The average completion time of those who accepted the incorrect default is not
significantly different to the completion time by Compliant types in CORR (MW:
z = 0.142, p = 0.887). This suggests that the behavior of some subjects may be
driven by inertia.
Likewise, if we split the sample of Under-Compliant individuals in UNDER into
those who left the default value unchanged (N=27) and those who did not (N=16),
a similar pattern emerges to that observed in OVER. Those who accepted the de-
fault value and under-reported their tax liabilities took on average 142 seconds to
complete the filing task; this is not significantly different to the average comple-
tion time by Compliant types in BASE (MW z = 0.801, p = 0.423) or CORR (MW:
z = 0.672, p = 0.502). This suggests that the behavior of some subjects in both
treatments is also driven by the default heuristic.
We can therefore classify Under-Compliant individuals in UNDER in two cate-
gories: 15 subjects (or 35%) are passively under-compliant, who accept the de-
fault value and are honest otherwise. The remainder are actively under-compliant:
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some keep the incorrect default value and evade also in other fields in the tax re-
turn; others change all fields, including the pre-populated one.
Result 3 A minority of individuals passively accepts incorrect defaults; their com-
pliance behavior is primarily a function of the pre-populated value. However, most
under-compliance is driven by active choice.
In short, our data broadly rejects Hypothesis 1. Only a minority of subjects’
behavior is consistent with the default heuristic. Most deviations in completion
time are explained by deliberate actions.
1.4.2 The Effect of Pre-Populating Tax Forms
We start by looking at the impact of correctly pre-populating income fields in tax
forms on compliance. Figure 1.2 indicates that in the BASE, just over two thirds of
subjects were Compliant, and 28% were Under-Compliant. There are relatively
more Compliant subjects (73%) and relatively fewer Under-Compliant subjects
(20%) in CORR, although the distributions of types are not significantly different
in the two treatments (Fisher’s exact test (henceforth FET) p = 0.574). However,
the proportion of subjects entering the correct value in the income field that is
subject to pre-population went from 75% in the BASE to 99% in CORR (MW:
z = 4.356, p < .001).
Result 4 Correctly pre-populating a field in the tax form leads to higher compli-
ance in that field, although not to higher compliance overall.
In contrast, pre-populating the income field incorrectly lead to a decrease in
the proportion of Compliant subjects. In the OVER treatment that is due to an
increase in the proportion of Over-Compliant individuals, while the proportion of
Under-Compliant subjects is unchanged. As a result, we observe a significant
difference in the distributions of types in BASE and OVER (FET: p < 0.001). In the
UNDER treatment, the drop in Compliant individuals relative to BASE is due to an
increase in Under-Compliant types, while the proportion of Over-Compliant types
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remains unchanged. The type distributions in BASE and UNDER are significantly
different (FET: p = 0.002).
Result 5 Introducing incorrectly pre-populated fields results in fewer compliant
subjects.
In short, our data provide strong support for Hypotheses 2 and 3.
1.4.3 The Effectiveness of Norm-Conveying Nudges
The next question is to what extent can nudges imbedded within the tax return
mitigate the adverse effects of incorrect pre-population. To do this, we use the
UNDER treatment as the de facto baseline condition, and see whether nudges
can “recover” compliance levels back to those observed in the original BASE
treatment (or even higher).
Figure 1.2 shows that the effect of nudges on compliance is rather mixed: in
UNDERGENERIC (which featured a checkbox that subjects had to un-tick before
altering the content of the pre-populated field), the proportion of fully compliant
subjects is significantly lower than in the UNDER treatment (FET: p = 0.049).
Figure 1.3 shows that while average completion time for Compliant types was sig-
nificantly higher in UNDERGENERIC than UNDER (MW: z = 3.103, p = 0.002),
there was no significantly difference in average completion time among Under-
Compliant types in both treatments (MW: z = .030, p = 0.976). In other words, the
introduction of a check box increased under-compliance by introducing a physi-
cal barrier to changing the pre-populated field. This is manifested in the extra
56 seconds it took Compliant subjects to file their returns in UNDERGENERIC
compared to Compliant subjects in UNDER.
The introduction of a descriptive norm message plus a confirmation tick box
(UNDERALWAYS) had no discernible effect on the proportion of compliant in-
dividuals (FET: p = 1.000). It increased the average length of time Compliant
subjects took to complete the tax return by over 90 seconds (MW: z = 4.592,
p < 0.001) compared to UNDER. There was no significant difference in the com-
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pletion time of Under-Compliant subjects in UNDERALWAYS (MW: z = 1.555,
p = 0.120).
Passive under-compliance, as described in relation to the UNDER treatment
above, was more difficult in the UNDERALWAYS treatment, as subjects were
forced to acknowledge the statement of the norm by checking a tick box before
they were able to submit their return. In other words, despite creating a psy-
chological barrier to incorrect filing of the tax return, which manifested itself in
longer average completion times for the Compliant subjects, there was little effect
in terms of dissuading under-compliance.
Finally, the same message when triggered by subject’s filing behavior (UN-
DERTRIGGER) led to a greater proportion of Compliant individuals than Under-
Compliant in that treatment, although the distributions of subject types in UNDER
and UNDERTRIGGER were not significantly different (FET: p = 0.200). Again,
the effect of the norm trigger is felt on the Compliant types’ behavior: they took on
average 45 seconds longer in UNDERTRIGGER than in UNDER (MW: z = 2.446,
p = .014).
Result 6 Nudges based on physical barriers to changing default entries in tax
forms compounded the under-compliance that exists with incorrect pre-population.
Messages with descriptive norms did not achieve significant increases in the pro-
portion of Compliant types.
1.4.4 Observable Characteristics and Self-Reported Measures
As part of the post-experimental questionnaire, we collected data on a number of
socio-demographic variables: age, gender, employment status and self-reported
annual income. We also asked subjects a question related to their attitudes to-
wards tax in general: “Do you think cheating on taxes if you have a chance is
justifiable? Please state 1 if it is never justifiable, 10 if it is always justifiable or
a value in between.” We also asked subjects to comment on how they filled the
income and expenses fields in a text box. We considered four categories when
classifying responses: Rule Following; Honesty; Strategic/Evader; Other. While
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the overwhelming majority of responses fit only one category, some responses
fit two categories - often Rule Following and Honesty. The majority of responses
(57%) were classified as Rule Following, while the second most coded category
was Honesty (27%); 21% of responses were classified as Strategic/Evader and
13% were coded as Other. The proportion of each of the four response cate-
gories was roughly constant in all treatments - this means we cannot use those
variables to explain treatment level differences in compliance. However, these
variables may still be useful to explain choices at the individual level.
Table 1.3 reports the results of a series of Logit models estimating the proba-
bility of being a Compliant type. Model 1 considers only the relevant treatments as
dummy variables; the omitted treatment is BASE. The basic findings reported ear-
lier are confirmed: the average probability of being compliant is higher in CORR,
though the difference is not significant. The reverse is true of OVER (note that our
dependent variable equals zero if a subject either under-reports or over-reports
tax liabilities), although again, the difference is not statistically significant. The
average likelihood of being Compliant is significantly lower in UNDER; that likeli-
hood drops significantly further in the UNDERGENERIC (χ2(1) = 4.50, p = 0.034)
treatment; the likelihood of Compliant in UNDERALWAYS is not statistically sig-
nificantly different to that in UNDER (χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 0.997). The likelihood of
being Compliant in the UNDERTRIGGER treatment is not significantly different
than in UNDER (χ2(1) = 1.89, p = 0.170), but also not significantly different than
BASE.
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N 554 548 543
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.07 0.31
LL -359.7 -354.2 -260.0
Table 1.3: Logit estimates of the determinants of Compliant types
Model 2 incorporates participants’ observable characteristics, in particular,
age, gender through a male dummy variable, a dummy variable for self-employment
(SelfEmpl), self-reported annual income (Income) and age. None of these vari-
ables are significant, and the sign and significance level of the treatment dummies
are unchanged. Model 3 incorporates a variable measuring individuals’ attitudes
towards paying taxes (TaxAtt), as well as coded responses to the open-ended
questions about how they approached their filing decision (RuleFollower; Honest;
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Evader/Strategic; Other). Introducing these variables does not change the sign
or significance of the coefficients on the other regressors, except for the case of
the coefficient on UNDER, which is now significant at the 5% level (p = .037).
The coefficient on TaxAtt is negative and significant: subjects who feel strongly
that evading tax is justifiable are more likely not to report their true tax liability in
the experiment. In terms of the free-form response coded responses, subjects
who described their behavior in terms of following rules or instructions, or who
described their actions as a function of honesty were more likely to be Compliant
types. In contrast, those who described their actions as evading or strategically
grounded were less likely to comply. Finally, those who did not have a clear
description of their actions, or who reported not having a clear-cut strategy during
the experiment were less likely to be a Compliant type. We conjecture that the last
category is capturing some of the individuals who were Under-compliant through
error, as opposed to premeditated evasion.
Result 7 Attitudes towards tax are strongly correlated with under-compliance.
1.4.5 Revenue
We conclude our analysis by looking at the revenue consequences of defaults and
nudges in terms of the level of reported tax liability. Our current analysis has cen-
tered on the proportion of individuals who under-report, over-report or correctly
report their tax liabilities. It is possible that defaults and other types of nudges we
consider in our design, while not significantly changing the proportion of Under-
Compliant subjects, will change the amount they under-report3. We report on the
level of liability declared by subjects, that is the factor that determines revenue
before the application of any audit and payment of unpaid taxes or fines, as a
proxy for revenue as the figure of actual revenue may be biased by the outcomes
of particular audits.
3We exclude from this analysis six individuals, who either declared a negative tax liability or
a tax liability that meant they would make negative payoffs. In the previous analysis, these indi-
viduals would have been classified as Under-Compliant or Over-Compliant; because they are so
few, including them did not affect our analysis; however, since tax revenues are continuous, they
constitute true outliers, and including them would skew means and standard errors.
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Figure 1.4: Average declared liability
Figure 1.4 displays the average reported tax liabilities in each of the seven
treatments. The average tax liability in the BASE treatment was 58,629 ECU. Li-
ability is significantly higher in the CORR treatment (61,936 ECU; MW z = 2.051,
p = 0.040). The average liability in OVER is 67,711 ECU and also significantly
higher than BASE (MW: z = 4.620, p < 0.001), driven by the high proportion
of individuals who retained the incorrectly pre-populated entry in their tax form.
The average liability in UNDER is equal to 49,456 ECU, significantly less than in
BASE (MW z = 3.257, p = 0.001).
The introduction of nudges in the context of UNDER led to a mixed result with
regards to liability. The introduction of a checkbox in UNDERGENERIC led to a
further reduction in revenues (44,547 ECU; MW: z = 1.985, p = 0.047), while the
static descriptive norm message (UNDERALWAYS) resulted in larger average lia-
bilities (52,190 ECU), although the difference relative to UNDER is not significant
(MW: z = 0.456, p = 0.648). However, the reactive nudge (UNDERTRIGGER) led
to significantly larger average revenues (55,660 ECU) relative to UNDER (MW:
z = 2.270, p = 0.023), to the extent that there were no significant differences rel-
ative to BASE (MW: z = 1.312, p = 0.189). This suggests that the reactive norm
message, while not being able to affect the number of Under-Compliant subjects,
did effectively reduce the amount of evasion they engaged in.
Result 8 Reactive nudges reduced the foregone revenue from evasion from in-
correct pre-population of tax returns.
In short, our data provide only partial support to Hypotheses 4 and 5. While
nudges with descriptive norms were generally ineffective at changing the propor-
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tion of Under-Compliant individuals, reactive norms did reduce the extent to which
Under-Compliant individuals evaded.
1.5 Discussion
Our study seeks to understand how defaults and nudges containing descriptive
norm messages shape tax-paying behavior. As such, one of the primary contri-
butions of this paper is to understand the behavioral drivers of honesty in the tax
context. In this sense, our work builds on Mazar and Hawkins (2015), who study
the extent to which individuals engage in deceptive behavior when it is financially
beneficial. That study examines how lying changes as a function of whether the
deceptive action was pre-set or not by the experimenter. Mazar and Hawkins
(2015) find that deceptive behavior is indeed more prevalent when it is an act
of omission. The authors propose that rejecting a correct default is psychologi-
cally difficult: it not only involves stating something not true, but also rejecting a
pre-existing truthful statement.
Our analysis offers limited support to Mazar and Hawkins’ interpretation based
on self-concept maintenance. The proportion of compliant subjects in the treat-
ments with correct default values is the same as in our baseline treatment. The
time Under-Compliant subjects spent completing the form when the pre-populated
value was correct was no different than that spent by Under-Compliant subjects
in the baseline condition. However, collected tax revenues in the correct pre-
population treatment were significantly higher than in the baseline treatment. This
is only possible if those evading do so by a smaller extent. Importantly, this pri-
marily took place in the non-prepopulated fields. Nudges that displayed a norma-
tive message about compliance in response to inputs by subjects raised average
declared tax liabilities close to baseline levels.
We provide evidence of different motivations for why and when defaults are
hard to override, especially when they are incorrect. For a small subset of indi-
viduals in our sample, defaults reduce the cognitive cost of engagement with the
43
filing task. Those individuals will therefore be compliant if the default is correct,
but will be under-compliant or over-compliant if the default is incorrect. The be-
havior of these individuals is therefore consistent with the heuristics approach in
decision-making, and supports the claim by Kotakorpi and Laamanen (2015) that
pre-populated tax forms reduce the cognitive costs of tax filing.
A large proportion of individuals, when faced with an incorrect default (either
under-estimating or over-estimating tax liabilities), responded by evading even
more. Subjects may have interpreted incorrect pre-population as incompetence,
which could signal greater opportunities for evasion, which is a key determinant
of non-compliance in the field (Kleven et al. 2012)
Defaults are extremely powerful: their effect dominates the power of normative
messages, which have been shown to be particularly effective in other policy
contexts (Cialdini et al. 2006). Only a normative message that was responsive
to actual behavior was able to mitigate the adverse effect of an incorrect default,
thus providing strong support to the proposal for using reactive defaults made by
Smith et al. (2013). Even then, the effectiveness of reactive nudges was primarily
on the extent to which subjects evaded, rather than on the proportion of evaders.
One important dimension which we could not explore in the present study
is the role of taxpayer trust in the tax agency, and government in general. It is
plausible that individuals have low self-efficacy in the tax domain, and choose to
trust the values presented in the tax form. This means distinguishing between
inertia and self-efficacy explanations of behavior difficult. Self-efficacy could also
be at the heart of our revenue result: although the number of under-compliant
individuals was not reduced, the amount of evasion was reduced. Future work
could look at if the reduction in evasion occurs because those who would have
normally accepted the defaults actively change information, or because those
who were actively under-compliant actually become more conservative in their
evasion.
One important avenue for future research is to further understand how de-
scriptive and injunctive norm information interact with defaults and other forms of
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nudges in an honesty and/or tax context. Norms and norm abiding are an inte-
gral part of one’s identity, whether in a social or individual sense. Therefore, by
manipulating the extent to which people violate their sense of group identity by
evading, we could construct choice environments that deter dishonest behavior.
Finally, our data consist of decisions by UK resident taxpayers. It is possible
that attitudes towards government and taxes may differ across different countries.
As such, future should investigate the extent to which our results hold in different
cultural contexts.
1.5.1 Policy Implications
The experiment detailed in this paper reflects potential differences in the design
of on-line tax forms in the UK today and those that may be used in the near future
under recent proposals for change. The different treatments reflect situations that
might arise under the new filing system relating to the nature and quality of third
party reported data used to pre-populate tax forms.
When reviewing the results on an experiment designed to test the effects of
defaults on honesty, Mazar and Hawkins (2015) suggest that “it might be even
more effective to [...] have tax software automatically pre-fill key fields with avail-
able information and require applicants to actively override them rather than typ-
ing amounts into blank fields.” We argue that this should only be the case for fields
for which the tax authority has extremely reliable information. One such case
could be employment income: in the UK case, there is already a well-developed
system of Pay-As-You-Earn tax reporting, which could be used to pre-populate
tax returns of individuals who have multiple sources of income. Bloomquist et al.
(2012) report that the quality of such third party data in the US is high, unlike
data capital earnings. Our evidence suggests that tax return entries for which
government tax agencies have low quality data should not be pre-populated, as
this could lead to increases in non-compliance.
We considered measures that the tax authority can mitigate the potentially in-
creased levels of non-compliance, but they should be carefully considered. A lock
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on the pre-populated field with a nudge for honesty actually caused compliance
to worsen if the pre-populated value was below the true level of income. A static
nudge containing a descriptive norm message on compliance that was always
present had no discernible effect on compliance or revenue.
A reactive nudge reminding users that a lower declaration of income lead to
a higher probability of audit was much more effective in increasing compliance,
particularly in relation to the major income item in subjects’ profiles. We note
that the message we used in this experiment is highly specific to the profile used.
Generating an equivalent message in a real tax system would be non-trivial for a
tax authority.
A noteworthy effect of the reactive nudge is that it increases response times
by Compliant types, while having a limited effect on those under-reporting their
tax liabilities, both in terms of reducing their number or changing their deliberation
time. This introduces a welfare question: in a more complex environment where
the filing task could be expected to take days rather than minutes, this nudge is
introducing an extra burden on compliant types, while not necessarily reducing
the number and behavior of non-compliant types.
More generally, our findings indicate an important scope for nudges that react
to users’ behavior. This types of nudges are particularly well suited to online
environments, where we expect most of the interactions between people and
their government or private service will take place in the near future. The fact
that nudges react to user behavior may lead users perceiving that the nudge is
directed at them, thus further increasing their potential. This is a promising area
for future policy implementation.
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Chapter 2
An Experimental Test of a Simple
Psychological Model of Lying
Aversion
2.1 Introduction
Every day people are faced with the temptation to tell lies. Occasionally such
opportunities may be for personal gain, but more typically they are directed to-
wards the upkeep of our own self-image or that of others. Indeed the majority of
lies people reported telling in diaries kept to track dishonest behaviour were for
psychological reasons such as to appear kinder or smarter than they were or to
avoid embarrassment or conflict (DePaulo et al. 1996). Cultures may well contain
norms of politeness that require the ability to tell some forms of lie; for example
the ability to show thanks for an unwanted gift is often encouraged and devel-
oped in childhood (Talwar et al. 2007). In the same manner, the art of impression
management, the act of influencing the perceptions of oneself by other people re-
quires different forms of deception, such that people are often well versed in small
everyday lies (Goffman and Best 2005). Indeed such lies are typically easily told,
arousing little discomfort in the teller (DePaulo et al. 1996).
Serious lies are, however, typically considered somewhat differently, often cre-
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ating serious distress for the person telling the lie as they must break a perceived
social norm of honesty (DePaulo et al. 1996). There are, however, numerous
examples of serious lies having a large economic impact, such as incorrect ac-
counting information being used to inflate values by companies such as Enron,
Autonomy and Tesco (Financial Times 2012, 2014; Healy and Palepu 2003) and
misreported facts designed to attract custom or investment by firms including
Facebook, Snapchat and VW (Financial Times 2017; New York Times 2014; The
Guardian 2017). The sum of small or moderate lies can also add up to form
significant measures. The sum of all criminal attacks, deliberate evasion and ac-
tivity in the hidden economy designed to avoid or reduce tax payments amounted
to contribute £15.6 billion to the tax gap of missing liabilities in the UK for the
year 2013-2014 (HMRC 2015b). As well as producing a direct monetary cost,
lying can lead to the indirect effect of wearing down the trust on which advanced
economies are built. It has been suggested that the existence of a social norm
of trust, including the need for truthful disclosure, may serve as a mechanism
to allow beneficial cooperation that would otherwise be too expensive to achieve
(Arrow 1970).
For many people the act of lying therefore constitutes a social dilemma. There
are occasions when lying is acceptable, even encouraged, and others when lying
is seriously frowned upon, so people often learn to be able to choose when and
how to lie. Consider for example a job applicant at an interview. Among the ques-
tions asked, they may be asked for their IQ. This question is different in nature
to one relating to the applicant’s academic record as it is typical in a recruitment
process to have to produce certificates to prove an academic record, whereas it
is not typical to validate an IQ score. If the applicant knows their score, they have
the potential to report a higher value in a bid to appear smarter. The decision
that the potential employee then faces is how much should they increase their IQ
score by? For a person with a below average IQ score, there is a temptation to
at least increase the score to the average value, if not slightly above, to at least
match the perceived average of the competition for the job. There is no such in-
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ventive for those with an IQ score above the average, though there still remains
some incentive to report a value higher than the poorer, or even equivalent, com-
petition. However, there is a potentially a limit to the IQ score that an applicant
should report, in part owing to the believability of any value reported, but also as
they may not wish to appear dishonest. Furthermore an applicant may limit the
value they report in a bid not to appear boastful. For a job applicant to boost their
IQ score a little bit in response to the question seems innocuous, and indeed a
rational response if an applicant believes that others will do so, but to what degree
would an individual lie and does the extent of misreporting differ with their actual
true score?
The example of giving thanks for an unwelcome gift at the beginning of the
chapter indicates that people are often conditioned on when to lie from an early
age. The key element of the model presented in this chapter addresses a poten-
tially alternative dimension of such conditioning, that of how to lie.
Studies in experimental economics have found that subjects in the laboratory
have an aversion to lying as participants select less self-serving outcomes when
it requires the use of a deceptive message than through a direct choice (Gneezy
2005). Subjects have also been found to over-report their outcomes from unob-
served random events, such as a dice roll or a coin toss, when compared to the
theoretical outcome, but not always to the maximal degree (Cohn et al. 2014;
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013). Experimental subjects were also found to
report higher values for a calculation solving task when self-reporting their scores
compared to where the results were checked by the experimenter, but very few
subjects cheated by reporting the maximum amount (Mazar et al. 2008).
Recent research has begun to focus on a model for lying aversion, with a
particular emphasis of the effect of reputation on the agent’s decision (Abeler et
al. 2016; Gneezy et al. 2016). Abeler et al. (2016), compare a variety of possible
models for lying aversion and perform experimental tests of the predictions from
the models. The authors report that only a model combining a preference for
being honest with a preference for being seen as honest can explain their data.
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This finding is in keeping with separate experimental results detailing a preference
for being seen to be honest presented by Hao and Houser (2017).
The observation of a model relating to a preference for appearing honest re-
lates to the expected intuition of the motivating example of a job applicant report-
ing their IQ. The reputation element in the model serves to create a value to report
that reflects the subject’s preference for being seen to be honest. The approach
in this chapter differs from that of Abeler et al. (2016) in two main ways.
The first main difference relates to the model, specifically the nature of the cost
function used to express lying aversion in the model. As expressed in the lying
cost - reputation for honesty model of Abeler et al. (2016), the model presented
here incorporates two terms to express the cost of lying, the first of which is also a
cost in terms of the size of the lie. The model differs in the second cost term which
is framed in terms of some deviation of the value reported by the individual from
a reference point. The reference point can be considered as some value known
or estimated by the agent to represent the average of the value or as a measure
of the values reported by others. The reference point can then be viewed as an
anchor for the agent’s lying cost in terms of a preference for appearing honest.
Alternatively, the reference point can be interpreted as the point above which
reporting a value becomes less believable. An individual facing a decision to
falsely report some value in a manner that can increase their utility may believe
that reporting a value well above the average value is less credible than simply
reporting a value slightly above the average. Returning to the example, when
questioned as to their IQ, stating 120 for a job applicant of average IQ (with a true
score of 100) may boost their employment chances without comment, whereas
giving a value in excess of 130 may arouse some degree of suspicion in the
potential employer. Alternatively, the reference point may represent a point above
which the reported value may appear to be boastful and the act of bragging may
cause disutilty. For example, it may be that the potential employee has a very
high IQ, but does not wish to broadcast that fact.
The model presented in this chapter therefore contains two psychological cost
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terms reflecting different sources os disutility. The first captures any degree of in-
trinsic dislike for lying by an individual. It may simply be that an individual dislikes
lying, and, as is assumed here, that dislike increases with the extent to which the
individual deviates from the truth when making a false report. Such a dislike for
lying, however, need not necessarily exist for all individuals, indeed some may
experience little or no cost from lying through this mechanism1. The second lying
cost term captures any dislike for reporting an unbelievable lie, and further as-
sumes that such a dislike is increasing in the value reported as the lie become
less believable. The reference point captures the point at which the value re-
ported starts to loose believability. As with the first cost term, it may be that any
particular individual may experience little or no such a cost in terms of deviation
from the reference point. The model therefore allows for any combination (neither,
both or just one) of the two lying cost terms to determine an individual’s decision.
The second main difference from the approach of Abeler et al. (2016) pre-
sented in this chapter is the use an alternative test of the model. As in Abeler
et al. (2016), experimental subjects were required to undertake some task that
generated a score that they were required to pay themselves for, leading to an
opportunity to cheat through an implied misreporting of the value. There are
three elements to the difference in the experimental approach described in this
chapter. Firstly, a more natural setting was used, whereby subjects undertook a
numeracy test to produce scores, rather than a have a lottery generate the values
to be reported. This design provides a less abstract setting for the lying deci-
sion and allows for some element of error, in that subjects can incorrectly answer
questions on the test and still claim an associated payment. Secondly, the design
allowed for an assessment of cheating at the individual level as the test papers
of the subjects to be collected, while actions were not attributable to any particu-
lar individual as payments were kept anonymous. Thirdly, as the numeric ability
of the subjects was unknown, the experimental design uses a between subjects
comparison of two treatments with different reference points based on the modal
1It is also possible that some individuals experience extra pleasure from telling lies, such indi-
viduals are classed as having a zero cost in the discussion here
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scores of a prior control treatment to serve as a variation in the reference point,
rather than using alternative distributions of an underlying lottery.
2.2 Literature
There is considerable experimental evidence that some people are averse to ly-
ing. Gneezy (2005) observed that higher proportions of people choose a self-
serving outcome from a pair of payoffs when presented with the choice in a dic-
tator game compared to in a sender-receiver game where obtaining the greater
payment for oneself required telling a lie. A similar result is presented by Cai
and Wang (2006), who report over-communication of the truth in sender-receiver
games compared to a sequential equilibrium model. Sánchez-Páges and Vorsatz
(2009) present results from a sender-receiver game with a silent option and con-
clude that the over-communication of truth in such games arises from an aversion
to lying rather than a preference for truthfulness.
The results of Gneezy (2005) may arise due to a population of two distinct
types, a first of people who are morally driven and never lie and another of indi-
viduals who are economically driven and will lie to obtain a preferred outcome, or
from a population with heterogeneous costs of lying. Hurkens and Kartik (2009)
report an extension of the experiment of Gneezy (2005) and present evidence
from their results that fails to reject the hypothesis of two types. Gibson et al.
(2013) present evidence for heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness from an
experiment where subjects face the same reporting decision but with different
levels of economic cost. The authors conclude that the variation in the choices
made by subjects at different levels of cost is consistent with heterogeneous lying
costs.
The variation in peoples’ choices with the type of lie has been examined by
Erat and Gneezy (2012), who report different proportions of subjects choosing
to tell a lie in a sender-receiver game when the payoffs associated with the lie
vary as to which of the players may benefit from the lie. A higher proportion
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of subjects were recorded telling a lie that benefited both players, though 35%
of subjects in their still did not tell such a Pareto-improving lie. Vanberg (2017)
presents evidence that the extent of the lying aversion observed in this condition
may be due to sender’s expectations of the receiver’s actions in the experimental
design.
The role of a subject’s beliefs about the beliefs of the other player in a sender-
receiver game have also been examined. López-Pérez and Spiegelman (2013)
conclude that subjects’ behaviour is more consistent with pure lie aversion than a
model of belief dependent lie aversion. Peeters et al. (2015) provide evidence that
over-communication of the truth correlates to the sender’s first order beliefs about
what a receiver will do, suggesting some subjects exhibit a preference for truth
telling. The authors find no evidence that the sender’s action correlates with their
second order beliefs, suggesting excessive truth telling is unlikely to be driven by
guilt aversion in their experiment.
Other studies have examined the role of the effect of various contexts on the
decision to lie, for example of ex-post disclosure (Behnk et al. 2014; Greenberg
et al. 2015), of a competitive or co-operative context (Rode 2010), of social ties
(Chakravarty et al. 2011), of the communication channel (Conrads 2014; Holm
and Kawagoe 2010), of framing of feelings (Cappelen et al. 2013) and of correla-
tion with pro-social behaviour (Biziou-van-Pol et al. 2015).
The papers discussed thus far have examined lying under the condition where
the experimenter knows the true state, largely in the setting of a sender-receiver
game. An alternative strand of the literature examines lying under the condition
that the experimenter does not know the true state, and while they are therefore
unable to examine the individual’s decision to lie, they can examine lying at the
sample level by comparison to an underlying theoretical distribution or a mea-
sured benchmark.
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) present results from an unobserved dice
rolling task appended to other experimental sessions in which subjects were of-
fered different payments for the values they could report. Subjects were found to
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over-report both the highest payoff and the second highest payoff scores com-
pared to the theoretically expected level. The authors term the over-reporting of
the second highest payoff score as partial lies, in that subjects lied, but did not re-
port the highest score possible. In a similar study, Utikal and Fischbacher (2013)
found that nuns under-reported their scores from a dice roll compared to female
students.
Mazar et al. (2008) offer evidence in support of a theory of self-concept main-
tenance, in which people are able to tell lies under conditions where they do not
have to negatively update their self-image. The authors detail results from a num-
ber of experiments based on a puzzle task whereby subjects must find matching
pairs of numbers within a matrix, where cheating is possible in treatments that
are self marked by subjects. An increased attention to standards, in the form of
a task remembering the ten commandments or a reminder of the honour code of
the student’s institution, was found to reduce the level of cheating compared to
neutral treatments.
One result of direct interest to the work presented here arises in the fifth ex-
periment of the paper. The authors present a two-by-two treatment where in the
first dimension the ability to cheat was varied (control versus recycle) and in the
second dimension subjects were told different values of average number of calcu-
lations solved by subjects on the test, in one treatment they were told the correct
value of four while in another they were told an exaggerated value of eight. The
results show a significant effect for the difference in the ability to cheat, but no
effect arising from the change in reported average performance.
Abeler et al. (2014) describe an experiment where members of the German
public were contacted by telephone by a market agency to undertake a survey. A
potential payment for the survey was offered at the end with the outcome to be
decided by an unobserved coin toss or tosses by the subject. The results show
no significant deviation from theoretical predictions, suggestive of a high degree
of honesty among the sample contacted. Student subjects in the laboratory were
found to lie more, though as in the results of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013),
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not by only over-reporting the maximum case but also a lesser payoff. Cohn
et al. (2014) also report on an experiment with a repeated coin toss and found
that subjects who work in the banking industry were more dishonest when their
identity as part of banking culture was made salient prior to be asked to perform
the coin tosses.
An interesting insight into the process of lying is offered by Shalvi et al. (2011b)
who give an account of a dice roll experiment where subjects were told to roll
the dice three times and report the value of the first roll. The authors describe
how the experimental results are consistent with a model of a best of three rolls,
suggesting that the subjects may have used the counterfactual rolls observed in
determining their actual reported value.
The papers investigating reports of values unobserved by experimenters high-
light a pattern of incomplete lying. Some subjects do lie, but the lies told are not
always the maximal ones. Different results have been observed in terms of be-
haviour, from largely truth telling in the coin flip of Abeler et al. (2014), to consis-
tent small lies in the matrix test of Mazar et al. (2008), which hints that context
forms an important part of the decision to lie. A further strand of the literature
seeks to examine the effect of justification by allowing subjects to cheat “in the
mind”, in that they are asked to make some prediction about an event before it
happens but only asked to report on that view after it has been observed.
Jiang (2013) reports significantly higher levels and values of cheating in an
experiment where subjects were asked to choose the face up or face down side
of a die for payment between a treatment where subjects were only asked to write
down their choice after the dice roll compared to one where they were asked to
write their choice down first. The author concludes that the behaviour required to
cheat in the write-first treatment serves as a source of greater hurt to subjects’
self-image than in the throw-first treatment. Hao and Houser (2017) report an
experiment where lying is significantly reduced in a treatment where cheating is
perceived as planned, as the act of cheating requires a pre-meditated step, com-
pared to where the act may be viewed as impulsive. The authors argue that their
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results are consistent with a view of people having a preference for appearing
honest than an intrinsic preference for honesty. While both experiments show
that there is more lying when the intent of such an action is less transparent, it
is unclear if this result is due to a preference for appearing honest or due to a
perception of greater opportunity to cheat.
The experiments presented so far give evidence that people often avoid telling
lies and suggest that such lying aversion behaviour relates to people’s ability
to self-justify their actions. Much of the evidence matches to the premise pre-
sented in the introduction that people face many opportunities for dishonesty and
have mechanisms for choosing how to behave such that outcomes may vary with
the context. For example, the degree to which a dishonest action can be self-
rationalised in terms of the relative benefits to oneself and to others has been
shown to alter outcomes. Moral reminders can serve to manipulate people’s de-
cisions and reduce dishonesty. Differences in the chance of being caught or in
the role of the perception of others about the intention of a dishonest action, as
to whether pre-meditated or impulsive, can also affect people’s choices in the de-
cision to report falsely. A key piece of evidence presented is the observation of
partial lies, that is outcomes where people report falsely but do not simply report
the payoff maximising option. The final literature section therefore focuses on a
set of experiments that examine the extent of lying, that is where subjects have
some reward that is increasing in the size of the misreported value.
Lundquist et al. (2009) describe an experiment in which the size of the lie
was found to have an impact where subjects were required to report their score
on a task to another participant and low scoring subjects had an incentive to
over-report. The authors detail that the probability of a lie increased the actual
score (for those with the appropriate incentive to lie) concluding that the aversion
to lying increases with the size of the lie. Gneezy et al. (2013) report on an
experiment based on a sender-receiver game where the payoff to the sender is
a function only of the message sent and not of the action of the receiver. The
results shows that the propensity of the subjects to report the maximum value
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falls as the actual value increases, from which the authors conclude that there is
considerable aversion to lying and that there result is inconsistent with a theory
based on the size of the lie.
Gneezy et al. (2016) examine a model of concave lying costs with a term for
reputation using an experiment with a random draw. The authors argue that the
fall in the lying rate and a high proportion of maximal lies is consistent with a
model of a fixed cost of lying and not with a model of a convex cost of lies. The
results also show that reputation matters as more subjects report more partial
lies when outcomes are not observed by the experimenter. The authors conclude
that there is an important impact of the size of the lie in terms of reputation.
The results of Mazar et al. (2008) are also consistent with a model based
on the size of lie, subjects do not report the maximal value, suggesting there is
some optimal lie for the value they wish to report that is less than the maximum.
Shalvi et al. (2011a) report an experimental result whereby subjects are willing
to tell a medium lie but avoid a small or a large lie, suggesting that they find the
justification of the medium lie easier.
In a recent paper, Abeler et al. (2016) perform a meta analysis of a large num-
ber of experiments with reports of unobserved lotteries. The analysis reveals that
the partial lying result of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) is robust over the
large number of experiments surveyed, in particular that subjects report over the
whole range of values, and that non-maximal payoff reports are made more often
than would be predicted. The authors propose a series of different models and
asses them against a set of criteria designed to reflect the main stylized facts
of the meta analysis. The models incorporate terms for lying costs, a reputa-
tion for honesty and social norms as well as a number of sub-variants for each
of these categories and combinations. The authors describe a series of experi-
ments designed to test the predictions of their models and conclude that a model
containing a lying cost and a reputation for honest cannot be rejected by their
data.
The literature presented in this section details a number of experiments investi-
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gating the propensity of subjects to lie. A key result observed across experiments
is that of lying aversion, in that subjects are often more truthful than either ratio-
nality or their social preferences would predict. A number of the results suggest
that reputation has a role to play in people’s decision as to whether or not to lie.
There are also a number of differences, in particular as to whether or not the size
of a lie has an effect of behaviour.
The results also indicate that ancillary features of the experimental design,
such as the nature of the information being lied about, the perception of the op-
portunity to cheat, the believability of any value reported and impact of the dis-
covery of lie, whether financial or non-pecuniary in terms of shame or reputation
are all potentially important for behaviour. The results give rise to particular con-
cern with regard to the experimental design. In some settings it may be that once
it becomes clear to a subject that cheating is possible, their decision collapses
to a binary one, cheat using the maximal value or report the truth. This may be
consistent with particular real world situations but, as argued in the introduction,
not with all the circumstances in which people have the opportunity to lie. The
use of an abstract lottery, such as a random draw by a computer or a dice roll,
to produce values may further promote such polarisation of the decision. Such
designs may serve to much reduce the roles of ownership and believability in
people’s decisions - as evidenced by the significant proportion of people report-
ing they achieved 10 straight winning flips of a coin (Cohn et al. 2014). The results
presented, however, also show that ownership and believability can change be-
haviour and therefore may have an important role in appropriate contexts.
2.3 Theory
2.3.1 Model
The model considers a set of states distributed over a normalised interval from
zero to one, S = [0, 1]. A state of the world, s ∈ S is drawn from a differentiable
distribution function F(s) and privately revealed to an agent. The agent must then
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report a value for the state, r ∈ S, that determines their payoff, v(r). There are two
channels through which an agent experiences disutility from lying, a cost in terms
of the size of the deviation of the reported value from the true value, c(r−s), and a
cost relating to the deviation above the reference point, cR(r− sR). The reference
point, sR ∈ S, can be viewed as an anchor for the agent’s lying cost in terms
of a preference for appearing honest, or alternatively the reference point can be
interpreted as the point above which a reported value becomes less believable.
For simplicity it is assumed that the disutility from reporting a lie is separable from
the benefit. The utility function of the agent in the model is therefore expressed
by:
U(r , s, sR) = v (r )− c(r − s)− 1cR(r − sR) (2.1)
where 1 is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if r ≥ sR and zero otherwise.
The agent faces the problem:
max
r∈S
U(r , s, sR) (2.2)
The following assumptions will hold through the discussion.
Assumption 1 The payoff to the agent is continuous and strictly increasing in the
value reported
Assumption 2 The cost function c(r− s) is continuous, zero when there is no lie
and is either zero everywhere or is strictly convex with a minimum at the point of
truth
Assumption 3 The cost function cR(r − sR) is continuous, zero when the value
reported is less than or equal reference point and is either zero everywhere or
strictly increasing and convex for reported values above the reference point
The first assumptions states that the payoff function, v(r), is continuous and
increasing in the value reported (v(r′) > v(r) ∀r′ > r) such that reporting a higher
value increases utility in the absence of any lying costs. The second assumption
states that agents are either unconcerned by any form of lying, or their concern
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increases with the size of the lie at an increasing rate. That is c(r − s) = 0 if
r = s, and either c(r − s) = 0 ∀r or c(r′ − s) > c(r − s) ∀r′ < r ≤ s, c(r′ − s) >
c(r− s) ∀s ≤ r < r′ and λc(r− s) + (1− λ)c(r′ − s) > c(λr + (1− λ)r′)− s) ∀r′ >
r,λ ∈ (0, 1). The third assumption states that agents are either unconcerned
by telling a lie that involves reporting a value above the reference point or face
a cost that is increasing in the size of the lie above the reference point at an
increasing rate. That is cR(r− sR) = 0 if r ≤ sR and either cR(r− sR) = 0 ∀r > sR
or cR(r′ − sR) > cR(r − sR) ∀sR ≤ r < r′ and λc(r − s) + (1 − λ)c(r′ − s) >
c(λr + (1−λ)r′)− s) ∀r′ > r > sR,λ ∈ (0, 1). The assumptions in terms of the two
costs from lying are similar, in that both allow for an agent who is unconcerned
by that particular form of cost and state that the cost for those who do have a
concern is increasing with positive deviation. The two lying costs terms differ in
that, for any agent with a concern for the particular cost, the cost in terms of
the size of a lie applies to misreported values above and below the true value,
whereas the cost in terms of deviation from the reference point applies to values
reported above the reference point.
The continuity component of the assumptions given above ensure there is a
solution to the agent’s problem that can be expressed as the correspondence
r∗(s, sR).
2.3.2 Predictions
The first proposition examines the change in value reported by an agent upon an
increase in the state.
Proposition 1 The minimum value reported by an agent is non-decreasing in the
realised state
The minimum value detailed in the proposition refers to the lowest value of the
optimal range the agent will report (r∗(s, sR)) for some given pair of a state and
a reference point. For two states where one has a larger value than the other,
s2 > s1, and an unchanged reference point, this proposition states that the optimal
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solutions for the value to report for the two states, r∗2(s2, s
R) and r∗1(s1, s
R), are such
that min(r∗2(s2, s
R)) ≥ min(r∗1(s1, sR)). A proof is given in the appendix.
This result ties to the predictions of monotone comparative statics (Milgrom
and Shannon 1994). The only component of the utility function affected by a shift
in the state is the cost in terms of the size of the lie. The convexity assumption on
the cost term c(r−s) leads to decreasing differences, that is as the state is raised
the difference in the value of the cost function for any two fixed values to report
falls. When the cost term is applied as a negative term in the utility function, this
leads to increasing differences, and the monotone comparative statics result that
the optimum is non-decreasing can be applied.
The first proposition relies on continuity of the payoff function given in the
first assumption but not on the assumption that the function is increasing. The
proposition still applies in the case where the payoff is decreasing, that is where
under-reporting the true state is beneficial to the agent. The second proposition
uses the assumption of increasing payoff to determine lower bounds on the value
the agent will report.
Proposition 2 For states below the reference point, the value reported by an
agent must be at least the true state. For states on or above the reference point,
the value reported must be at least the reference point
For states below the reference point (s < sR) reporting a value below the true
value can never form a solution as it will always lead to a lower level of utility than
reporting the truth. For states on or above the reference point (s ≥ sR) reporting
a value below the reference point can never form a solution as it will always lead
to a lower level of utility than reporting the reference point. Reporting a value
below the true state may, however, lead to a higher utility than reporting the truth
as there the reduction in the cost in terms of deviation from the reference point
may be greater than the additional cost of in terms of reporting a lie and the loss
of payoff from reporting a lower value.
This proposition details an important consequence of the inclusion of the ref-
erence point. An agent who is given a true state below the reference point will
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never report a value that is less than the true state. However an agent that re-
ceives a state above the reference point may report a value that is below the true
state but that must still be on or above the reference point.
The first two propositions can be combined to characterise the lower bound
of agent behaviour for a given reference point. For a given state, the minimum
value that an agent might report will be given by the either the true value of the
state or the reference point depending on whether the state is below or above
the reference point. For any increase in the state, the lower bound of the value
reported by the agent will be at least the lower bound of the values potentially
reported by the agent at the previous state.
Proposition 3 The minimum value reported by an agent is non-decreasing in the
reference point
For two reference states where sR2 > s
R
1 , the lower bound of the optimal solutions
are given by r1 = min(r∗1(s, s
R




2 )). The proposition states
that r2 ≥ r1. A proof is given in the appendix, derived in the same manner as
for the first proposition. This proposition states the cost of lying associated with
some reported value for a given realised state will not rise under an increase
in the reference point, such that the agent will either report the same value or
potentially a higher one. An increase in the reference point may serve to make a
misreported value above the reference point a more credible lie or to appear less
boastful.
2.3.3 Model Extension
The analysis presented in the previous section makes clear predictions with a
limited number of assumptions. The propositions clearly define the lower bound
of behaviour, in that the minimum values reported by an agent can be determined
and the change in the lower bound of the value report with a change in the state
or a change in the reference point can also be characterised. It is, however,
difficult to make further concrete predictions, in particular relating to any potential
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upper bound on behaviour in relation to the change in state, without additional
assumptions. In the ensuing discussion, the following additional assumptions will
be used.
Assumption 4 The payoff function is twice differentiable and weakly concave in
the value reported
Assumption 5 The cost function in terms of the size of the lie is twice differen-
tiable other than at the point of reporting the truth
Assumption 6 The cost function in terms of the deviation from the reference is
twice differentiable other than at the point of reporting the reference point
The first of the additional assumptions can be stated as v′(r) > 0 and v′′(r) ≤ 0.
This assumption allows for constant or diminishing marginal utility of the payoff.
The second additional assumption, stated in terms of the size of the lie x = r− s,
can be written as c′(x) < 0 for x < 0 and c′(x) > 0 for x > 0 and c′′(x) > 0 ∀x 6= 0
other than the case where c(x) = 0. The discontinuity of the derivative at the point
of no lie (x = 0) allows for truth telling behaviour. The third additional assumption
can be expressed as c′R(r − sR) > 0 for r > sR and c′′R(r − sR) > 0 other than
the case where cR(r− sR) = 0. There may be a discontinuity in the first derivative
at the reference point in that it need not be zero, allowing for behaviour whereby
agents report the reference point.
2.3.4 Predictions for Model Extension
It can be noted that under the additional assumptions the utility function, other
than in the case where the two cost terms are zero everywhere, is strictly concave.
As the case where the costs are zero everywhere leads to the trivial solution
r∗(s, sR) = 1 for all s and sR, then under the additional assumptions there is a
single optimal value for the agent to report for each value of s for a given value
of sR. The propositions of the previous section can therefore be restated in terms
of the value reported by the agent, rather than the minimum value of the range of
values reported.
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The solution to the agent’s problem may be characterised by the appropriate
first order derivative condition, though there are three important boundary con-
ditions to consider, in particular relating to payoff maximising behaviour and to
behaviour relating to the discontinuities in the derivatives of the cost terms.
The second proposition of the previous section detailing the lower bound on
the value an agent will report can be recast in terms of the marginal benefit and
marginal cost. For realised states below the reference point, s < sR, the marginal
cost of reporting a state below the true value is negative and as the marginal ben-
efit is assumed to be positive reporting values below the reference point cannot
form a solution to the problem. Thus r∗(s, sR) ≥ s for s < sR. For realised states
above the reference point, it may be that the boundary condition for reporting the
reference point, v′(r) ≤ c′R(r − sR)∀r ≥ sR, applies, such that r∗(s, sR) ≥ sR for
s ≥ sR. The next proposition uses the additional assumptions to examine an
upper bound on the agent’s behaviour upon a change in the state.
Proposition 4 The maximum increase in the value reported by an agent upon
an increase in the state is equal to change of the value of the state
A proof of this proposition can be derived from the first order condition for an
interior solution to the agent’s maximisation problem. This can be expressed by
the following:
v ′(r ∗(s, sR))− c′(r ∗(s, sR)− s)− c′R(r ∗(s, sR)− sR) = 0 (2.3)
Denoting the derivative of the optimal value r with respect to the state as r’, taking
the second derivative yields:
v ′′(r ∗(s, sR))r ′ = c
′′
(r ∗(s, sR)− s)(r ′ − 1) + c′′R(r ∗(s, sR)− sR)r ′ (2.4)
By assumption c′′ and c′′R are both non-negative whereas v′′ is non-positive, so it
must be that r′ ≤ 1.
This proposition gives the upper bound on how the value reported by the agent
may change with an increase in state in that it can be at most the same as the
64
change in the value of the state. Furthermore, proposition one can be expressed
as r′ ≥ 0, such that the range of values that the value reported by the agent with a
change in the state can be expressed by r′ ∈ [0, 1]. It can be noted that the three
boundary conditions for which the first order condition does not hold conform to
this range for a change in the reported value with a change in the state. In a
first boundary condition, an agent may continue to report the maximum value,
whereby r′ = 0. In a second, an agent may continue to report the truth, such
that r′ = 1. In the third boundary condition an agent may continue to report the
reference point, such that r′ = 0.
An interesting feature to note is that where c′′R(r∗(s, sR) − sR) = 0, such as
would apply when r < sR, that is the agents optimal value would be below the
reference point, then the case where r′ = 1 corresponds to the condition v′′ = 0.
That is the agent will report a value that has a constant difference to the state
where they have a constant marginal utility with regard to the payoff for reported
values below the reference point.
2.4 Types
There are a number of different types of agent that exhibit varying forms of be-
haviour that are consistent with the model. This section will describe a number of
them. The first six types are illustrated in Figure 2.1. These six types represent
the more extreme cases consistent with the model.
Behavioural Type 1 A dishonest type of agent may exist that always reports the
maximum value, r∗ = 1
The first type reflects a rational agent with little or no cost of lying such that they
always report the maximum value. The dishonest type of agent is illustrated in
Figure 2.1a. The following condition characterises such a type of agent:
U(1, s, sR) > U(r , s, sR) ∀r ∈ [0, 1); ∀s ∈ S (2.5)
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(a) Dishonest (b) Honest
(c) Fixed Value (d) Honest Modest
(e) Dishonest Modest (f) Fixed Lie
Figure 2.1: Illustration of behavioural types
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Behavioural Type 2 An honest type of agent may exist that always reports the
true value, r∗ = s
The honest type has a sufficiently high cost of lying in terms of the size of the lie
that they always report the true value. The honest agent is illustrated in Figure
2.1b. The following condition characterises such a type of agent:
U(s, s, sR) > U(r , s, sR) ∀r ∈ [0, 1] & r 6= s; ∀s ∈ S (2.6)
Behavioural Type 3 A fixed value type of agent may exist that reports the same
value for all states
The fixed type of agent experiences a cost in terms of deviation from the reference
point such that they will always report the same value. The fixed value type of
agent is illustrated in Figure 2.1c and is characterised by the following condition:
U(rT , s, sR) > U(r , s, sR) ∀r ∈ [0, 1] & r 6= rT ; ∀s ∈ S (2.7)
where rT is the fixed value that the agent reports. The value rT will be discussed
further in the next section.
Behavioural Type 4 An honest modest type of agent may exist that reports the
true value for states below the reference point, but the reference point for states
on or above the reference point
The honest modest agent is illustrated in Figure 2.1d and is characterised by the
following conditions:
U(s, s, sR) > U(r , s, sR) ∀r ∈ [0, 1] & r 6= s; ∀s ∈ [0, sR) (2.8)
U(sR, s, sR) > U(r , s, sR) ∀r ∈ [0, 1] & r 6= sR; ∀s ∈ [sR, 1] (2.9)
An honest modest agent can be thought of as being generally driven by hon-
esty, such that they report the truth in low states, but whose desire to conform
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to reporting the reference point is sufficiently strong that it outweighs their desire
for honesty and causes them to misreport their value by under-reporting the true
value for states above the reference point. The honest modest agent wishes to
be honest but even more wishes to appear honest for high realised states.
Behavioural Type 5 A dishonest modest type of agent may exist that reports the
reference point for states below the reference point, but the truth for states on or
above the reference point
The dishonest modest type is a striking alternative to the honest modest type
given before. The dishonest modest type is illustrated in Figure 2.1e and is char-
acterised by the following conditions:
U(sR, s, sR) > U(r , s, sR) ∀r ∈ [0, 1] & r 6= sR; ∀s ∈ [0, sR) (2.10)
U(s, s, sR) > U(r , s, sR) ∀r ∈ [0, 1] & r 6= s; ∀s ∈ [sR, 1] (2.11)
The dishonest modest agent experiences the cost of lying from both cost compo-
nents of the utility function, but the cost in terms of the reference point is dominant,
such that for low states the agent is prepared to report a lie, but only for states up
to the reference point. For states above the reference point, the marginal cost for
states between the reference point and the true state is reduced to a level below
the marginal benefit by the contribution from reporting a value that is below the
true state in terms of the size of the lie such that reporting the true state becomes
optimal for the agent. A dishonest modest agent does not mind telling a lie, but
finds it beneficial to report the truth for states above the reference point.
Behavioural Type 6 A fixed lie type of agent may exist that reports a lie of a
constant size for states that they are able to do so and otherwise will report the
maximum value
The fixed lie type of agent is illustrated in Figure 2.1f. Such an agent has no
concern for the reference point (such that cR(r − sR) = 0 everywhere) but some
cost in terms of the size of the lie such that for some values of the state the
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agent’s choice is characterised by the interior optimum. Furthermore the agent
has a constant marginal benefit from the payoff (v), such that the solution to the
agent’s optimisation problem is a fixed value, r+, with respect to the state so long
as the implied value to report is less than the maximum value. This agent is
therefore characterised by the conditions:
v ′(r ∗) = c
′
(r ∗ − s) v ′(r ) = v , ∀s < 1− r+ (2.12)
r ∗ = 1 ∀s ≥ 1− r+ (2.13)
The condition given for a fixed lie type of agent always has the same solution
relative to the point of truth (so long as there remains an interior solution), such
that the agent will therefore be comfortable with a particular size of lie to tell.
A fixed lie type will embellish the realised value to the same extent whatever
the realised value up to the point where they are reporting the maximum value
anyway. The main proposition gives that the reported value is non-decreasing in
the realised state, such that once an agent reports the maximum value, they will
report that value for all higher states.
The fixed lie type reveals a further important result of the model in that there
is an agent who reports a positive lie that is not the maximum value, that is a
partial liar. For such an agent, the value to report represents the optimal trade
off between the additional utility for reporting a higher value and the extra cost of
reporting a more false value.
The behaviour of the fixed lie type in reporting a constant increment over the
realised state from such a model is discussed in the work by Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi 2013, who argue that such a model is inconsistent with their results
as it does not allow the significant over-reporting of the second highest value in
the dice roll task as presented in their experimental results. For the model given
here, however, this outcome represents an example of the one of extreme types
of behaviour, whereas there are other behavioural types in the model that are
consistent with their result.
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of first order conditions
The solution to the first order condition associated with the fixed lie type of
agent is illustrated in the left hand plot of Figure 2.2. The optimal value for the
agent to report can be considered as an increment, labelled r+ in the figure, as this
value gives the constant size of the lie the agent will choose over the set of states
where the interior optimum continues to apply. Such an agent will never report a
value less than the truth, giving rise to the previous observation that a model only
containing a cost in terms of the size of the lie cannot produce negative lies.
The right hand plot of Figure 2.2 illustrates the term rT previously referenced
in the condition of the fixed value type. It represents the solution to the first order
condition of the agent’s problem when only the cost in terms of deviation from the
reference point is present and holds as an interior optimum.
The six behavioural types presented so far reflect extremes of behaviour con-
sistent with the model. A number of the types arise from the boundary condi-
tions in the model, reflecting very small or very large moral considerations for
lying. Others arise from considering only one of the cost terms in isolation, or
from switching between the primary effect of the two cost terms. The following
behavioural type seeks to characterise a more moderate form of agent who ex-
periences both components of the lying cost.
Behavioural Type 7 A moderate lying agent may exist that reports an increasing
value with the state leading to positive lies in low states and negative lies for high
states
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of value reported for a moderate lying type
A moderate lying agent experiences some cost in terms of the size of the lie,
such that the type is willing to over-report their value, but only to some restricted
degree. However, they also experience a cost in terms of the reference point,
leading to higher costs for telling a lie of an equivalent size when the value re-
ported lies above the reference point compared to below. Indeed, the additional
cost for a particular lie above the reference point may be enough to cause the
agent to switch to negative lies. A moderate lying agent is illustrated in Figure
2.3.
Figure 2.3 illustrates a number of features pertaining to a moderate lying
agent. If the agent experiences sufficient cost in terms of the size of the lie that
they will only over-report to a small extent in low states, then there will be some
region where the agent exhibits behaviour consistent with a fixed increment. For
any given state where the agent wishes to report a value below the reference
point, the reference point will have no direct influence on the agent’s choice, and
the size of the increment of any lie will be constant. The highest state under which
this consideration applies for can be determined from the first order condition, and
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is given by sR − r+, the state under which the agent will report a value equal to
the reference point. If the agent experiences a sufficient cost in terms of deviation
from the reference point then there may be some state where the agent will report
the truth. The value of the state at which the agent will report the truth can also
be determined from the appropriate first order condition, as will it occur when the
agent reports the value rT such that the state at which the agent reports the truth
is sT, where sT = rT. For such an agent, the extent of the lie reported between
the states sR− r+ and sT is falling. This change in behaviour reflects the influence
of the cost of deviation from the reference point on the agent’s behaviour. For
realised states above the truth telling point the agent will no longer over-report
the value and may switch to under-reporting.
A comparison of Figure 2.3 with the panels 2.1c and 2.1f of Figure 2.1 high-
lights the outcome of the combination of the two cost components on the be-
haviour of an agent. For realised states below the reference point, the cost in
terms of the size of the lie may have the main effect driving behaviour where the
agent reports a value with a fixed increment. For states above the reference point,
the cost in terms of deviation from the reference point may be the main influence,
producing behaviour akin to reporting some fixed value. The agent’s behaviour
for values in the central range, around the reference point, will reflect elements
of both considerations. An agent who experiences both forms of the psychologi-
cal cost contained in this model will therefore exhibit moderated behaviour in that
they will typically over-report values for low realised states but reduce the degree
of over-reporting for higher realised states and even under-report values for suf-
ficiently high states. This is not to say this moderated behaviour applies to all
agents, the model still allows for rational liars and honest types, only to agents
who experience the appropriate relative levels of the two costs and the benefit
from the lie.
A moderate lying agent is also consistent with the model of self-concept main-
tenance (Mazar et al. 2008). The agent is happy to over-report values to some
extent, especially for low states. However the degree of this over-reporting will
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fall for such an agent as the state rises, eventually potentially turning into under-
reporting of the value.
2.5 Change of Reference Point
The third proposition detailed that the value reported by an agent will be non-
decreasing for an increase in the reference point. It can be noted that a number
of the types described in the previous section will be unaffected by an increase
in the reference point, in particular the fully dishonest, fully honest and fixed lie
types of agent, who have no concern for the reference point or whose degree of
concern is dominated by their cost in terms of the size of the lie. In all three cases
proposition 3 holds and the value reported by the agent does not decrease with
an increase in the reference point.
However other types may be affected by a change in the reference point and
may increase the value they report for any given state upon an increase in the
reference point. This outcome matches to the simple intuition that if the reference
point is higher, such that the cost in terms of deviation from the reference point
for a any given value for an agent to report affected by such a cost is lower, larger
lies are more likely.
An example of a shift in the reference point is given Figure 2.4. The left hand
panel of the figure illustrates how two different reference points, sR and sR′ where
sR′ > sR, can be extracted from the model of the previous section for a particular
agent set over an extended theoretical range of states ([−1, 1]). The right hand
panel shows the optimal response of the agent over the observable range [0, 1] for
the two reference points produced by overlaying the two sections taken from the
left hand panel. The key feature illustrated in Figure 2.4 is that higher values are
reported under the case of the higher reference point for the moderate lying agent
under consideration. This agent’s cost in terms of deviation from the reference
point is such that the same degree of deviation is optimal, but this is applied
relative to the reference point, such that the value of the state where the agent
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of value reported with different reference points
reports the truth (sT) is greater under the case where the reference point is higher.
In the case illustrated, the degree of change in the reference point is sufficient that
under the lower reference point the agent will report negative lies in the highest
states, whereas they report the maximum value for equivalent states under the
higher reference point.
A further feature illustrated in Figure 2.4 is that there need not be an effect
in behaviour upon a shift in the reference point. As noted at the beginning of
this section a number of types consistent with the model will not be affected by
a change in the reference point. However the illustration also shows that types
that are affected by the change in the reference point may not be affected for all
states. In particular where the cost of telling a lie in terms of the size of the lie
is such that at the lower reference point the agent will report a value below the
lower reference point, an increase in the reference point will have no effect.
2.6 Hypotheses
The approach to testing the model adopted in this chapter utilises a between sub-
jects design in which each subject faces a single decision, with hypotheses based
on the sample outcomes. An alternative test of the model would seek to examine
the value an individual would report for all the possible values of the realised state
under conditions with differing values of the reference point. Such a within subject
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design for an experiment, however, faces a problem of experimenter demand in
eliciting valid responses from subjects being asked to respond multiple times, as
described in Charness et al. (2012).
The propositions detailed in the previous sections allow for a number of hy-
potheses as a test of the model. The first two hypotheses are framed in relation
to the value reported by subjects, whereas the latter two detail conjectures about
outcome behaviours. The first hypothesis is a simple statement reflecting one of
the key predictions of the model, that of partial lying.
Hypothesis 1 A proportion of the sample will report false values that are not the
maximum value
The first hypothesis states that some individuals will report a partial lie, that is
a false value that is not the maximum value. A response that is a partial lie is
consistent with a number of the types discussed in the previous section, such as
the fixed lie type (for appropriate values of the realised state).
The second hypothesis details a prediction about the value that will be re-
ported under two separate conditions with different reference points, such that
sR′ > sR. The hypothesis proposes a pattern of change in the reported value
upon a shift to the higher reference point. Proposition 3 gives that the reported
value is non-decreasing upon an increase in the reference point, such that a
simplistic hypothesis would conjecture that there would be no decrease in the
value reported upon an increase in the reference point. A hypothesis of this form
would, however, offer no evidence in support of the role of the reference point in
the model. To create a hypothesis that is able to provide positive evidence re-
quires an analysis relating to how any of the types of agents consistent with the
model would be affected by an increase in the reference point. To support this
analysis, the hypothesis splits the decision space into four quadrants based on
the application of lower of the two reference points to both the dimension of the
realised state and of the reported value. The resulting quadrants can be labelled
by the appropriate corresponding compass points. The SW quadrant applies for
values of the realised state and the reported value are below the lower reference
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point sR (s < sR, r < sR), such that the NW quadrant applies when s < sR and
≥ sR and the NE quadrant where both the value of the realised state and the
reported value are on or above sR (s ≥ sR, r ≥ sR). The theory predicts that no
values should be reported in the SE quadrant.
Hypothesis 2 There should be no change in the value reported by individuals
reporting in the SW quadrant under the lower reference point upon an increase
in the reference point. The value reported by some individuals in the NE and NW
quadrants will be increased
The utility function of the model states that the cost in terms of lying has no impact
when an agent reports a value below the reference point, such that the reference
point has no influence on values reported in the SW quadrant. As this condition
will still apply under an increase in the reference point, an agent’s choice will
not be changed, leading to the first part of the hypothesis. To detect positive
evidence in favour of the model presented here with a reference point therefore
requires consideration of the NW and NE quadrants, where the value reported is
on or above the lower reference point (under the condition of the lower reference
point). While there will be some agents in these regions unaffected by a shift in
the reference point (such as characterised by the Honest or Dishonest types), if
there are agents of the types affected by the reference point, then the increase
in the reference point will lead to an increase in the value reported for a given
realised state in the NW and NE quadrants.
The remaining hypotheses consider the propensity to report the maximum
value or the truth under the conditions of the different reference points.
Hypothesis 3 The proportion of the sample reporting the maximum value will in-
crease in the treatment with a higher reference point for realised states in excess
of sR
The third hypothesis reflects that there is an upper bound to the reporting deci-
sion, such that if the previous hypothesis that agents will report increased values
under a condition with a higher reference point holds, then a greater proportion
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of agents will report the maximum value. Gneezy et al. (2013) report a decline
in the propensity to report the maximum value with an increase in the realised
state in a sender-receiver game. The authors of that study state that the pattern
observed is inconsistent with a simple model of a convex cost of lying. As pre-
viously noted, Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) also state that their results
from a dice rolling task are inconsistent with a simple model of a convex cost of
lying. The inclusion in the model of an additional cost in terms of deviation from
the reference point allows for a decline in the propensity to report the maximum
value and furthermore the hypothesis that the proportion of subjects reporting the
maximum value will be greater under the condition of the higher reference point.
Hypothesis 4 There will be a greater propensity for truth telling in the treatment
with the lower reference point for states in excess of sR
The fourth hypothesis conjectures that if there is less lying expected in the
condition with the lower reference point, as given in the previous two hypotheses,
then there will be more truth telling as a result.
2.7 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experimental design is based on a numeracy test of sufficient difficulty that
the majority of subjects were not able to correctly answer all questions in the al-
located time. Cheating was possible in the experiment as subjects were required
to pay themselves for their performance before turning in their assessment book-
lets along with the unclaimed proportion of their potential payment as they left the
laboratory.
Invitations to laboratory sessions were sent to potential subjects from a pool of
previously registered students at the university of Exeter using the ORSEE sys-
tem (Greiner 2015). Nine sessions were held over three separate days between
the 24 January and 31 January 2017. Thirty two subjects were invited to each of
the nine sessions, with an average show up rate of 89.6%.
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Before each session commenced, the thirty two desks in the laboratory were
pre-configured with the experimental materials. The set of items placed on each
desk was identical and consisted of a large clear plastic bag, a small white en-
velope containing twenty 20 pence coins, three pound coins and two white A4
envelopes, one marked with a letter A, the other marked with a letter B. An image
of the configuration of one of the desks is given in Figure B.1 in the Appendix.
Each of the desks was clearly labelled with a desk number, ranging from 1 to 32.
Upon entry to the laboratory, each subject was given a participant payment
receipt form, requested to draw a token revealing a number in the range 1-32 and
invited to sit at the desk labelled with the number drawn. Subjects were asked
to fill in their name on a blank payment form and sign it before the experimental
tasks began.
Subjects were then requested to take the booklet out of envelope A and the
instructions from the first page were read aloud. Full instructions for the experi-
ment are given in the Appendix. The instructions began that there was a £3 show
up fee for the experiment, and there may be an opportunity for subjects to make
more money through their decisions in the experiment. The instructions detailed
that subjects should not use their name or any other identifier on the lab materials
other than the payment form that they had already signed to ensure the anonymity
of responses. Subjects were informed that the experimenters would not examine
the payment receipts and that these were to be processed only by the university’s
finance team.
The instructions further stated that the experiment would be in two parts, the
first of which was a series of questions in a booklet attached to the instructions
sheet. Subjects were given ten minutes to complete the booklet, which contained
a section on personal characteristics, a question relating to the subject’s risk aver-
sion preferences, an inter-temporal investment decision and a cognitive reflection
test.
At the end of the ten minutes, subjects were asked to put the booklet for the
first part of the experiment to one side and open the second large A4 envelope
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marked with the letter B. Again the instructions from the first page of the booklet
were read out loud. The instructions for the second part of the experiment detailed
a numeracy test. Subjects were told that they were required to complete a series
of calculations of the form 3+5-2=. The instructions stated that subjects would be
given thirty seconds to complete as many out of a total of twenty calculations as
possible and that each solution would earn 20 pence. The instructions described
that at the end of the thirty seconds subjects were to check how many calcula-
tions they had answered and pay themselves accordingly from the envelope of
20 pence pieces on the desk. Subjects were then required to place the two book-
lets for the experimental tasks and the envelope containing any remaining coins
into the clear plastic bag and seal it. Subjects were also asked to complete the
payment form with the total amount for the experimental session, but to keep that
separate.
The instructions stated that upon completion of these tasks, subjects would
be free to leave, but were requested to place the clear plastic bag containing
experimental materials in the left hand box of two boxes, and the payment receipt
face down in a separate box by the door of the laboratory as they left.
Once the instructions had been read out, subjects were given thirty seconds
to complete the numeracy task, whereupon the instructions for processing the
experimental materials were repeated, the subjects were thanked for their time
and allowed to leave the laboratory.
Three initial sessions were run as a CONTROL. From these sessions, two val-
ues were found for the most common response by the subjects (measured in the
manner described in the next paragraph), with 18% of subjects reporting a value
of ten and a matching 18% reporting a value of twenty. These modal responses
from the CONTROL were selected for use in the treatment sessions. Three fur-
ther sessions were then performed for each of two additional treatments (leading
to a total of nine sessions) using one of the two modes from the initial control
treatment to set a reference point. In the first treatment, LOW, an additional line
was added to the instructions that stated:
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In previous sessions using this test one of the two most commonly
reported values was 10 questions.
In a second treatment, HIGH, an alternative line was added to the instructions
that stated:
In previous sessions using this test one of the two most commonly
reported values was 20 questions.
Upon completion of the experiment, the plastic envelopes returned by each
of the subjects were opened and the contents inspected. The number of coins
returned was counted and recorded and an implied figure of twenty minus the
number of coins returned was calculated as the score reported by a subject. The
numeracy test was marked and the number of questions attempted by a subject
as well as the number of solutions that were correct were recorded. Answers
from the booklet as to a subjects’ gender and their other choices made up the
complete base data set used.
The average earnings for the experiment were £5.79, for a task that lasted 30
minutes. The treatments are summarized in Table 2.1
Treatment Subjects % Male Description
CONTROL 88 36.6 No reference to previous sessions
LOW 82 47.6 Mode of CONTROL revealed as 10
HIGH 88 50.0 Mode of CONTROL revealed as 20
Table 2.1: Treatment overview
2.8 Results
2.8.1 Variables
The following discussion uses a number of terms to describe values recorded
from the experiment. The first is ReportedCalculations, which is the number of
calculations a subject paid themself for, as implied from the number of coins they
returned at the end of the session. A subject returning no coins therefore has a
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value for ReportedCalculations of 20. The second term is CorrectCalculations,
which is the number of calculations on the answer sheet a subject answered
correctly, as checked by the experimenter after the sessions. A third measure,
AttemptedCalculations, is the number of calculations a subject wrote an answer
for on the experimental booklet, whether the answer was correct or not.
Responses by subjects whereby the value of ReportedCalculations is greater
than the number of AttemptedCalculations, that is when subjects paid themselves
for calculations they did not attempt, are classified as reporting a Lie. Responses
by subjects where the value of ReportedCalculations is equal to or less than the
number of AttemptedCalculations but the value of ReportedCalculations is greater
than the number of CorrectCalculations are classified as a Misreport. This latter
category therefore covers responses that may arise due to deliberate cheating by
subjects or may arise due to genuine error in performing one or more calculations.
All responses where the value of ReportedCalculations is greater than the number
of CorrectCalculations are classified as a False report, encompassing both the Lie
and Misreport classifications.
A response classified as a Lie is an explicit act of cheating, a subject behaving
in this manner took money for questions they had attempted. The forms of be-
haviour underlying reports classified as Misreports are, however, more complex,
as the number and nature of the incorrect answers found varies. For instance,
in some cases it is enough that a subject answered a single question incorrectly,
most probably in error, for their response to be classified as a Misreport. How-
ever, a response whereby a subject wrote the same value for all the answers,
which would include a large number of incorrect solutions, would also be classi-
fied as a Misreport. Cases with a moderate proportion of incorrect answers are
also classified as a Misreport, though the intended behaviour of the subject may
be unclear. The observation of such behaviour has a parallel in studies of tax
evasion, where it is not always clear if non-compliance is a deliberate act or a
result of error (Andreoni et al. 1988).
In order to test the second hypothesis, the reporting space is compartmen-
81
talised into four quadrants by a series of dummy variables relating to the value of
the reference point set in the LOW treatment. The first of these dummy variables,
CCAR, takes a value of 1 when the number of CorrectCalculations is equal to or
greater than 10, otherwise the value is 0. The second, RCAR, takes the value
1 when ReportedCalculations is equal to or greater than 10, otherwise the value
is 0. These variables allow for specification of four regions within the reporting
space. The NE quadrant of the reporting space, as detailed in the hypotheses,
therefore refers to the region where CCAR=1 and RCAR=1.
The binary variable Male takes a value of 1 if a subject reported being male
and 0 otherwise. The term Age refers to the age reported by the subjects. The
variable Allocation is the subject’s choice for investment in the risky component
in the risk aversion measure of the first part of the experiment, Option details
their choice in the an inter-temporal investment decision and CRTCorrect is a
binary variable that takes the value 1 if the subjects response on the cognitive
reflection test was the correct value. The terms Extroversion, Agreeableness,
Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness and Openness refer to answers given on
a scale from 1 to 7 about the subjects degree of agreement with two statements
assessing their personality for each of these traits (Woods and Hampson 2005).
The pairs of statements used for this assessment are given in the Appendix. The
variables Economics, AccountingFinance and STEM take a value of 1 if a subject
stated that their course of study was economics, accounting and finance or part
of science, technology, engineering and maths respectively.
2.8.2 Methods
Non-parametric tests are two-sided unless stated as one-sided (1S) in relation to
a directional hypothesis. The primary response variable is ReportedCalculations,
which is censored on the right hand side by the maximum score on the numeracy
test of 20. The value for ReportedCalculations is also technically censored on the
left hand side at zero, but as no subject reported fewer than 5 calculations, left
censoring has no effect. Censored regressions were performed using a limiting
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value of 20 for the dependent variable reflecting the maximum possible score on
the numeracy test (Tobin 1958). The declaration by each subject (indexed by
i) is treated as an independent response. The censored regression model for





ReportedCalculationsi = ReportedCalculations∗i if ReportedCalculations
∗
i < 20
ReportedCalculationsi = 20 if ReportedCalculations∗i ≥ 20
ui ∼ N(o,σ2)
(2.14)
where the primary vector of explanatory variables consists of the main treatment
terms, the variables to separate the reporting space and the set of appropriate
interactions, as given by the following:
x′iβ = β0 + β1RCARi + β2CCARi + β3LOWi + β4LOWi ∗ RCARi
+ β5LOWi ∗ CCARi + β6HIGHi + β7HIGHi ∗ RRARi + β8HIGHi ∗ CCARi
+ β9CorrectCalculationsi + β10RCARi ∗ CorrectCalculationsi
+ β11CCARi ∗ CorrectCalculationsi + β12LOWi ∗ CorrectCalculationsi
+β13LOWi∗RCARi∗CorrectCalculationsi +β14LOWi∗CCARi∗CorrectCalculationsi
+ β15HIGHi ∗ CorrectCalculationsi + β16HIGHi ∗ RRARi ∗ CorrectCalculationsi
+ β17HIGHi ∗ CCARi ∗ CorrectCalculationsi
(2.15)
The coefficients of the regression relating to Equation 2.15 are the partial effects
with relation to the conditional mean of the latent variable. Regressions based
on Equation 2.15 are referred to as Model 1. Model specification tests using
each of the variables corresponding to responses in the questionnaire from the
first part of the experiment revealed a significant correlation between the subject’s
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choice and their gender. A second regression model (Model 2) adds an additional
regression term to Equation 2.15 for the variable Male. A third regression model
(Model 3) adds a term to the regression for each of the variables detailed in the
previous section.
A test for heteroskedasticity of the regression results revealed a correlation
between the generalised residuals of the censored regression and the value of
CorrectCalculations (Chesher and Irish 1987; Pagan and Vella 1989). An addi-
tional model (Model 4) uses an alternative form for the variance given by:
V{ui} = σ2{exp(α0 + α1 ∗ CorrectCalculationsi)}2 (2.16)
Model 5 utilises the heteroskedastic form of the variance given in Equation
2.16 and adds to variable Male to the regression Equation 2.15.
A multinomial logistic model can be used to examine a classification of sub-
jects’ reports (Nerlove and Press 1973). Let yi denote the classification of the
choice made by the subject i with some associated vector of observable charac-
teristics xi. The probability that a subject chooses a particular classification, j,
from the a set of classifications 0, 1 ... J is given by P(yi = j|xi). The multinomial
logistic model for the subjects choice can be expressed as the following:







To remove the indeterminacy in the model, a normalisation was conducted for
one of the subjects’ choices (Correct) such that the values are zero (β0 = 0). The
expression for the model can be rewritten as:









The base expression for the independent variables in the regression is formed
from the interactions of the value of CorrectCalculations and the treatment:
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x′iβj = βj0 + βj1CorrectCalculationsi + βj2LOWi + βj3HIGHi+
βj4CorrectCalculationsi ∗ LOWi + βj5CorrectCalculationsi ∗ HIGHi (2.19)
The model given in Equation 2.19 is referred to as Model L1. An extended
model for the regression further incorporates other variables relating to the per-
sonal characteristics of the subjects (Model L2). Greene (2010) proposes a
mechanism for addressing issues relating to the usage of hypotheses tests of
the coefficients of interaction effects in non-linear models raised by Ai and Norton
(2003). The approach to analysis suggested by Greene (2010) is to perform tests
relating to specification of the model prior to analysis, for which the author argues
that graphical presentations create an informative adjunct to any statistical analy-
sis. I adopt this recommended approach in the analysis of the results. The results
presented make extensive use of the post-estimation calculated propensities at
the integer values of CorrectCalculations. An overview of the approach used for
the analysis is given in Williams (2012). Results for the regressions performed
are presented in the Appendix.
2.8.3 Overview
Figure 2.5 displays the mean number of CorrectCalculations recorded in each
of the three treatments. There is no difference in the number of CorrectCalcu-
lations between the HIGH and LOW treatment (Mann-Whitney test (henceforth
MW) z = 0.003, p = 0.9975) though there is somewhat higher average number of
CorrectCalculations observed in the HIGH (MW: z = 1.705, p = 0.0882) and LOW
(MW: z = 1.65, p = 0.0987) treatments compared to the CONTROL, which sug-
gests that there may have been subjects with a greater degree of numeric ability
in these sessions. The number of subjects correctly answering twenty questions,
however, did not vary between the treatments (Fishers Exact Test (henceforth
FET): p = 1.000) with 5.68%, 4.88% and 4.55% of subjects answering all the
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Figure 2.5: Mean values of CorrectCalculations, AttemptedCal-
culations and ReportedCalculations
questions correctly in the CONTROL, LOW and HIGH treatments respectively.
Crucially, the number of CorrectCalcualtions did not fall and the observation of
slightly higher correct scores in the LOW and HIGH treatments compared to
CONTROL indicating that the presence of an additional sentence in the instruc-
tions relating to the scores of previous subjects did not negatively affect subject’s
performance on the test.
Figure 2.5 shows no difference in the number of AttemptedCalculations be-
tween the CONTROL and LOW treatments (MW: z = 1.53, p = 0.1228) or
between the LOW and HIGH treatments (MW: z = 1.072, p = 0.2836), how-
ever there is a difference observed between the CONTROL and HIGH treat-
ments (MW: z = 2.501, p = 0.0124). The figure also shows a higher number
of ReportedCalculations in the HIGH treatment compared to the LOW treatment
(MW: z = 1.821, p = 0.0686) and the CONTROL treatment (MW: z = 3.131,
p = 0.0017), though no difference between the LOW and CONTROL treatments
(MW: z = 1.598, p = 0.1099).
Figure 2.6 shows bubble plots of the number of ReportedCalculations against
the number of AttemptedCalculations (top row) and the number of CorrectCalcu-
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Figure 2.6: Bubble chart of ReportedCalculations by AttemptedCalculations and
by CorrectCalculations
lations (bottom row) for the three treatments. Lies can be identified by off-diagonal
bubbles in the plots in the top row, Misreports can be observed in the off-diagonal
bubbles in the plots in the bottom row.
The experimental procedures gave subjects an additional mechanism through
which they could cheat, in that at the end of allowed time for performing the
calculations when they were asked to count up how many questions they had
completed and pay themselves, subjects could have used some of this time to
answer additional questions. Cheating through such a manner would not be iden-
tified within this experiment. To this end, the experimenter remained in the room
throughout the experiment and no cases of subjects continuing to undertake cal-
culations were observed. The plots in Figure 2.6 also give evidence for little or no
cheating through this mechanism, as such behaviour would have lead to a higher
proportion of responses in the top right hand corner of the plots.
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2.8.4 Reported Value
Result 1 A proportion of the sample reported False values that were not the max-
imum value
The first hypothesis from the model predicts that some subjects will report
a False value that is not the maximum value. A comparison of the upper plot
against the lower plot for each column of Figure 2.6 reveals a markedly higher
proportion of subjects whose responses are classified as a Misreport compared
to those that are a Lie for all three treatments. 64.7% of all subjects’ responses
were classified as False, where 6.2% of responses were classified as a Lie and a
further 58.5% were classified as a Misreport. False values reported by subjects
that are not reports of the maximum value, can be identified as bubbles in the
lower panels of Figure 2.6 that lie above the diagonal but blow the line where
ReportedCalculations is equal to 20. 46.5% of all subjects were observed to
report values lying in this region.
Result 2 A higher level of False values were reported by subjects in the HIGH
treatment compared to the LOW treatment in the NW and NE quadrants of the
reporting space
The second hypothesis predicts a change in behaviour in reporting False val-
ues between the LOW and HIGH treatments in relation to the shift in the refer-
ence point. There is no significant difference in the proportion of subjects re-
porting a False value between the treatments (FET: p = 0.847), however Figure
2.6 clearly shows differences in the subjects’ responses between the HIGH and
LOW treatments. The results of the censored regression detailed in Equation
2.15 are given in Table B.1 in the Appendix and illustrated in Figure 2.7, which
shows the estimated regression plots for the LOW and HIGH treatments in the
three key quadrants of the reporting space. Results for the statistical tests of the
joint hypotheses that both the intercept and slope are equal between the LOW
and HIGH treatments in each of the quadrants are illustrated in Figure 2.7 and
detailed in Table 2.2. As noted in the methods section, there was a considerable
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Figure 2.7: Illustration of results for censored regression of CorrectCalculations
on ReportedCalculations
2
degree of heteroskedasticity found in the regression results. As the presence of
heteroskedasticity will bias the estimators calculated by a censored regression
(Pagan and Vella 1989), a further regression with an additional term to represent
the heteroskedasticity was also performed. The results, given in Table B.1 in the
Appendix are not significantly altered.
Quadrant Region Model 1 Model 3




NW CorrectCalculations < 10,
ReportedCalculations
≥ 10
p=0.0097 *** p=0.0227 **
NE CorrectCalculations ≥ 10,
ReportedCalculations
≥ 10
p=0.0090 *** p=0.0423 **
Table 2.2: Results for joint test of difference of intercept and slope
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Figure 2.7 illustrates two key points in relation to the second of the hypotheses.
The first is that there is no significant difference in behaviour between the LOW
and HIGH treatments in the SW quadrant, that is for subjects with a value of less
than 10 for both CorrectCalculations and ReportedCalculations. The bubble plots
of Figure 2.6 illustrate a pattern of a mixture of correct reporting and small levels
of misreporting in the SW quadrant of the reporting space consistent with the
regression results of Figure 2.7. The second key point is that there is a significant
difference in the value reported between the treatments in both the NW and NE
quadrants.
In the NW quadrant, the high intercepts and negative slopes observed in both
treatments arise from a proportion of subjects who report the maximum value for
very low values of CorrectCalculations combining with those who report slightly
above the number of CorrectCalculations for a value of CorrectCalculations just
under 10. The less negative slope found for the HIGH treatment relative to the
LOW treatment in the NW quadrant indicates that there is more Misreporting as
the value of CorrectCalculations rises to 10 in the HIGH treatment compared to
the LOW treatment. For the NE quadrant, the larger intercept and lower slope
calculated for the HIGH treatment compared to the LOW treatment are indicative
of larger false values being misreported in the HIGH treatment.
Table 2.3 shows that the proportions of the sample observed in each of the
quadrants are very similar between the LOW and HIGH treatments, indicating that
the patterns observed in the regression are due to differences in behaviour within
the quadrants rather than arising due to subjects moving responses between the
quadrants. The values for the CONTROL treatment are shifted slightly to the SW
and NW quadrants, reflecting the slightly lower number of CorrectCalculations
under this treatment, as demonstrated in Figure 2.5.
Quadrant CONTROL LOW HIGH
SW 23.9% 14.6% 11.4%
NW 29.5% 26.8% 26.1%
NE 46.6% 58.5% 62.5%
Table 2.3: Proportion of sample observed in reporting quadrants
A generalised residuals test for misspecification (Chesher and Irish 1987; Pa-
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gan and Vella 1989) indicates that the subject’s gender does have a significant
role in the regression. Table B.1 shows that differences reported are reasonably
robust to the addition of gender and the other information recorded about the
subjects. A further test for heteroskedasticity also revealed an issue with residu-
als found to be correlated to the value of CorrectCalculations. Table B.1 further
shows that the results are robust to an extended censored regression using the
expression given in 2.16 to model the heteroskedasticity.
2.8.5 Classifications
The final two hypotheses propose expected behaviour in relation to the reporting
of particular values, namely the maximum value and the correct value. Subjects’
responses were classified into one of a number of types relating to if they reported
the maximum value, the correct value or some value in between. Details of the
classifications used are given in Table 2.4, which shows that the categories of
Lie and Misreport described in the previous section could be further subdivided
according to subjects who reported the maximum value falsely (that is Reported-
Calculations=20 but CorrectCalculations<20), whereby the response is classified
with the prefix Full and those who reported a false value that was not the max-
imum value, which are classified with the prefix Partial. Responses by subjects
who reported the number of questions they had solved correctly on the numer-
acy test are classified as Correct and the small number of subjects (1.2%) who




FullLie ReportedCalculations=20 > AttemptedCalcula-
tions
PartialLie 20 > ReportedCalculations > AttemptedCalcu-
lations
FullMisreport ReportedCalculations=20 = AttemptedCalcula-
tions > CorrectCalculations
PartialMisreport 20 > ReportedCalculations ≤ AttemptedCalcu-
lations; ReportedCalculations > CorrectCalcula-
tions
Correct ReportedCalculations = AtteptedCalculations =
CorrectCalculations
UnderReport ReportedCalculations < CorrectCalculations
Table 2.4: Response Classifications
In terms of False reporting, the classifications of FullLie or a FullMisreport can
be combined to form a further classification of FullFalse. Similarly, the classifica-
tions of PartialLie and PartialMisreport can be combined to form a classification
of PartialFalse reports.
Figure 2.8 shows the proportion of subjects’ responses by classification for
each of the treatments. The following subsections detail a number of the differ-
ences in the proportions reporting by classification between the treatments visible
in the Figure. As the proportion of subjects found to be under-reporting is small
and the extent to which those under reporting did so is negligible, responses orig-
inally classified as an UnderReport are re-classified as Correct in the following
discussion.
Result 3 A higher proportion of subjects where observed to report a FullLie in
the HIGH treatment compared to the LOW treatment
6.2% of all subjects were classified as reporting a Lie, with a significantly
higher level of Lies found in the HIGH (11.4%) treatment compared to the CON-
TROL (2.3%) treatment (FET: p = 0.032), though not compared to the LOW
(4.9%) treatment (FET: p = 0.165). A significantly higher proportion of subjects
(8.0%) were observed to have reported a FullLie in the HIGH treatment compared
to there being no subjects seen to behave in this manner in the LOW treatment
(FET:1S p = 0.009) and the CONTROL treatment (FET: p = 0.014).
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Figure 2.8: Proportion of subjects reporting in each of the classi-
fications
Result 4 A higher proportion of subjects where observed to report a FullMisre-
port in the HIGH treatment compared to the LOW treatment
There are no differences in the proportion of subjects’ responses categorised
as a Misreport between the treatments (FET: p = 0.443). There is, however, a sig-
nificant difference in the proportion of subjects’ responses classified as a FullMis-
report, with 22.7% of subjects in the HIGH treatment reporting in this manner
compared to 11.0% in the LOW treatment (FET:1S p = 0.033). The observation
of higher proportions of subjects’ responses that are a FullLie or a FullMisreport
in the HIGH treatment compared to the LOW treatment leads to the conclusion
that there will be a higher proportion of FullFalse values in the HIGH treatment,
detailed by the following result.
Result 5 A higher proportion of subjects reported a FullFalse value in the HIGH
treatment compared to the LOW treatment. The calculated propensity to report a
FullFalse value is greater in the HIGH treatment for values of CorrectCalculations
above 7
30.7% of subjects reported a FullFalse value in the HIGH treatment compared
to 11.0% in the LOW treatment (FET:1S p = 0.001). The results of the multino-
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Figure 2.9: Propensity of subjects to report a value classified as
FullFalse
mial logistic regression detailed in Equation 2.19 for the classifications FullFalse,
PartialFalse and Correct are given in Table B.3 in the Appendix. The calculated
propensity for subjects to report a FullFalse value by the level of the CorrectCal-
culations for each of the treatments is illustrated in Figure 2.9. Statistical tests
for the contrast in propensity are given in Table B.4 in the Appendix. The results
show that there is a higher propensity to report a FullFalse value in the HIGH
treatment compared to the LOW treatment for a number of CorrectCalculations in
excess of 7.
The proportion of subjects reporting a Correct value is similar in the CON-
TROL treatment (34.1%) to the LOW treatment (36.6%) and the HIGH treatment
(31.8%), and the difference between the LOW and HIGH treatments is not signif-
icant (FET:1S p = 0.311). This finding is evidence against the fourth hypothesis.
Figure 2.10, however, illustrates there is a higher propensity to report a Correct
value in the LOW treatment compared to the HIGH treatment for values of Cor-
recCalculations in excess of 16. Table B.5 in the Appendix shows results for
statistical tests of the contrast in propensity. This result suggests that subjects’
behaviour may be consistent with the fourth hypothesis, but only for high values
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Figure 2.10: Propensity of subjects to report a value classified as
Correct
of CorrectCalculations that mean the overall sample test does not report them.
A similar proportion of responses made by subjects were classified as a Par-
tialFalse value in the CONTROL (53.4%) and LOW (51.2%) treatments. A lower
proportion of the responses made by subjects in the HIGH treatment (35.2%)
were classified as a PartialFalse value (FET: p = 0.044 compared to LOW treat-
ment). Figure 2.11 illustrates the calculated propensity to report a PartialFalse
value by the number of CorrectCalculations in the three treatments. There is an
increased propensity to report a PartialFalse value in the LOW treatment com-
pared to the HIGH treatment for scores of CorrectCalculations between 5 and 13,
as demonstrated by statistical tests of the contrast in propensity shown in Table
B.6 in the Appendix.
2.8.6 Behaviour
A key feature of the results is the difference between the proportion of subjects
whose responses were classified as a Lie (6.2%) the those classified as a False
value (64.7%), the difference being the proportion of responses classified as a
Misreport. The bottom row of panels of the bubble plots presented in Figure
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Figure 2.11: Propensity of subjects to report a value classified as
PartialFalse
2.6 suggest a number of different types of behaviour by subjects who were clas-
sified as misreporting, in particular some subjects reported highly inflated val-
ues, others reported intermediate values while others only misreported by a small
amount. The following section seeks to further examine the nature of misreport-
ing by the subjects.
The answer sheets submitted by subjects were coded independently by two
experimenters according to the behaviour used to complete the experiment. Three
major categories were identified, the first of which, DeliberateCheating, was com-
prised of a number of minor categories. Subjects were judged to have deliberately
cheated in one of three ways. The first mechanism identified for cheating was sim-
ple overstating of the number of calculations attempted (Overstating), correlating
to the reporting a Lie in the previous sections. The second mechanism was the
use of random numbers not related to the actual calculations being undertaken
(RandomNumbers). The third mechanism was to make a deliberate error, typi-
cally in the form of a single response to calculations, or a incremental sequence
used to complete the solutions sheet (DeliberateError). The second major be-
havioural category identified was Correct, whereby subjects reported the number
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(a) Proportion of sample categorised by
major behaviour
(b) Proporion of subjects regarded De-
liberateCheating categorised by minor
behaviour
Figure 2.12: Behavioural characterisation of answer booklets
of calculations they had answered correctly. The third major category identified
was CalculationError, whereby subjects answered a small number of calculations
incorrectly, typically with values close to the actual correct answer. In a small
number of cases the categorisations by the experimenters differed, in particular
between DelibderateCheating through RandomNumbers and CalculationError. In
such cases, the results presented err on the side of caution and use the category
of CalculationError for such responses.
Result 6 The proportion of subjects’ answer sheets categorised as Deliberat-
eCheating is greater in the HIGH treatment than the LOW. The proportions of
subjects reporting by each of the three identified mechanisms for cheating are
the same between the HIGH and LOW treatments
Figure 2.12a shows there are no differences in the proportions of responses
assigned to the Correct category, in keeping with the results presented in the pre-
vious section. It is also important to check the HIGH treatment does not have an
effect on which values are reported correctly. There are no differences observed
for the median of the scores conditional on subjects being allocated to the Correct
category between the HIGH and LOW treatment (MW: z = 1.116, p = 0.2645) or
in the distribution of the values of the CorrectCalculations (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
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test: p = 0.527). This suggests that there is no particular impact on the behaviour
of those reporting in a manner classified as Correct between the treatments.
There is a significant increase in the proportion of answer sheets assigned to
the DeliberateError category between the HIGH treatment and the LOW treatment
(FET: p = 0.022) and the CONTROL treatment (FET: p = 0.022).
The observation that there is no difference in the proportion of subjects whose
response was categorised as Correct and no alteration in the distribution of the
Correct responses between the LOW and HIGH treatments suggest that the ma-
jor difference is in a switch of behaviour for a proportion of the subjects whose
responses were categorised as a CalculationError in the LOW treatment to out-
comes that were categorised as DeliberateCheating in the HIGH treatment. The
higher propensity to report a PartialFalse value in the LOW treatment for interme-
diate values of CorrectCalculations compared to the HIGH treatment illustrated
in Figure 2.11 relates to the greater level of answer sheets classified as Calcula-
tionError in the LOW treatment. This change in the pattern of reports suggests
that the errors being made are not simply random and that the classification of
CalculationError is an over estimate of the number of subjects making errors as
it masks some subjects who were cheating at low levels, particularly in writing
incorrect answers for harder problems or as the time pressure of the test came to
bear. However as subjects were able to attempt the questions in any order they
choose, and some clearly started from the bottom rather than the top, it would
require a further level of subjective opinion as to which order a subject attempted
the questions to gauge any such effect. Further research should include a control
for the estimation of error rates, such as the removal of an incentive to cheat by
having the experimenter mark and pay the subjects for the test.
Figure 2.12b shows the proportions of subjects’ answers sheets that were
assigned as DeliberateError for each of the minor categories identified as the
manner by which subjects cheated. Interestingly while cheating was markedly
increased in the HIGH treatment, the proportions of subjects among those cheat-
ing that were categorised to be deliberately cheating though any one of the three
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methods identified remained the same between the HIGH and LOW treatments.
This suggests that alteration of the reference point did not serve as a trigger for
a particular form of cheating, but merely to increase the incidence of each of the
various mechanisms identified.
One particular behaviour that was observed on the answer sheets was sub-
jects who cheated by reporting the maximum value while making no serious at-
tempt at the numeracy test given to them in the experiment, other than to fill in the
answer sheet with mostly random numbers or an incremental pattern. The propor-
tion of subjects engaged in such maximal DeliberateCheating, that is exhibiting a
pattern of ReportedCalclulations equal to AttemptedCalculations equal to 20 with
a value for CorrectCalculations of 5 or fewer, is consistent over the treatments at
6.8%, 8.5% and 9.1% in the CONTROL, LOW and HIGH treatments. The simi-
larity of these proportions between treatments indicates that the individuals who
were prepared to act in this way were not affected by the reference point, consis-
tent with agents in the model who have little or no cost of lying from either of the
terms in the utility function. Subjects who reported in this manner are responsible
for the high intercepts and negative slopes observed for the regression results of
the NW quadrant in Figure 2.7.
2.8.7 The Effect of Gender
Dreber and Johannesson (2008) report that men were significantly more likely
to lie in a sender-receiver game, though other authors have failed to detect such
effects in similar experiments (Childs 2012; Gylfason et al. 2013). While the model
presented here makes no prediction in relation to gender, subjects were asked to
state their gender along with a number of other personal characteristics in the first
part of the experiment in order to be used as controls.
The censored regression of the value reported by subjects shows a strong
positive effect from being male (p = 0.007) when only gender is added (Model
2), though while a positive effect remains after the other terms of Model 3 are
added, the observed effect is weaker (p = 0.055). There is a strong positive
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effect on the propensity to report a FullFalse value associated with being male
(p = 0.016). Males reported a value classified as FullFalse value significantly
more than females when considered across all treatments (FET: p = 0.001), with
this difference most pronounced in the CONTROL treatment (FET: p = 0.002),
though less so in the LOW treatment (FET: p = 0.078) and not significantly in the
HIGH treatment (FET: p = 0.165).
2.9 Discussion
The aim of the study presented in this chapter was to propose and examine a
model as to how people lie. The theory proposed contains two psychological
costs, the first being an intrinsic measure that increases with the size of the lie
being told, the second being a measure that increases with deviation above a
reference point, representing additional disutility from reporting a value in excess
of a perceived average or norm that may relate to a preference for the appearance
of honesty, a concern for the credibility of the value being reported a desire not to
appear boastful. The experimental results provide evidence consistent with the
predictions of the model, that as well as reporting partial false values, a portion of
subjects were observed to lie more in the treatment with a HIGH reference point
compared to a LOW one.
The intuition of the key result is simple, the higher value of the reference point
in the HIGH treatment served to make lying more acceptable for some subjects
than in the case where the lower value was used. There are a number of potential
reasons as to why the alternative reference point of the HIGH treatment may
have changed subjects’ behaviour. The statement that one of the previous most
common reported values in previous sessions was twenty may have lead subjects
to believe that a high proportion of subjects had cheated in the previous sessions,
potentially indicating that cheating was possible, that cheating had occurred at a
significant level or a combination of both in that cheating was possible and had
occurred at a significant level. The information may therefore have served to
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reduce some subject’s cost of lying by indicating the presence of the opportunity
to cheat and (or) an existing norm of cheating in the experiment. This change in
behaviour is inconsistent with a model for lying aversion containing only a cost in
terms of the size of the lie.
The theory allows for a number of different types that exhibit varied behaviour
in response to a change in the underlying state or a change in the reference point.
As noted in the hypotheses section it is not possible in the experimental design
used here to test for the type of a subject, but it is still possible to examine if the
observed behaviour is consistent with the types suggested by the model.
A dishonest agent who has little or no cost of lying is expected to always
report the maximum and this will not vary with treatment. The results find a com-
mon proportion of subjects in each of the treatments who make little effort in the
experiment and always report the maximum value suggestive of such dishonest
agents. An honest agent who has a high cost in terms of the size of the lie and
a relatively low cost in terms of deviation from the reference point should report
correctly in all treatments. The common rate of correct reporting observed for the
three treatments suggests that there is some proportion of subjects who conform
to this behaviour.
The model predicts that moderate agents with a low cost in terms of the size
of the lie (such that they would be prepared to tell a lie) but a relatively high cost
in terms of deviation from the reference point should report a lie that will decline
in its extent as the realised state increases. Furthermore, such an agent will in-
crease the values they report (for a given state) in the HIGH treatment compared
to the LOW. The observed increase in the proportion of subjects reporting the
maximum value in the HIGH treatment compared to the LOW treatment is con-
sistent with this prediction. Furthermore the higher proportion of subjects found
to be reporting a PartialFalse value in the LOW treatment compared to the HIGH
treatment for intermediate values of the number of CorrectCalculations is indica-
tive of such a moderate type. Indeed it is the change in behaviour of subjects of
this type between the two treatments that gives rise to main result.
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Interestingly the result in this chapter is different to that of Mazar et al. (2008)
who found no difference when setting different reference points in an experiment
based on self-reporting values for completion of a matrix test. It may be that their
choices of previous average scores (four and eight) were insufficiently different to
trigger an observable effect given that they could not observe individual cheating
and found a very low proportion of subjects reporting the maximum value.
A key difference to other studies of the work presented in this chapter is the
endogenous attribution of the realised states through the use of a numeracy test
rather than through an exogenous lottery. The primary driver for this design fea-
ture was to make the subjects’ decision relate to a self-generated value rather
than one randomly assigned to them. A secondary feature is that the experiment
is able to observe cheating at an individual level. The ability to record individual
responses lead to the observation of a rich pattern in the different manners in
which subjects cheated, from the deliberate and obvious, putting the same value
for all twenty answers, to the much more subtle, putting correct answers to the
first ten questions but then random numbers for a further five. While there is ev-
idence that people cheat more and in different ways when the realised state is
unobserved by the experimenter (Abeler et al. 2016; Hao and Houser 2017), the
results presented here give further insight into some of the psychological mech-
anisms of cheating. The experimental design represents a key innovation of the
chapter, in that future studies may use it to further examine dishonesty under the
condition where the intention of the response is ambiguous.
The additional cost in terms of the deviation from the reference point repre-
sents the primary innovation of the model offered in this chapter. In a recent
work, Abeler et al. (2016) proposed a number of models and concluded that one
with both a cost in terms of the size of the lie and for a preference for appearing
honest was consistent with experimental results. Such a model is also consistent
with the experimental results presented here. The major difference is that the
model detailed in this chapter does not explicitly model a preference for appear-
ing honest, but rather includes a psychological term to reflect how a social norm
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or an agreed mode of behaviour may serve as an additional cost affecting an in-
dividual’s decision. As described in the introduction, such considerations may be
thought of as a preference for appearing honest or as a regard for the credibility
of the value being reported. The chapter does not examine the causes of the
cost in terms of deviation from the reference point, but simply investigates if such
a model is consistent with experimental results. The chapter therefore does not
attempt to address the different interpretations of the reference point in relation
to a preference for appearing honest, the credibility of the reported value or a
disutilty from boasting. Future work should therefore further examine the nature
of the roles of a reputation for being seen to be honest and of the credibility of a
lie in people’s decisions when telling lies.
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Chapter 3
An Experimental Examination of
Lying in Different Sample Subject
Pools
3.1 Introduction
A number of experiments have been conducted which demonstrate that the ex-
tent of a subject’s honesty varies according to the context. Variation in the relative
payoff to a subject with an opportunity to lie to that of the person affected has
been observed to cause different proportions of subjects to report falsely (Erat
and Gneezy 2012). Similarly, a greater propensity to lie has been observed un-
der conditions where the intension of the act of lying could be viewed as less
transparent (Hao and Houser 2017; Jiang 2013). The degree of social contact
between subjects in an experiment has also been witnessed to be an important
factor in the decision to report honestly, whereby some subjects were less likely
to lie to friends compared to strangers (Chakravarty et al. 2011).
The experiments conducted in each of the studies cited in the previous para-
graph involved a sample consisting of students attending a laboratory. Economics
experiments are often conducted in a laboratory using student subjects as this
method gives the researcher control over the environment and a convenient sub-
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ject pool (Frechette 2016). However the use of students as subjects can be re-
strictive and a number of arguments have been made for extra-laboratory meth-
ods including the use of a more representative sample to increase external validity
and to address issues of subject self-selection into experiments (Charness et al.
2013; Harrison and List 2004).
Recently, researchers have examined the potential role for burgeoning on-line
labour markets such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) service to serve as a
source of subjects for economic experiments (Charness et al. 2013; Horton et
al. 2011; Paolacci et al. 2010). There is evidence to suggest that such labour
services mitigate two of the largest barriers to the widespread use of on-line ex-
periments, the requirement to be able recruit and securely pay subjects and to
ensure the internal validity of the experiment. The use of such services may be of
great benefit to the field of experimental economics as they offer experimentalists
the opportunity to recruit a low cost alternative to students that is potentially far
more convenient and representative (Paolacci et al. 2010).
The use of different subject pools to examine behaviour has a long history in
experimental economics (Frechette 2016). Many behaviours have been found to
replicate between pools and some others can be replicated by exposure to the
appropriate market. Confidence in the transferability of outcomes is even greater
when considering treatment effects rather than point estimates (Frechette 2016).
The availability of potential subjects through on-line labour services such as AMT
has further driven studies to compare subject pools (Bartneck et al. 2015; Ex-
adaktylos et al. 2013; Horton et al. 2011; Paolacci et al. 2010; Peer et al. 2014).
Initial evidence suggests that there is little difference in responses between stu-
dents and workers recruited from AMT in classic studies such as framing effects
and simple games (Horton et al. 2011; Paolacci et al. 2010), though there is some
evidence for a requirement to filter for subject understanding of the experiment
(Horton et al. 2011).
The experimental context may well, however, be somewhat different for a
worker through an on-line labour provision service rather than a typical student
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and, as described in the first paragraph, context can be an important factor in
the decision to lie. One key difference may arise through the role of the worker’s
reputation, in the sense of the percentage of employer approved tasks previously
undertaken by a worker. The rate of previously approved tasks is available as
a filter to recruiters on the AMT system, such that unapproved work may serve
to damage a workers reputation in that it may reduce their eligibility for future
tasks (Kees et al. 2017; Peer et al. 2014). Indeed, Peer et al. (2014) present
results demonstrating that high reputation workers produce higher quality data,
proposing that researchers should use a cut-off based on the task approval rate
for recruitment. A desire to maintain the value of their reputation may therefore
affect AMT workers’ decision making processes in an experiment differently to
students. While there is little evidence for differences between subject pools and
AMT workers in the outcomes for standard economic experiments, there is an
open question as to whether such concerns for reputation may have an effect in
a context where a subject has to make a moral decision such as whether or not
to lie. It may be that a moral task constitutes a different form of decision for sub-
jects recruited from a labour service than from a pre-registered pool of potential
experimental participants.
The sender-receiver game forms the basis of one of the main mechanisms by
which lying aversion has been examined (Erat and Gneezy 2012; Gneezy 2005;
Gneezy et al. 2013). The experimental design involves the revelation of some
state from among a set of states to one of two players, the sender, who must
then send a message to the second player, the receiver, about the state. The
message transmitted may or may not be truthful and the payoffs to each of the
players may vary with the content of the message or some action chosen by the
receiver after receiving the sender’s message. A key design element of sender-
receiver games is that while the party affected by the lie (the receiver) need not
know whether the party with the potential to lie (the sender) has stated the truth
or not ex post, the experimenter does observe the true state and the message
of the sender. This feature contrasts to an alternative class of designs for the
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examination of lying where the experimenter does not observe an individual’s
actions, but compares sample outcomes to theoretical predictions or alternative
treatments (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013; Mazar et al. 2008). Experiments
with a design based on the sender-receiver game have an advantage in that the
experimenter can observe and analyse individual lies. There is some evidence,
however, that this advantage to the experimenter is offset to some degree by
an effect on behaviour arising from the design, as evidenced by differences in
behaviour detected for identical lotteries between subjects whose decisions were
observed to those who were not (Abeler et al. 2016; Gneezy et al. 2016).
This chapter describes an on-line implementation of a sender-receiver game
undertaken by separate subject pools of undergraduate students and of workers
recruited through the AMT system. This study is not the first to perform a sender-
receiver game with AMT subjects, as Biziou-van-Pol et al. (2015) conduct such
a task as part of their investigation into the relationship between lying behaviour
and pro-social preferences. The aims of the experiment presented in this chapter
are, however, somewhat different. The first aim of the investigation is to examine
if there are substantial differences between the reporting behaviour observed for
the two samples. This chapter is the first to present results detailing a compari-
son of different subject pools undertaking a sender-receiver game. The second
objective of the chapter seeks to examine if subject responses are altered by a
change in the distribution of states underlying the sender-receiver game through
a treatment that places a higher probability on lower values. This second objec-
tive parallels treatments recently described in Abeler et al. (2016) and Gneezy
et al. (2016), who detail self-reports of unobserved lottery draws by subjects with
different distributions of payoff values. The difference in the approach used in this
chapter is that the draw presented to the subjects is observed. A further key differ-
ence to previous studies using the sender-receiver game to investigate deception
(Biziou-van-Pol et al. 2015; Erat and Gneezy 2012; Gneezy 2005; Gneezy et al.
2013) is an expansion of the size of the set of states used from 2 or 6 to 100, an
innovation also investigated in Gneezy et al. (2016).
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The chapter makes two methodological contributions. The first contribution
is to quantify differences in behaviour between a standard undergraduate subject
pool and and an AMT worker pool in a simple online deception game. The second
contribution pertains to the extent the subjects engage with and understand the
task, particularly the experimental instructions, and how that leads to decisions
that be attributed to confusion, as opposed to non-standard preferences (Akiaya
et al. 2017; Andreoni 1995; Houser and Kurzban 2002).
3.2 Literature
In many economics experiments, subjects are invited to a session in a laboratory
from a pool of people who have pre-registered to take part in experiments, often
using the system ORSEE (Greiner 2015). These subject pools typically consist
of students from the university of the researcher(s). However two major concerns
have been raised in relation to the use of pools of students as subjects for ex-
periments (Harrison and List 2004). The first issue is that such pools consist of
people who have volunteered to undertake experiments, such that there is some
degree of self selection. The second concern is that the pool consists of students
who may not be representative of a wider population. Frechette (2016) surveys
a number of studies conducted with subject pools that differ from that typically
used comprising of student subjects including animals, children, representative
samples and professionals. The author draws a general conclusion that results
carry over between different groups with a number of exceptions to this rule.
A number of papers address the issue of self-selection of subjects by volun-
teering to take part in experiments (Anderson et al. 2013; Cleave et al. 2013; Falk
et al. 2013; Slonim et al. 2013). There are potentially two competing reasons as
to why such self-selection may form an issue (Falk et al. 2013). Potential sub-
jects may be driven by the payments on offer and therefore be more self-serving
than the more general population. Alternatively, the possible participants may
have a desire to assist with the research being conducted and therefore be more
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pro-social than the general population.
Falk et al. (2013) compare the charitable donations of students made before
arrival at a university with their decisions to undertake experiments in the labora-
tory. The authors report no significant relationship between the student’s charita-
ble giving and their participation in experiments. Cleave et al. (2013) examine the
risk and social preferences of a first year undergraduate class among those who
subsequently attend laboratory experiments and those who do not. The results
show no relationship between social preferences or risk attitude and attendance
at experimental sessions, though a significant relationship between the amount
sent in a trust game and a lower propensity to attend experiments suggests that
the extent of pro-social behaviour in the lab may be less than in the population.
Slonim et al. (2013) report a similar experiment recording a number of survey re-
sponses as well as experimental decisions and report that participants who had
lower income, more leisure time, more interest in economics and were more pro-
social on the dimension of volunteering time were more likely to participate in
experiments. Anderson et al. (2013) further report a similar result in a compari-
son of pro-social preferences between a typical sample of university students and
trainee truckers recruited within a residential training program.
Further papers, or other sections of some of the papers detailed above, seek
to examine the question as to whether typical student subjects exhibit the same
behaviours as a wider, more representative, sample over a number of different
economic decisions. A primary category of interest has been social preferences.
Bellemare and Kröger (2007) examine social capital, as measured by choices in
a trust game, and report that the student sample serves to form a lower bound on
the degree of pro-social preferences, a result that is also reported in Falk et al.
(2013). Differences in pro-social behaviour between a community group and stu-
dents, as recorded in a representative dictator game with a charitable donation,
are also presented by Carpenter et al. (2008), where members of the community
group are reported to be significantly more pro-social than the students. Cappe-
len et al. (2015) detail similar findings using a dictator game and a trust game
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between students and a representative sample of the Norwegian population and
the same pattern of lower pro-social behaviour is also reported between a sample
of self-selected students and one of self-selected adults in Anderson et al. (2013).
Other studies have examined for differences in risk attitude and inter-temporal
preferences (Andersen et al. 2010; Gaudecker et al. 2012), in co-ordination through
public goods games (Bortolotti et al. 2015; Gächter et al. 2004) or the prisoner’s
dilemma (Bigoni et al. 2013), in depth of reasoning in beauty contests (Bosch-
Domènech et al. 2002) and for differences in bidding behaviour in auctions (De-
positario et al. 2009). Belot et al. (2015) provide evidence of consistent out-
comes for a similar set of games with inexperienced samples of students and
non-students and conclude that results based on student samples are likely to
over-estimate the extent of selfish and rational behaviour in the wider population.
An alternative set of investigations, focusing on whether the choices of stu-
dents differ from those with professional experience, particularly in a domain rel-
evant to the choice under examination, are reviewed in Frechette (2015). Ex-
perience of a particular domain, rather than expertise, may also have an effect
on choice. One area of research where students typically have little experience
compared to the wider population is in tax filing, such that researchers have in-
vestigated the differences between student and non-student sample pools is tax
compliance (Alm et al. 2015; Choo et al. 2016). Alm et al. (2015) report no signifi-
cant differences between student and non-student subject pools other than where
specific external experience of a treatment feature may have a role. Choo et al.
(2016) on the other hand report higher levels of compliance in taxpayer samples
compared to a sample of students which they attribute to the application of norms
of compliance from outside the laboratory. The lower degree of non-compliance
observed among taxpayers compared to students in Choo et al. (2016) reveals
that the context may have different effects on different samples when making
moral choices.
In a paper examining lying, Abeler et al. (2014) compare responses in a 4
coin flip task where subjects were paid 5 EUR for each tail flip reported over the
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telephone between members of the German public at home and students from
a German university in the laboratory. Students in the laboratory reported sig-
nificantly more tails then the members of the public. Results among the student
sample were similar in a further treatment where they were required to submit
their value through a computer. Ruffle and Tobol (2017) report on lying behaviour
among a sample more representative of the general population that students us-
ing current and former members of the Israel Defence Force in a self-reported
dice roll task. The authors detail a correlation between a lower tendency to over-
report the value of the die with higher scores on tests of cognitive ability.
Two key elements of the literature discussed in the previous paragraphs are
the mechanism by which the non-standard sample was recruited and way in which
the experiment was conducted. Among the papers cited, a number of different
methods for recruitment were utilised, including contact with a suitable employer
(Burks et al. 2009), attachment to established surveys (Bellemare et al. 2008),
the use of market research firms (Choo et al. 2016), extending laboratory sign
ups to non-students at a campus (Alm et al. 2015), newspaper articles (Bosch-
Domènech et al. 2002) and the use of e-mail and advertisements (Belot et al.
2015). Methods for conducing the experiment included calling subjects into the
laboratory, establishing local laboratories in hotels (Andersen et al. 2010), tele-
phone calls (Abeler et al. 2014), utilising sessions on training courses (Burks et
al. 2009) and conducting experiments on-line (Choo et al. 2016). The time and
financial cost of such methods, typically allied to the higher experimental cost of
incentive payments due to the higher opportunity costs of non-student subjects,
from part of the rational for why student subjects are typically used.
Recent technological advances have, however, produced on-line labour mar-
kets that offer a low cost, highly scalable and potentially more representative
sample to researchers (Horton et al. 2011). Services such as AMT offer the
advantage of addressing a number of difficulties and concerns around using on-
line experiments, in particular in relation to the recruitment of subjects, making
secure payments to them and ensuring the internal validity of the experiment.
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Paolacci et al. (2010) detail an experiment comparing survey responses to three
common tasks from the heuristics and biases literature among samples of stu-
dent subjects recruited through a laboratory, AMT workers and subjects recruited
through internet message boards. The results show that responses did not differ
significantly between the pools and errors in responses were lower for subjects
recited through AMT then through internet discussion boards. Demographic data
suggests that AMT workers are more representative of the U.S. population than
student sample pools (Paolacci et al. 2010). Horton et al. (2011) report results
for a number of investigations conducted using AMT workers, notably that prim-
ing and framing produce effects consistent with findings from the laboratory. In
addition the authors compare choices from a prisoner’s dilemma conducted with
AMT workers to those of students in a laboratory and find the selections do not
differ, especially when subjects who failed a comprehension test are excluded.
The over-communication of truthful messages compared to equilibrium pre-
dictions has been observed in a number of experimental studies of the sender-
receiver game (Cai and Wang 2006; Sánchez-Páges and Vorsatz 2007; Wang et
al. 2010). An aversion to lying was observed through the different propensity for
choices over the same pairs of payoffs between a sender-receiver game a dicta-
tor game where the higher payoff to the sender required sending a message that
was untrue to the receiver (Gneezy 2005). Sánchez-Páges and Vorsatz (2009)
demonstrate that lying aversion is due to a desire not to lie rather than a prefer-
ence for telling the truth. Evidence for pure lie aversion, rather than arising from
beliefs is presented by López-Pérez and Spiegelman (2013). Erat and Gneezy
(2012) demonstrate that the propensity to report a false value is a function both
of the sender’s own and the receiver’s payoff, and produce a classification of lies
in terms of the benefit or harm both to the sender and the receiver. Gneezy
et al. (2013) describe results that highlight different types of subject who report
honestly for some values of realised state, but report falsely for others.
Biziou-van-Pol et al. (2015) report on an examination of a sample of work-
ers recruited through AMT into the relationships between altruistic preferences
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and lying aversion and between co-operative tendencies and lying aversion. The
authors report a difference in the proportions reporting a false value between
treatments of a sender-receiver game with a Pareto improving set of payoffs and
an altruistic pair of payments and that men are more likely than women to tell an
altruistic white lie, but not to tell a Pareto white lie. The results also demonstrate
a positive correlation between honesty in the Pareto improving treatment and al-
truism in a dictator game that was not observed for the altruistic deception game.
The authors also report a positive correlation between honesty in the Pareto im-
proving deception game and co-operation in the prisoner’s dilemma that was not
found for the altruistic deception game.
Recently, both Abeler et al. (2016) and Gneezy et al. (2016) have reported
on experiments where subjects were required to report values based on draws
from different distributions. Abeler et al. (2016) report on results demonstrat-
ing “drawing-in”, whereby the proportion of subjects reporting a true low value
compared to the theoretical value decreases as the probability of the low state
decreases. Likewise, Gneezy et al. (2016) report on results showing that sub-
jects demonstrate a higher propensity to report a partial lie with a decrease in the
probability of the highest payoff state.
The design of the sender-receiver stage of the experiment of Biziou-van-Pol
et al. (2015) reflects the design used in Erat and Gneezy (2012) whereby there
are two potential states and a sender subject must report a state to the receiver
subject and separate treatments that vary the relative payoff of the two states to
the sender and receiver which are unknown to the receiver. The design differs
in that the message is used to determine the payoff to both players, rather than
a subsequent action chosen by the receiver, an alteration similar to that used in
Gneezy et al. (2013), whereby the message transmitted determined the sender’s
payoff, though the payoff to the receiver was a function of the receiver’s action.
The experimental design used in this chapter further extends the number of po-
tential states to 100 while retaining the feature that the receiver is passive and that
only the message sent by the sender will affect the payment to the two players.
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3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment was conduced with two separate samples, a first consisting of
undergraduate students at the University of Exeter and a second of people regis-
tered as workers in the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) system. This section will
first describe the design of the sender-receiver task before detailing other com-
mon elements of the experiment and the recruitment processes used for the two
samples.
3.3.1 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted on-line using bespoke software running on a web
server hosted by the University of Exeter. Full details of the experimental instruc-
tions are given in the Appendix.
The third part of the experiment was a sender-receiver game framed as a lot-
tery draw over values in the range 1 to 100. Figure 3.1 shows the instructions for
the baseline treatment. Subjects were informed that they would be randomly and
anonymously paired with another subject from the experimental session, and that
their paired subject would receive the same instructions and their own indepen-
dent draw from the lottery. The instructions informed subjects that there were two
roles in the experiment, a type A role (corresponding to a sender) and a type B
role (receiver), and that one member of each pair would be assigned to one of the
roles but that the actual role they were to be assigned to would be determined af-
ter the experiment was completed. The instructions detailed that each of the pair
of subjects would be paid the same multiple of the value reported by the person
allocated to be of type A and their task was to report the value they would wish to
report if assigned to the type A role.
Two treatments in which the distribution underlying the lottery was varied were
performed. Figure 3.1 shows the instructions for the baseline condition, BASE,
where a uniform distribution with each of the values in the range 1-100 being
equally likely was used. In the treatment condition, SKEW, the lottery values
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Figure 3.1: Screenshot of instructions for BASE treatment
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in the range 1-37 had a higher likelihood of being drawn (3-in-174) than higher
values (1-in-174). This distribution was chosen as the maximum value of the
range given the higher probability corresponds approximately to the expected
value of the distribution. Table 3.1 summarises the treatments and sample sizes.
Sample Treatment Sample Male
Student BASE 50 48.0%SKEW 51 47.1%
AMT BASE 179 61.5%SKEW 181 61.9%
Table 3.1: Summary of treatments and sample sizes
3.3.2 Experimental Procedures
Upon access to the software, subjects were informed that the experiment involved
three parts and that they would be required to complete the second part of the
experiment in order to qualify for the third part of the experiment. They were
further informed that the first part of the experiment would involve a number of
questions for which they were required to make selections. On the first page
of the first part of the experiment, subjects were presented with a questionnaire
eliciting personal details such as age and gender as well responses to questions
in the relation to the five factor model of personality traits (Woods and Hampson
2005). The subsequent pages of the first part of the experiment asked subjects to
undertake a hypothetical risk-aversion task based on Gneezy and Potters (1997)
and a hypothetical inter-temporal investment decision.
The second part of the experiment informed subjects that they were required
to undertake a slider repositioning task as described in Gill and Prowse (2012).
The instructions informed subjects that there would be three practice rounds be-
fore a final qualification round in which they would be required to reposition at
least 15 sliders to the centre of the bar in 60 seconds in order to qualify for the
third part of the experiment.
Subjects who failed to complete 15 or more sliders in the final round of the
slider task were informed that they had failed to qualify and would receive only
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their show up fee. Subjects who repositioned 15 or more sliders were shown
instructions for the third part of the experiment.
Before progressing to the lottery draw and making their decision, subjects
were given a short multiple choice quiz on the experiment to test their under-
standing of the lottery reporting task. The six questions used are given in the
Appendix. Incorrect answers were reported and further information given to the
subjects. Correct answers to all questions were required in order for subjects
to progress to the reporting task. Once the quiz was completed, subjects were
informed of their lottery draw and asked to submit the value they would like to
report.
3.3.3 Student Sample
Subjects were recruited from a pool of previously signed up University of Exeter
students subjects using ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Students studying psychology
or in the final year of an economics course were excluded from the recruitment
process. Subjects in the student sample were informed as part of the ORSEE
recruitment process that the experiment would be conducted on-line, that they
would be able to access the experiment over a three hour period in a pre-defined
window, that the experiment should take no longer than an hour to complete,
payment for the session would be made to a registered bank account and there
would be no need to attend the laboratory. Student subjects who signed up for
the session were informed that they would receive further details of how to access
the experiment prior to the session starting.
Sessions were conducted between 9 am and 12 am. Subjects who had reg-
istered to undertake the experiment were sent an e-mail the evening before their
session containing a unique username and password as well the address of the
appropriate web site for the experiment. The e-mail reminded them of the time
window and that payments would be made to their bank accounts.
Upon accessing the software, subjects were prompted to enter their username
and password. The experiment then progressed as described in the previous sec-
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tion with a number of specific additional features. Student subjects were informed
as part of the initial instructions that the show up fee for the session was £3. For
the third part of the experiment, Student subjects were informed that the person
selected to be type A would be paid 5 pence times the value they reported and the
person assigned to be type B would be paid 5 pence times the person selected to
be type A reported. At the end of the session student subjects were given further
information about their payment and how it would be made. This required that
they enter their bank details into the university’s payments system and confirm
through the software that this had been carried out. Subjects were also e-mailed
this information once the session was completed. In a small number of cases,
subjects had to be further contacted to confirm their payment details.
Sessions were run between 12 Jan 2016 and 5 Feb 2016. Two sessions
each recruiting 40 subjects were run for the BASE treatment, and a third session
recruiting 80 subjects was run for the SKEW treatment. The median payment
to student subjects was £6.75 for a task with a median time of 18 minutes and
47 seconds, corresponding to a median payment rate of £21.56 per hour, with a
lowest value of £4.60 per hour and a highest value £36.20 per hour.
3.3.4 AMT Worker Sample
AMT subjects were recruited through advertising a HIT on the Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk system. Subject recruitment was pre-filtered in the AMT system accord-
ing to several criteria for the potential workers, that they must have a number of
previous HITs approved greater than 500, a HIT approval rate greater than 95%,
be located in the United States and not have been assigned a role created by
the experimenters to identify subjects who had undertaken the experiment. The
recruitment message shown in AMT is given in the Appendix. AMT subjects were
informed that the fee they would receive for the experiment was $3 and that they
could earn more through their choices in the experiment that would be paid in the
form of an AMT bonus. Upon reading the recruitment message on AMT, subjects
could accept the HIT, whereby they would have an hour to complete the experi-
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ment and validate their payment. If a subject failed to register their completion,
in particular because they failed to complete the experiment in the time frame or
chose not to do the experiment upon reading the instructions, the HIT would be
republished for another worker to access.
Upon accessing the software, AMT subjects were shown details of the ethical
considerations of the experiment and a set of contact details for the experimenters
(given in Appendix). Subjects who progressed were invited to enter the web site
using their unique AMT identifier. The remainder of the experiment progressed
in the same manner as given before with a number of minor differences. The
instructions for the first part of the experiment detailed a show-up fee of $3, task
values were presented in dollars rather than pounds, and the payments in the
third part of the experiment were detailed as 5 cents times the value reported
by the person assigned to the type A role. At the end of the experiment, AMT
subjects were given a unique code generated by the experimental software that
they were required to enter into AMT such that the match between their AMT
identifier and their software code prior coud be verified to any payments being
actioned.
Sessions were run between 10 March and 21 April 2016, with subjects re-
cruited on specific days in batches of 60. The number of subjects assigned to
each treatment is given in Table 3.2. AMT subjects were assigned sequentially to
one of the treatments upon login to the software. At the end of each session, sub-
jects were paid their fees and bonuses and allocated a label in the AMT system
such that the subjects who had undertaken the experiment could be identified
and excluded from future sessions.
The median payment to AMT subjects was $6.00 for a task with a median time
of 16 minutes 45 seconds, corresponding to a median payment rate of $21.49 per
hour, with a lowest value of $5.16 per hour and a highest rate of $45.15 per hour.
The average AMT payment rate is considerably higher than the minimum wage in
the US and higher than rates typically quoted as being paid for performing surveys
on AMT, which have been seen to be as low as $1.38 (Horton and Chilton 2010).
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3.3.5 Errors
The proportion of AMT subjects observed making at least one error in the quiz
over the BASE and SKEW treatments (81.5%) is higher than that found for the
student sample (73.8%) (Fisher’s exact test (henceforth FET): p = 0.07). These
proportions are, however, notably high for both samples. Subjects who gave in-
correct answers on the quiz were prompted with further information and invited to
answer the questions again. The proportion of AMT subjects making a repeated
mistake in the quiz, conditional on making a mistake at the first attempt (10.9%),
was found to be significantly lower than for the student sample (23.3%) (FET:
p = 0.005). Subjects who incorrectly answered a question on the quiz more than
once are excluded from the main analysis. A larger fraction of student subjects
(17.2%) was excluded than AMT subjects (8.9%) (FET: p = 0.012).
3.3.6 Sample Characteristics Comparison
Males were slightly initially under-represented in the sample of student subjects,
comprising 43.5% of student subjects recruited, whereas males were initially
over-represented in the AMT sample (54.7%), atypical of previous studies (Pao-
lacci et al. 2010). The proportion of females who failed to qualify for the final
part of the experiment in the slider task or who were excluded for making a re-
peated error in the quiz is higher than for males in both samples, leading to a
more balanced male to female ratio in the student sample (47.7%) but to a more
exaggerated male to female ratio in the AMT sample (59.2%).
The median age of a subject recruited through AMT (32) is significantly higher
than that of the student sample (19) (Mann-Whitney (henceforth MW) test: z =
15.053, p < 0.001), reflecting the different nature of the subject pools (Paolacci
et al. 2010). A number of differences were found between the samples in the
self-reported personality measures. Student subjects were more likely to identify
themselves as extroverts compared to subjects recruited through AMT (MW test:
z = 4.860, p < 0.001) and to have a lower degree of emotional stability (MW test:
z = 5.029, p < 0.001). No difference was found in the median value allocated to
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the risky component of the investment task.
The median length of time taken by the AMT subjects over the combined
BASE and SKEW treatments was shorter than that taken by the students (MW
test: z = 4.410, p < 0.001). A difference in the median time taken between the
samples was found for a number of sections of the experiment, and this finding is
discussed in further detail in the results section.
3.3.7 Sample Summary
The numbers of subjects who were recruited and the number who completed the
first part of the experiment including qualifying for the final bonus payment round
are shown in Table 3.2. The table also details the number of subjects making
errors in the quiz to ascertain understanding before undertaking the decision in
part three of the experiment as well as the number of subjects used in the analysis
and the number of the used subjects who reported being male.
Sample Treatment Recruited Completed Error Repeated
Error
Used Male
Student BASE 80 62 46 12 50 24SKEW 80 60 44 9 51 24
AMT BASE 237 191 156 12 179 110SKEW 241 204 166 23 181 112
Table 3.2: Sample characteristics by treatment
3.4 Hypotheses
The goal of the research presented in this chapter is to examine if subjects re-
cruited from AMT behave in the same manner as subjects from a typical student
subject pool when faced with a moral choice in a sender-receiver game whereby
reporting a false value will increase both their payment and the payment to the
person to who they report the value (a Pareto White Lie, as according to the
classification of Erat and Gneezy (2012)).
There are a number of reasons as to why the choices made by the subjects
in the two pools may be different. A first simple reason is that the demograph-
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ics of the two pools will be different, for example the student subjects will on
average be younger than the AMT subjects (Paolacci et al. 2010). A second po-
tential reason is that subjects recruited through AMT are termed as workers in
the AMT system. There are two mechanisms available to make a payment to a
worker recruited through AMT. The first mechanism is the default, which involves
a base fee which is paid upon approval of a successful unit of work completed
by the AMT worker. This payment can be see to parallel a show-up fee used
in experiments for student subjects. The second, additional mechanism, allows
the recruiter (experimenter) to make a further payment in the form of a bonus.
Such an optional bonus payment can therefore be used to make payments relat-
ing to the incentivised element of an experiment. A key filter for the recruitment
of workers through AMT is the HIT approval rate, the proportion of previously at-
tempted units of work successfully completed by a worker. A potential recruiter
may filter for workers who only have an approval rate above some required level,
indeed it has been suggested that researchers should employ such a filter and
report the value used when performing experiments with AMT subjects (Kees et
al. 2017; Peer et al. 2014). As such gaining the successful approval of a task
could be of importance to AMT workers as it may influence their ability to un-
dertake future work. While the separation of the processes for the approval and
base payment from any bonus payment allows for the choice in the experiment of
the AMT worker to be independent from their reputation in terms of the approval
rating, some AMT subjects may be concerned that an immoral choice in the ex-
periment will have a negative influence their reputation. As student subjects are
specifically recruited to undertake experiments, rather than to serve as workers,
such a concern will not be present, leading to a first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 AMT subjects will report positive false values less frequently than
student subjects
The experiment used in the study presented here differs from a number of pre-
vious studies (Biziou-van-Pol et al. 2015; Erat and Gneezy 2012; Gneezy 2005)
in that there is an expanded set of possible states underlying the sender-receiver
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game, as reported in a number of recent studies (Abeler et al. 2016; Gneezy et
al. 2016, 2013). A larger number of possible states allows for subjects to report
partial lies, as reported by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and further dis-
cussed by Abeler et al. (2016), and for the experimenter to adjust the distribution
of possible states, as demonstrated by Abeler et al. (2016) and Gneezy et al.
(2016). A second hypothesis can therefore be derived from the theory proposed
in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 described that under an increase in the reference point,
the minimum value reported by an agent is non-decreasing. A treatment with a
higher expected value, in that the distribution of possible states is uniform com-
pared to an alternative that is skewed to have higher probabilities for lower states,
can be considered to have a higher reference point.
Hypothesis 2 Subjects should misreport no less frequently in a treatment with a
uniform distribution compared to one with a distribution skewed to lower values
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Variables
A number of variables are referenced in the following section. The variable SKEW
is binary and takes a value of 1 for measures from the SKEW treatment and 0
otherwise. STUDENT is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a subject is part
of the student pool and 0 if the subject was recruited from AMT. LotteryDraw refers
to the lottery draw presented to the subject prior to reporting their choice of value.
ReportedValue is the choice made by the subject as the value to report. The
variable Error is a binary measure which takes the value 1 if a subject answered
any of the questions on the quiz of understanding incorrectly. The binary variable
Male takes a value of 1 if a subject reported being male and 0 otherwise. The
term Age refers to the age reported by the subjects. The terms Extroversion,
Agreeableness, Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness and Openness refer to
answers given on a scale from 1 to 7 about the subjects degree of agreement with
two statements assessing their personality for each of these traits (Woods and
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Hampson 2005). The pairs of statements used for this assessment are given in
the Appendix. The variable Allocation is the subject’s choice for investment in the
risky component in the risk aversion measure of the first part of the experiment.
The term Slider represents the subject’s score in the (final) qualifying round of the
slider task, which takes a minimum of 15 and maximum of 48, representing the
number of sliders required to qualify for the final part of the experiment and the
total number of sliders.
There are four terms widely used that refer to the time taken by subjects in
various steps of the experiment. The term Prelottery is the total elapsed time
between in seconds a subject login and being presented with the instructions for
the final lottery reporting task. The variable Lotteryinstructions is the length of
time in seconds a subject spent between loading the instructions for the lottery
task and progressing to the quiz to check for subject understanding of the task.
The term Lotteryquiz is the length of time a subject spent on the quiz. The term
Lotterydecision is the length of time in seconds between a subject loading the
lottery reporting decision page after completing the quiz and submitting a choice.
3.5.2 Classification of Choice
The choices made by subjects can be classified into one of three categories. The
first classification is an UpLie, whereby the value of ReportedValue is greater than
that of the LotteryDraw. The second classification is an Honest value, whereby the
ReportedValue is equal to the LotteryDraw. The third classification is a DownLie,
where the subject’s choice of ReportedValue is less than the LotteryDraw.
The choices of subjects are analysed using a multinomial logistic model (Nerlove
and Press 1973). Let yi denote the classification of the choice made by the sub-
ject i with some associated vector of observable characteristics xi. The probability
that a subject chooses a particular classification, j, from the a set of classifications
0, 1 ... J is given by P(yi = j|xi). The multinomial logit model for the subject’s choice
can be expressed as the following:
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To remove the indeterminacy in the model, a normalisation was conducted for
one of the subjects’ choices (Honest) such that the values are zero (β0 = 0), and
the expression for the model can be rewritten as:









The basic expression for the independent variables in the regression is formed
from the interactions of the sample (STUDENT), the treatment (SKEW) and the
value of the LotteryDraw, such that for a given classification (j):
x′iβj = βj0 + βj1LotteryDraw + βj2STUDENT + βj3SKEW+
βj4LotteryDraw ∗ STUDENT + βj5LotteryDraw ∗ SKEW+
βj6STUDENT ∗ SKEW + βj7LotteryDraw ∗ SKEW ∗ STUDENT (3.3)
An extended model (Model 2) for the regression further incorporates other
variables relating to the personal characteristics of the subjects and the time
taken by subjects for various elements of the experiment. In the first instance
the three classifications detailed at the start of this section (UpLie, Honest and
DownLie) are used and the regressions are normalised such that an Honest re-
sponse serves as the baseline. In a later section the classifications are further
divided but and regression model extended to reflect the additional classifications.
Greene (2010) proposes a mechanism for addressing issues relating to the
usage of hypotheses tests of the coefficients of interaction effects in non-linear
models raised by Ai and Norton (2003). The approach to analysis suggested by
Greene (2010) is to perform tests relating to specification of the model prior to
analysis, for which the author argues that graphical presentations create an in-
formative adjunct to any statistical analysis. I adopt this recommended approach
in the analysis of the results. The results presented make extensive use of the
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Figure 3.2: Proportion of subjects reporting by classification
post-estimation calculated propensities to report a particular classification for a
given set of values of the LotteryDraw (0 to 100 in steps of 10). An overview
of the approach used for the analysis is given in Williams (2012). Results for
the regressions used are presented in the Appendix. All regressions use robust
standard errors. Vertical or horizontal bars on figures represent standard errors.
3.5.3 UpLie
Result 1 Student subjects demonstrated a higher propensity to report an UpLie
than AMT subjects at values of the LotteryDraw below 50
Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of responses by classification in the BASE
and SKEW treatments for student and AMT subjects. The figure shows that pro-
portion of subjects reporting an UpLie is larger among the student subjects than
among AMT subjects in both treatments. This difference is significant for the
SKEW treatment (FET: p = 0.039), though not for the BASE treatment (FET:
p = 0.112). There are no differences in the proportions reporting an UpLie
between the SKEW and BASE treatments in either the student sample (FET:
p = 0.839) or the AMT sample (FET: p = 0.833).
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Figure 3.3: Propensity of subjects to report a value classified as
an UpLie
There are two main factors for the different levels of the significance observed
for the difference in the proportions of subjects reporting an UpLie between sam-
ples in the two treatments. The first relates to the smaller size of the student
sample leading to relatively larger standard errors. The second factor relates to
the range of vales of the LotteryDraw for which subjects were observed to show
a higher propensity to report an UpLie. Figure 3.3 illustrates the propensity to
report an UpLie as calculated at specific values of the LotteryDraw for the two
samples and the two treatments.
The propensity to report an UpLie declines with the value of the LotteryDraw
for both samples over both treatments. At high values of the LotteryDraw the
propensity to report an UpLie is low and the same in the two samples. However,
at low values of the LotteryDraw, the propensity to report an UpLie is greater
among the student subjects then for AMT subjects. Values for the test of the
contrast of the propensity to report an UpLie are given in Table C.2 in the Ap-
pendix. There is a significant difference in the calculated propensity to report an
UpLie for values of the LotteryDraw of 50 or less in both the BASE treatment
(p ≤ 0.0317) and the SKEW treatment (p ≤ 0.0697). The difference in signifi-
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cance of the non-parametric tests of the propensity to report and UpLie between
the samples observed between the BASE and SKEW treatments presented in
the previous paragraph can therefore also be related to the higher propensity for
an UpLie occurring for lower values of the LotteryDraw combined with the greater
manifestation of low values of the LotteryDraw in the SKEW treatment. These
results are consistent with the first hypothesis.
3.5.4 Honest
Result 2 AMT subjects show a higher propensity to report an Honest value for
values of the LotteryDraw less than 20
Figure 3.2 indicates a higher proportion of AMT subjects report an Honest
value compared to the student subjects in both the BASE and SKEW treatments.
Non-parametric tests, however, reveal no significant differences in the propensity
to report an Honest value between subjects in the BASE treatment (FET: p =
0.252) or the SKEW treatment (FET: p = 0.192). There are also no differences
between the treatments in the student sample (FET: p = 1.000) and the AMT
subjects sample (FET: p = 0.830).
Figure 3.4 illustrates the calculated propensity to report an Honest value at
a variety of values of the LotteryDraw for the student and AMT samples in the
BASE and SKEW treatments. Values for the test of the contrast of the propensity
to report an Honest value are given in Table C.3 in the Appendix. The calculated
propensity to report an Honest value in the BASE treatment is higher among AMT
than student subjects for values of the LotteryDraw of 20 or below (p ≤ 0.0676)
and for values of the LotteryDraw of 40 or below in the SKEW treatment (p ≤
0.0926).
3.5.5 DownLie
Figure 3.2 shows little difference in the proportion of student subjects reporting
a DownLie compared to AMT subjects in the BASE treatment (FET: p = 0.636)
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Figure 3.4: Propensity of subjects to report a value classified as
Honest
or the SKEW treatment (FET: p = 0.343). Values for the test of the contrast of
the propensity to report a DownLie value are given in Table C.4 in the Appendix.
Notably no student subjects were observed to report a DownLie for low values of
the LotteryDraw (under 78) in the BASE treatment whereas 13% of AMT subjects
were observed to report a DownLie for the same range of values, leading to a
significant difference for values of the LotteryDraw less than 70. There are no
differences found in the propensity to report a DownLie between the samples in
the SKEW treatment or between the treatments for either sample.
3.5.6 FullLie
The results presented in the previous sections are consistent with previous stud-
ies where subjects reported true values when presented with an incentive to re-
port elevated false values that increased the payoff to both sender and receiver
(Biziou-van-Pol et al. 2015; Erat and Gneezy 2012). However it is notable that a
smaller proportion of student subjects made reports classified as Honest at low
values of the LotteryDraw, and that a higher proportion reported values classified
as an UpLie. Previous experimental results have presented evidence of partial
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lying, whereby subjects report false values that are not the payoff maximising
ones (Abeler et al. 2016; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013). The observation
of such reports is indicative of effects at the intensive margin, that is what value
to report, as well as the extensive margin, that is the decision to report in a false
manner. In this section reports classified as an UpLie are separated into two
further categories of FullLie, whereby a subject is observed to falsely report the
maximum value, and PositivePartialLie, where a subject falsely reports a value
greater than the true value of the LotteryDraw, but that is not the maximum pos-
sible value of 100. A multinomial logistic model, again with a subject’s choice
of Honest chosen for the baseline, was performed using the alternative classifi-
cations. The results for the propensity to report an Honest value or a DownLie
were not found to change significantly from the original model, so the discussion
of these classifications is not repeated.
Result 3 There are no significant differences in the tendency to report a FullLie
between the samples. There is a lower propensity to report a FullLie by subjects
in the AMT sample for values of the LotteryDraw of 40 or above in the SKEW
treatment compared to the BASE treatment
Figure 3.5 illustrates the proportions of different samples reporting a FullLie or
a PositivePartialLie for the BASE and SKEW treatments. There are no significant
differences in the proportion of subjects reporting a FullLie between the subject
samples in either the BASE treatment (FET: p = 1.000) or the SKEW treatment
(FET: p = 0.844). The proportion of subjects reporting a FullLie is higher in the
BASE treatment compared to the SKEW treatment, though this difference is not
significant for the student subjects (FET: p = 0.496) or the AMT subjects (FET:
p = 0.107).
Figure 3.6 illustrates the calculated propensity to report a FullLie at various
values of the LotteryDraw for the BASE and SKEW treatments among the student
and AMT subjects. Values for the test of the contrast of the propensity to report
a FullLie are given in Table C.6 in the Appendix. The contrast shows a significant
difference in the propensity to report a FullLie between the BASE and SKEW
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Figure 3.5: Proportion of subjects reporting a FullLie or Posi-
tivePartialLie
treatments for values of the LotteryDraw of 40 or above (p ≤ 0.0712) among the
AMT subjects, though there is no difference between the treatments found for the
student subjects. This result is consistent with the second hypothesis.
3.5.7 PositivePartialLie
Result 4 Student subjects demonstrated a higher tendency to report a Posi-
tivePartialLie than subjects recruited through AMT
Figure 3.5 shows the proportion of the student sample reporting a value clas-
sified as a PositivePartialLie is higher in both the BASE (FET: p = 0.082) and
SKEW (FET: p = 0.036) treatments than for the AMT subjects. This result can
be linked with the observation of similar proportions in the two samples that that
reported values classified as a FullLie in the previous result to note that the first
result, a higher propensity of student subjects to report an UpLie, is driven by a
higher tendency to report a PositivePartialLie among student subjects compared
to AMT subjects.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the calculated propensity to report a PositivePartialLie
at various values of the LotteryDraw. Values for the test of the contrast of the
131
Figure 3.6: Propensity of subjects to report a value classified as
a FullLie
propensity to report a PositivePartialLie value are given in Table C.7 in the Ap-
pendix. There is a significant difference in the calculated propensity to report a
PositivePartialLie between the student and AMT subjects for values of the Lot-
teryDraw of 30 or below (p ≤ 0.0284) in the SKEW treatment and for values of
the LotteryDraw in the range 30 to 60 inclusive p ≤ 0.0819) in the BASE treat-
ment. No differences were found in the propensity to report a PositivePartialLie
between the treatments for either sample.
3.5.8 Controls
The evidence presented in the previous sections indicates that the student sub-
jects reported more lies, in particular that there was a greater proportion found to
report values that were classified as a PositivePartialLie. Tables C.1 and C.5 de-
tail results from extended regressions on the classification of the reported value
with additional control terms to check for correlations with personal characteristics
declared by subjects and the subjects’ actions within the experiment.
There is a clear negative correlation between the tendency to report an UpLie
and Error, that is subjects who answered all the questions correctly on the quiz
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Figure 3.7: Propensity of subjects to report a value classified as
a PositivePartialLie
were more likely to report a value larger than the true state. Conversely there is
a positive correlation between the tendency to report a DownLie and Error, indi-
cating that subjects who answered one or more questions incorrectly were more
likely to report a value below the true value. The same pattern of a significant
negative correlation with Error is found for the tendency to report a FullLie, and
is negative but not significant for the case of a PositivePartialLie. Errors made by
subjects on the quiz of understanding of the task are further discussed in the next
subsection.
The length of time a subject spent reading the instructions (Lotteryinstructions)
of the lottery task can be seen to positively correlated with the tendency to report
a FullLie and negatively with to the tendency to report a DownLie. This suggests
that the time spent reading the instructions may serve as a measure of the degree
of attention that a subject gave to the experiment and in turn to the nature of the
choice made. There is a negative correlation between the time spent answering
the questions in the quiz of understanding of the experimental task (Lotteryquiz)
and the tendency to report both an UpLie and a FullLie, further suggesting that the
degree of understanding a subject has of the experiment influences the nature of
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their decision. The results also show a positive correlation between the time taken
in the length of time to make a deicision of the value to report in the lottery task
(Lotterydecision) and the tendency to report a PositivePartialLie, suggesting that
the act of reporting a value that is a partial lie takes longer compared to reporting
values of the other classifications. The role of the length of time subjects spent
on the experiment is further discussed in a later section.
There are no effects found in relation to age or gender. There is a negative
correlation observed between the tendency to report a DownLie and the measure
of Extraversion, suggesting that people who agree more with the statement that
they are reserved in nature are less likely to report a DownLie.
3.5.9 Errors
79.7% of the recruited sample (72.5% of the used sample) made at least one
error on the quiz, such that it is clear that the subjects’ level of understanding of
the experimental task after reading the instructions is incomplete. The regression
results and the analysis of timings presented in the preceding section detailed that
there is positive correlation between making an error on the quiz and reporting
a value classified as a DownLie as well as a negative correlation between time
taken reading the instructions and the likelihood of reporting a DownLie. Both of
these findings suggest that the choice to report a value below the true value may
relate to a subject’s lack of understanding of the experimental task. This section
further investigates this link by examining the errors subjects made in the quiz of
understanding of the experimental task.
There are no differences in the overall error rates between the treatments for
either sample. Overall student subjects made fewer errors than AMT subjects
(FET: p = 0.022), but the difference is weakly significant in the base treatment
(FET: p = 0.082) and not significant for the SKEW treatment (FET: p = 0.135).
Table 3.3 shows the results of logistic regressions on a binary measure as to
whether or not a subject made an error in the quiz testing the subject’s under-
standing of the lottery task. The estimates for two regressions are shown, the
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first for the set of subjects used in the main analysis, the second for all subjects
who completed the final task in the experiment, therefore including those subjects
who made more than one error on the quiz of understanding of the lottery task.
The results show a negative correlation between the time spent reading the in-
structions and the propensity to make an error in the quiz, which is strengthened
in the case where subjects excluded from the main analysis are included in the
regression. The results also show that males were less likely to make an error
and that there is no observable effect relating to the sample or the treatment. This
result suggests that while student subjects proportionally recorded fewer errors
on the quiz of understanding, this was in a large part due to the longer length of
time they spent reading the instructions compared to AMT subjects.







































































Psudeo R2 0.07 0.07
LL -229.0 -241.8
Table 3.3: Logistic estimates of determinants of making an error in the test of
understanding
Figure 3.8 shows the proportion of subjects reporting by the given classifi-
cations separated by whether they made an error on the quiz as well by the
treatment and sample. Consistent with the regression results presented in the
previous section, the proportion of subjects reporting a DownLie is higher for
subjects who made an error on the quiz compared to those who did not, and the
proportion of subjects reporting a FullLie is lower. Overall a considerably lower
proportion (3.8%) of subjects who made no error on the quiz of understanding
reported a value classified as a DownLie compared to subjects (15.7%) who did
make an error (FET: p = 0.001). The proportion reporting a value classified as a
FullLie is higher among subjects who did not make a mistake on the quiz (40.9%)
compared to those that did (16.4%) (FET: p < 0.001). The proportions reporting
a value classified as an Honest response or as a PositivePartialLie do not differ
between subjects who answered all the quiz questions correctly and those that
did not.
Table 3.4 details the percentage of the used subjects who made an error on
their first attempt at each of the questions in the test of understanding of the lottery
task. Details of the questions are given in the Appendix. All of the questions in
the quiz were multiple choice, with the default option set (incorrectly) as a blank.
Questions 1, 2 and 4 were most frequently answered correctly by subjects, with
60.0% of subjects answering all three of these questions correctly (61.5% among
student subjects and 59.5% among AMT subjects).
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Figure 3.8: Proportion of subjects reporting by classification sep-
arated by Error
Sample Trmt Any Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
Student BASE 68.0% 10.0% 26.0% 34.0% 6.0% 30.0% 26.0%
Student SKEW 66.7% 5.9% 21.6% 43.1% 3.9% 29.4% 31.4%
AMT BASE 78.8% 21.2% 11.7% 54.2% 10.1% 46.4% 50.3%
AMT SKEW 69.1% 12.2% 18.2% 44.2% 10.5% 44.8% 40.9%
Table 3.4: Percentage of errors on first attempt at quiz of understanding of the
lottery task of used sample
Question 4 tested if subjects knew the relative payoff to their partner player if
they were chosen as player A, the correct response being 5. A large proportion of
subjects answered this question correctly (89.6%) with no significant variation be-
tween samples or treatments, suggesting the majority of subjects had determined
the key feature of the experiment. 49.9% of subjects, however, answered ques-
tion 3 incorrectly, which checked if subjects understood the effect on payment of
their choice if they were selected to be player B ("My value will not matter"). The
proportion of student subjects answering this question incorrectly is lower than
for the AMT subjects, particularly in the BASE treatment. A large proportion of
the incorrect answers (91.9%) were 5, consistent with a view that subjects under-
stood the important features of the experiment with regard to the nature of the
payment, but potentially that a proportion were confused as to the nature of the
roles detailed in the instructions.
A larger proportion of AMT subjects answered question 5, asking what the
maximum payment available (£5 or $5), and question 6, asking for the minimum
payment (5 pence or 5 cents), incorrectly compared to student subjects in both
treatments (there are no differences between treatments for either of the sam-
ples). 76.0% of the incorrect answers for question 5 were £4 ($4 for AMT sub-
jects), with the proportions giving this as the incorrect answer similar between the
samples. 64.2% of the incorrect answers for question 6 were £1 ($1 for AMT sub-
jects). 50% of student subjects answered incorrectly in this way, while more AMT
subjects did so (67.2%) (FET: p = 0.047). That these two values should provide
strong focal points for incorrect answers is striking as they correspond to the max-
imum and minimum values in the example table in the instructions, as shown in
Figure 3.1. This finding potentially suggests that some subjects, in particular from
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the AMT sample, paid attention to the example table and gave answers based on
the table values rather than by calculating the appropriate values for questions 5
and 6.
The number of errors show that some subjects failed to fully understand the
instructions for the lottery task. The nature of the errors, however, also reveals
that the majority of subjects had particular misunderstandings that they were then
able to correct the answers when prompted with the answers. While subjects who
made a second mistake on the quiz have been excluded from the analysis, the
evidence suggests that there remain some subjects who did not have a full under-
standing of the experiment and that the behaviour of such subjects is positively
correlated to the tendency to report a DownLie and negatively with a FullLie but
is not correlated with other the other classifications.
3.5.10 Experimental Timings
The correlation of times taken in certain steps within the experiment and the clas-
sification of outcome observed in the Controls section is worth further investi-
gation. Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2017) provide a summary of the growth of
articles in experimental economics utilising response times in the examination of
subjects decisions, as well making the case for using response time data in anal-
ysis. The authors suggest that the analysis of response times can be used in
assisting with the classification of decision-makers into types and in investigat-
ing how decisions are made, in particular that the time observed by a subject in
responding to a particular decision can be related to the nature of the choice. Pi-
ovesan and Wengström (2009) present evidence that faster subjects make more
egotistic choices than slower ones. Rubinstein (2013) presents evidence demon-
strating a link between short response times and decisions in a variety of games
which are made in error. Chapter 1 of this thesis presents evidence of subjects
taking a longer period of time to make responses that are non-compliant in a tax
reporting experiment compared to those submitting compliant decisions, poten-
tially arising from the additional cognitive complexity of deciding upon a value to
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misreport. Wang et al. (2010) present alternative experimental evidence using
eye tracking and pupil dilation in a sender-receiver game that is consistent with a
hypothesis that the process of deciding how much to deceive an opponent is cog-
nitively complex. The analysis of the extended multinomial logistic regressions
presented in the previous section indicated some interesting patterns of correla-
tion between the subjects’ choice and the time taken over various tasks within the
experiment that are therefore further investigated in this section.
There are no significant differences in the distribution of times taken for any
component of the experiment between the BASE and SKEW treatments within
either of the student or AMT subjects (see Tables C.8 and C.9 in the Appendix).
The recorded values of the times taken for each step over the experiment are
therefore pooled across the treatments so as to be by sample in the following
analysis.
Result 5 Student subjects took significantly longer reading the instructions for all
three parts of the experiment than subjects recruited through AMT
Figure 3.9 shows the median time taken for the various steps within the ex-
periment for the two sample pools. The median time taken for each of the steps
is different between the two samples at a significance below the 1% level (Mann-
Whitney (henceforth MW) tests). A longer median time was observed for student
subjects (31 seconds) than for AMT subjects (22 seconds) to read the initial in-
structions for part one of the experiment (MW test: z = 3.475, p < 0.001). Like-
wise, a longer median time was observed for student subjects to read the instruc-
tions for the slider task (51 seconds) than for AMT subjects (39 seconds) (MW
test: z = 4.052, p < 0.001). A longer median time was also observed for students
to read the instructions for the final lottery based task of 244 seconds compared
to 139.5 seconds for the AMT subjects (MW test: z = 7.897, p < 0.001). Sub-
jects recruited through AMT were also observed to have shorter median times for
completion of all the tasks in part 1 of the experiment.
AMT subjects, however, were observed to have a longer median value than
student subjects for the time taken to complete the slider task and the quiz of
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Figure 3.9: Median time taken for tasks within the experiment
understanding of the lottery task. The longer median time observed for AMT sub-
jects for the slider task may reflect a higher degree of network latency between
the web server and the more geographically remote AMT subjects for this, tech-
nologically more burdensome, part of the experiment. The longer median time
taken on the quiz checking for understanding of the lottery task may arise due to
a higher rate of errors made by the AMT subjects, as discussed in the previous
section.
Result 6 Subjects who reported a DownLie spent a shorter time reading the in-
structions for the lottery
Figure 3.10 shows the median length of time subjects spent on various steps
of the experiment by sample and the classification of their reported value. There
are no differences within the samples in the time spent on the experiment by clas-
sification prior to the lottery task (Prelottery). The median time spent reading the
instructions for the lottery task (Lotteryinstructions) is far shorter among subjects
who reported a DownLie than for subjects reporting any one of the three other
categories among both student subjects (MW test: z = 3.707, p < 0.001) and
AMT subjects (MW test: z = 6.499, p < 0.001). Figure 3.10 further shows there




Figure 3.10: Median time taken for completion of steps of the experiment by
classification
testing the subject’s understanding of the experiment by classification in either
sample.
Result 7 AMT subjects take significantly longer in choosing a value to report
when reporting a PositivePartialLie compared to a FulLie
Figure 3.10 highlights that a longer median value was observed for the time
taken to make a decision in the lottery task by AMT subjects who reported val-
ues classified as PostivePartialLie (Lotterydecisiontime) compared to reporting a
FullLie (MW test: z = 3.514, p < 0.001). The median value observed for the time
taken to report a PostivePartialLie by AMT subjects is also longer than that taken
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to report an Honest value (MW test: z = 2.704, p = 0.0068) and a DownLie (MW
test: z = 2.326, p = 0.0200).
Figure 3.9 shows that student subjects were observed to have a longer me-
dian time (26 seconds) to choose a value to report than AMT subjects (19 sec-
onds)(MW test: z = 2.615, p = 0.0089). Figure 3.10 shows that the median
value for the time taken to make a decision in the lottery task was observed to
be longer for student subjects reporting a value classified as a PositivePartialLie
than for values classified as a FullLie or Honest, though the differences are not
significant.
3.6 Discussion
The results presented in the previous section show that a higher proportion of
student subjects were observed to report an UpLie, that is to misreport a lottery
value for financial gain, than of subjects recruited through AMT. This result is
consistent with the fist hypothesis that conjectured that AMT subjects would be
less likely to misreport. There are, however, interesting features in the pattern of
reporting between the two samples.
Similar proportions of subjects in the two samples were observed to report
a FullLie in both the BASE or SKEW treatments, whereas a higher proportion
of student subjects were found to report a PositivePartialLie compared to AMT
subjects, particularly at lower values of the LotteryDraw in the SKEW treatment.
A higher proportion of AMT subjects were observed to report an Honest value
compared to student subjects over a corresponding range of low values for the
LotteryDraw. These results suggest that the student subjects were more willing
to lie than the AMT subjects given a sufficient incentive to lie. Interestingly, the
primary difference is that such student subjects when willing to lie given a low
value of the LotteryDraw, showed a greater tendency to report partial lies rather
than the maximum value.
The results show that there are some significant differences in the personal-
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ity measures between the samples, but that there is no particular correlation of
these measures, or of gender, age or a measure of risk aversion to the tendency
to report in a particular manner. The greater propensity for honesty and the as-
sociated lower tendency to report a positive lie may therefore reflect a greater
concern for their reputation among the AMT subjects as hired workers rather
than as pre-registered volunteers for research experiments as is true of the stu-
dents. However recent research has shown that an extended version of the set
of personality traits containing the additional trait of honesty-humility correlates
better with dishonest behaviour (Hilbig and Zettler 2015) that was not collected
in this study. The finding that AMT subjects exhibit a lower propensity to report
false values and a higher propensity to report the truth is in keeping with the re-
sults of Choo et al. (2016), who found that a representative sample of taxpayers
were more compliant than a sample of students, who claim their result is due to
taxpayer’s retaining norms of compliance in the experiment. The results is also
similar to that of Abeler et al. (2014), who found that students where more likely
to misreport the outcome of a series of coin tosses than members of the German
public. A key difference of the study here is that AMT subjects were aware they
were part of an experiment, as were the students, unlike the subjects from the
German public.
There were no significant differences found in the proportions reporting for
each of the classifications between the BASE and SKEW treatments for the stu-
dent sample. A lower propensity to report a FullLie was observed in the SKEW
treatment compared to the BASE treatment at higher values of the LotteryDraw
for AMT subjects. These results are consistent with the second hypothesis that
subjects should misreport no less frequently in the BASE treatment compared to
the SKEW treatment. The result for the AMT subjects is stronger in that it pro-
vides some evidence in favour of the reference point model postulated in Chapter
2, in that more maximal lying is observed in the BASE treatment which has a
higher reference point.
A relatively large proportion of subjects (13.0%) were observed to report a
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DownLie despite the fact both subjects received a higher payment if the value re-
ported was over stated from the truth. Though downward lies have been observed
in one study (Utikal and Fischbacher 2013), a number of recent experiments have
found little or no downward lying (Abeler et al. 2016; Gneezy et al. 2016), sug-
gesting the relatively frequent observation of values classified as a DownLie in
this study are a cause for concern.
The results show there is a positive correlation between the tendency to report
a DownLie and subjects who made errors on the quiz of understanding of the
lottery task. The results also show a negative correlation between subjects who
made errors and the propensity to report a FullLie, but no correlation with the
tendency to report the other categories. These observations suggest that there is
some proportion of subjects who are able, when prompted with the solutions, to
complete the quiz and progress to the decision step without a full understanding
of the task. Such subjects are then more likely to report a DownLie and less
likely to report a FullLie. Analysis of the time spent reading the instructions for
the experiment shows that subjects reporting values as classified as a DownLie
were observed to have spent a considerably shorter median time studying the
instructions. These results suggest that some subjects did not fully understand
the experiment, in a large part because they did not pay sufficient attention to
the experiment and that such a lack of understanding lies behind a significant
proportion of the choices classified as a DownLie.
While the literature review detailed number of studies that have replicated ex-
periments using AMT subjects, a number of others have identified issues with the
use of AMT subjects. Crump et al. (2013) suggest that testing subjects’ compre-
hension of the task is critical, noting their results resembled the classical studies
that they were attempting to replicate with subjects recruited through AMT when
the data was analysed with the inclusion of such checks. Deetlefs et al. (2015) re-
port an “unreliable” response level of 13% among subjects recruited through AMT,
as well as a tendency for such “unreliable” subjects to rush through experiments.
It is apparent from the analysis of experimental timings and the errors presented
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in this chapter that some proportion of the AMT sample pool do appear to con-
form to such “unreliable” behaviour. Notably, however, there is some proportion of
the student subjects for which the same “unreliable” behaviour applies. An open
question as to whether the observation of unreliable subjects arises from partic-
ular elements of the design used in this chapter or a wider problem for on-line
experiments is left for future research.
Researchers are looking to alternative pools of subjects for experiments, to
mitigate concerns relating to non-representative nature of student pools and prac-
tical issues such as the limited availability of subjects of laboratory space. Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk serves as one of the recent wave of new sources of subjects
for experimenters that addresses the specific issues of recruitment and payment.
While a number of studies have replicated different aspects of student behaviour
observed in the lab with AMT subjects on-line, this is the first study that I am
aware of that compares the behaviour of AMT subjects with student subjects in
deception game conducted on-line for both samples. While the main finding that
a lower proportion of AMT subjects report self-serving false values is clear, there
are also limitations in the analysis brought about by a fraction of subjects behav-
ing in an “unreliable” manner. As increasing numbers of experimenters turn to use
platforms such as AMT to source subjects, the results presented in this chapter




The introduction to this thesis argued that people regularly tell little lies, but that
people refrained from being dishonest at every opportunity, possibly due to some
intrinsic motivation to adhere to a social norm of honesty, or potentially due to a
preference to appear honest. The experimental results presented in each of the
three chapters in this thesis are consistent with previous studies of dishonesty.
A notable result is a propensity for honest responses even when a dishonest re-
sponse is the rational choice, an outcome referred to as “lying aversion” in the
literature (Gneezy 2005). Furthermore not all misreported values are largest lie
possible, some are “partial lies” (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013), a well es-
tablished experimental phenomena (Abeler et al. 2016). The three chapters of
the thesis each examine a different aspect of the decision to be dishonest.
Chapter 1 detailed an experiment investigating the use of defaults in a tax filing
specific context. The results showed that pre-population with incorrect values
that favoured the taxpayer lead to an increased level dishonesty. While some
proportion of the non-compliance was found to be passive, in the sense of only
arising from the incorrectly pre-populated default value, the majority was found
to be active, involving alterations to the value or further non-compliance in other
fields. The chapter notes a number of future directions for research in the tax
domain. An alternative avenue for future investigation could be to investigate
the use a similar form of defaults in a neutral (non tax filing) frame. A potential
example would be the use of a website to claim prizes from a lottery with a set
of defaults corresponding to the prizes on offer. The results in the chpater also
showed that the use of a prompt containing a descriptive norm was only effective
in restoring compliance when used in a reactive manner. The effects of various
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static and dynamic nudges utilising various descriptive or injunctive norms, as
discussed in the discussion of the chapter, could also be examined under such a
framework.
Chapter 2 described how the results of experimental treatments with different
reference points, in the sense of subjects being told about different modal val-
ues from previous sessions, lead to differences in dishonest behaviour consistent
with a psychological model containing a cost in terms of the reference point. The
chapter conjectured a number of different reasons for the existence of the addi-
tional cost, including a preference for the appearance of honesty, concern over
the credibility of the value being reported and a desire not to boast. Chapter 3
provided a further result consistent with the model. The results from a sender-
receiver game revealed that subjects had a higher propensity to report a maximal
lie at higher values of the underlying draw in a treatment with a uniform distribu-
tion compared to one with a distribution skewed towards low values. There are
two key avenues for future research.
The first avenue is to better establish the role for the distribution of underlying
outcomes in the decision to be dishonest, much as in the manner of the recent
experiments of Abeler et al. (2016) and Gneezy et al. (2016). One interesting
alternative would to compare the responses subjects asked to undertake a draw
with a uniform distribution, such as a six-sided dice roll, to those asked to under-
take an equivalent draw with a binomial distribution, such as reporting the number
of tails in 5 flips of a coin.
The second avenue to investigate further is the potential causes of the cost
associated with reporting values above the reference point. The experiment de-
scribed in this thesis establishes that there is a role for the reference point in
relation to a norm of lying, the treatment whereby subjects are informed of higher
reference point correlated to a greater propensity to misreport. The experiment,
however, does not examine the roles of the potential causes of the change in be-
haviour, such as the credibility of the value declared or a preference for appearing
hones. Abeler et al. (2016) detail an experiment designed to investigate the role
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of a reputation for appearing honest.
Chapter 3 adds to the literature on comparisons of behaviour between sub-
ject pools. The results show different patterns of dishonesty among students and
workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk undertaking the same online experiment,
a result consistent with those presented by Choo et al. (2016) and Abeler et al.
(2014). An important finding of chapter 3 is the presence of a proportion of “unre-
aliable” subjects, with a tendency to rush through the experiment and not have a
complete understanding of the experimental task in both pools of subjects. Such
a result should serve as a warning to all experimenters using online experiments,
whatever their source of subjects.
A result observed in both chapters 1 and 3 is that more complex deceitful mes-
sages, subject entered non-compliant levels of income in the experiment of chap-
ter 1 and positive partial lies in the experiment of chapter 3, were correlated with
longer median response times. This result matches to findings in the psychology
literature, whereby more complex lies were found to be cognitively more demand-
ing (Vrij and Heaven 1999) and to lead to longer response times (Vendemia et al.
2005). The results presented in this thesis back the conjecture of Spiliopoulos


















1Number Invited is the number of subjects invited to take part. Number Completed gives the
number of subjects completing the treatment.
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Figure A.1: Instructions Page 1
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Figure A.2: Instructions Page 2
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Figure A.3: Instructions Page 3
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Figure A.4: BASE treatment
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Figure A.5: CORR treatment
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Figure A.6: UNDER treatment
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Figure A.7: UNDERGENERIC treatment
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Figure A.8: UNDERTRIGGER treatment
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Given that the set S is closed and compact and the utility function is continuous,
then Weierstrass’s theorem states that some non-empty compact set exists for
the value to report to achieve the maximum utility for each value of the realised
state. Denote this set as the correspondence r ∗ (s, sR) for each value of the
state. For two realised states with different values, where s2 > s1, denote the
minimum values of r that obtain the utility maximum as r2 and r1 respectively.
That is r2 = min{r∗s2, sR} and r1 = min{r∗s1, sR}. Given that the two values r2 and
r1 yield maximal utility at their respective states, it follow that:
U(r1, s1, sR) ≥ U(r2, s1, sR) (B.1)
and
U(r2, s2, sR) ≥ U(r1, s2, sR) (B.2)
Using the specification of the utility function, these expressions can be rewritten
as:
v (r1)− c(r1 − s1)− cR(r1 − sR) ≥ v (r2)− c(r2 − s1)− cR(r2 − sR) (B.3)
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and
v (r2)− c(r2 − s2)− cR(r2 − sR) ≥ v (r1)− c(r1 − s2)− cR(r1 − sR) (B.4)
Summing over these two expressions yields:
−c(r1 − s1)− c(r2 − s2) ≥ −c(r2 − s1)− c(r1 − s2) (B.5)
which can be expressed as:
c(r2 − s1)− c(r1 − s1) ≥ c(r2 − s2)− c(r1 − s2) (B.6)
Given the definition that s2 > s1, then it follows r1−s1 > r1−s2 and r2−s1 > r2−s2.
The proposition can be proved by a contradiction. Under a further assumption of
r2 < r1, then the statements r1−s1 > r2−s1 and r1−s2 > r2−s2 must also hold, and
therefore the conditions r2−s2 < r1−s2 < r1−s1 and r2−s2 < r2−s1 < r1−s1 must
also be true. Ignoring temporarily the trivial case where c(r − s) = 0 everywhere,
from these expressions we can use the convexity assumption on c(r− s) to write:
c(r1 − s2) < s2 − s1r1 − s1 − r2 + s2 c(r2 − s2) +
r1 − r2
r1 − s1 − r2 + s2 c(r1 − s1) (B.7)
and
c(r2 − s1) < r1 − r2r1 − s1 − r2 + s2 c(r2 − s2) +
s2 − s1
r1 − s1 − r2 + s2 c(r1 − s1) (B.8)
Summing over these two expressions gives:
c(r1 − s2) + c(r2 − s1) < c(r2 − s2) + c(r1 − s1) (B.9)
which can be expressed as:
c(r2 − s1)− c(r1 − s1) < c(r2 − s2)− c(r1 − s2) (B.10)
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However, equation B.10 is a contradiction to the statement in equation B.6. As
the optimal value to report is always one in the case of no cost, we can therefore
state that r2 ≥ r1.
B.2 Proposition 3
For two reference points where sR2 > s
R
1 , denote the minimum values of r that
obtain the utility maximum as r2 and r1 respectively. It follows that:
U(r1, s, sR1 ) ≥ U(r2, s, sR1 ) (B.11)
and
U(r2, s, sR2 ) ≥ U(r1, s, sR2 ) (B.12)
Using the specification of the utility function, these expressions can be rewritten
as:
v (r1)− c(r1 − s)− cR(r1 − sR1 ) ≥ v (r2)− c(r2 − s)− cR(r2 − sR1 ) (B.13)
and
v (r2)− c(r2 − s)− cR(r2 − sR2 ) ≥ v (r1)− c(r1 − s)− cR(r1 − sR2 ) (B.14)
Summing over these two expressions yields:
−cR(r1 − sR1 )− cR(r2 − sR2 ) ≥ −cR(r2 − sR1 )− cR(r1 − sR2 ) (B.15)
which can be expressed as:
cR(r2 − sR1 )− cR(r1 − sR1 ) ≥ cR(r2 − sR2 )− c(r1 − sR2 ) (B.16)
Given the definition that sR2 > s
R
1 , then it follows r1 − sR1 > r1 − sR2 and r2 − sR1 >
r2 − sR2 . To test for differences, if we further assume r2 < r1, then the statements
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r1−sR1 > r2−sR1 and r1−sR2 > r2−sR2 must also hold. This leads to the observations
that r2−sR2 < r1−sR2 < r1−sR1 and r2−sR2 < r2−sR1 < r1−sR1 . Ignoring temporarily
the trivial case where cR(r− sR) = 0 everywhere, from these expressions we can
use the convexity assumption on cR(r− sR) to write:
cR(r1 − sR2) < s
R
2 − sR1
r1 − sR1 − r2 + sR2
cR(r2 − sR2 ) +
r1 − r2
r1 − sR1 − r2 + sR2
cR(r1 − sR1 ) (B.17)
and
cR(r2 − sR1 ) <
r1 − r2
r1 − sR1 − r2 + sR2
c(r2 − sR2 ) +
s2 − sR1
r1 − sR1 − r2 + sR2
cR(r1 − sR1 ) (B.18)
Summing over these two expressions gives:
cR(r1 − sR2 ) + c(r2 − sR1 ) < cR(r2 − sR2 ) + cR(r1 − sR1 ) (B.19)
which can be expressed as:
cR(r2 − sR1 )− c(r1 − sR1 ) < c(r2 − sR2 )− c(r1 − sR2 ) (B.20)
This is a contradiction to the statement in equation B.16. As the optimal value to
report is always one in the case of no cost, we can therefore state that r2 ≥ r1.
B.3 Change of Reference Point
The illustration in Figure 2.4 illustrates a slightly different case to that given in
the main body of the text in that the set of states, S, has been extended to cover
the range [−1, 1]. This does not affect the basic results. Setting the reference
point at s = 0 under this extended range does however simplify the analysis
under a change in the reference point, as alternative reference points can be
viewed as ranges within the extended space, such that for any given refrence
point, sR ∈ [0, 1], the appropriate sub range of the extended space would be
[−sR, 1− sR].
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An increase in the reference point from sR to sR′ can therefore be viewed as
a left diagonal shift in the space under analysis. Such a shift is illustrated in the
left panel of Figure 2.4. For any state in the actual range with the lower reference
point, that is some x−sR ∈ [−sR, 1−sR] where x ∈ [0, 1], there is a corresponding
value in the range with the higher reference point, x′ − sR′ ∈ [−sR′, 1 − sR′] such
that x = x′. Under these conditions, the values of x and x′ represent the same real
state in the actual range under consideration for the two different reference points.
The optimal reported value for the actual realised states for the two reference
points is shown in the right hand panel of Figure 2.4, taken from the overlay of the




Figure B.1: Laboratory desk configuration prior to experimental session
B.4.2 Part One
The booklet used for part one of the experiment is reproduced on the next six
pages, this includes the instructions read aloud at the start of the experiment.
B.4.3 Part Two
The booklet used for part one of the experiment is reproduced on the two pages
that following after that, this includes the instructions read aloud at in-between the
components of the experiment.
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Welcome to today’s experiment.  
Please do not write your name or student id on this form to ensure anonymity. 
This is an experiment on economic decision making, there are no right or wrong choices. 
You will be paid £3 for showing up today and may have the opportunity to earn more money 
through your choices in the experiment. It is important that your actions in this experiment are 
anonymous to the experimental team. As the university finance department require that payments 
are recorded you will still be required to sign for your payment, but this record will only be passed to 
the finance department and the experimentalists will have no access to these records. Your 
payments will therefore be anonymous to the experimental team. Please bear in mind that the 
experiment is designed to be anonymous and do not use information that would indicate your 
identity, such as your name or student id, in any of the materials in the laboratory other than the 
PARTICIPANT PAYMENT RECEIPT form. 
The experiment will be in two parts, we will introduce the second part later in the session. In the first 
part of the experiment you will be required to complete a questionnaire which is attached to these 
instructions. We will allow 10 minutes for you to complete the questions attached. If you have any 




Experiment Part 1 Questionnaire – Please Complete ALL Sections 
Please do not write your name or student id on this form to ensure anonymity. 
SECTION 1  
Please complete the following questions where appropriate (or leave blank if you do not wish to 
answer) 
Q1] Please let us know your gender: Male [ ] or Female [ ] 
Q2] Please let us know your age: ______ 
Q3] Please let us know your course of study: ________________________ 
Q4] Please let us know what year of your studies are you in: _______________________ 
Q5] Please tell us about your household income, is it 
> more than £10,000 [ ] 
> more than £20,000 [ ] 
> more than £40,000 [ ] 
> more than £60,000 [ ] 
> more than £100,000 [ ] 
None of the above [ ] 
Q6] Below are five pairs of descriptions. Circle one point on each scale to indicate how much you 
think each description sounds like you. For example: 
 If a pair of descriptions describe you equally well, then mark the centre of the scale 
Description 1  |-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|  Description 2 
 If you are slightly more like description 1 than description 2, then mark the scale slightly 
closer to description 1 
Description 1  |-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|  Description 2 
 If description 2 is exactly right and description 1 is not like you at all, then mark the scale 
right next to description 2 








How much does each description sound like you? Generally I come across as: 
Someone who is talkative, outgoing, 
is comfortable around people, but 
could be bossy and attention seeking 
|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-| 
Someone  who is a reserved, private 
person, doesn’t like to draw 
attention to themselves and can be 
shy around strangers 
Someone who is forthright, tends to 
be critical and find fault with others 
and doesn’t suffer fools gladly 
|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-| 
Someone who is generally trusting 
and forgiving, is interested in 
people, but can be taken for 
granted and finds it difficult to say 
no 
 
Someone who is sensitive and 




Someone who is relaxed, 
unemotional rarely gets irritated 
and seldom feels blue 
Someone who likes to plan things, 
likes to tidy up, pays attention to 
details, but can be rigid or inflexible 
|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-| 
Someone who doesn’t necessarily 
work to a schedule, tends to be 
flexible, but disorganised and often 
forgets to put things back in their 
proper place 
Someone who is a practical person 
who is not interested in abstract 
ideas, prefers work that is routine 
and has few artistic interests 
|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-| 
Someone who spends time 
reflecting on things, has an active 
imagination and likes to think up 







Please consider the following hypothetical investment.  
This investment has a 50/50 chance of success. If successful, any amount invested will return 2.5 
times the value invested. However, if not successful then it will return nothing. For example, if all 
£10 were to be invested, then if it is successful, it will return £25, but if unsuccessful it will return £0. 
You may invest any portion of the £10 (from 0 to 10), and keep the remainder.  
Suppose you invested £3, and kept the remaining £7.  
If the investment is successful, then you will receive £7.50 from the investment, plus £7 that you 
kept for a total of £14.50. However, if the investment is not successful, then you will receive nothing 
from the investment and only retain the amount you kept for a total of £7. 
Alternatively, suppose you invested £8 and kept the remaining £2.  
If the investment is successful, then you will receive £20 from the investment, plus £2 that you kept 
for a total of £22. However, if the investment is not successful, then you will receive nothing from 
the investment and only retain the amount you kept for a total of £2. 
 




In this section you are asked to choose from a list of hypothetical options corresponding to different 
amounts of money to be paid in the future. Which is the first of the following options that you would 
select in preference to receiving £100 in one month’s time: 
Option 1: £100.00 in thirteen months’ time 
Option 2: £101.50 in thirteen months’ time 
Option 3: £103.00 in thirteen months’ time 
Option 4: £104.50 in thirteen months’ time 
Option 5: £106.00 in thirteen months’ time 
Option 6: None of the above 
 
So if the first  option you would prefer is £104.50 in thirteen months’ time to £100 in one month’s 
time, (such that you would not have preferred £100, £101.50 or £103.00 in thirteen months’ time), 
you would select option 4. 
 
Please select which option you would choose. 




The purchase of a bat and a ball cost £1.10 (one pound and ten pence). The bat cost £1 more than 
the ball. How much did the ball cost? 
 
The ball cost ____ pence 
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Experiment Part 2 Numeracy Test 
In the second part of the experiment you have the opportunity to increase your payment for today’s 
experiment in a numeracy test. Once instructed to turn over you will find 20 questions of the 
following form on the reverse: 
3+5-2= 
You will be given 30 seconds to try and complete as many of the 20 questions as possible. 
You will earn 20 pence for each of the questions you complete.  
You will be told when the 30 seconds is to begin and when it is at an end. 
Once the 30 seconds is over you should check how many questions you have answered and work out 
your payment. You have been provided on the desk with a small white envelope containing 20 
twenty pence pieces. You should remove the appropriate number of twenty pence pieces from the 
envelope for your payment. You should then seal any remaining coins in the small white envelope. 
In previous sessions using this test one of the two most commonly reported values was 10 
questions. 
You should then write the value of you payment PLUS the £3 for you show up fee on your 
PARTICIPANT PAYMENT RECEIPT form. For example, if you complete 11 puzzles, you should remove 
11 twenty pence pieces corresponding to £2.20 to add to your £3 show up fee. You should then 
complete the PARTICIPANT PAYMENT RECEIPT form for the total of £5.20. 
You should then place all the experimental materials, including the booklets for the first and second 
part of the experiment as well as the small white envelope containing any remaining coins into the 
large plastic envelope provided, BUT NOT the PARTICIPANT PAYMENT RECEIPT which you should 
keep separate. 
You will then be asked to leave. As you leave, there will be two boxes by the door. Please place the 
plastic envelope containing the experimental materials in the large left hand box and the place the 
PARTICIPANT PAYMENT RECEIPT face down in the box on the right. 
 













































































































































































































































sigma 2.9151 2.8723 2.8102 1.2238 0.8451
alpha0 1.5855 1.9315
alpha1 -0.0746 -0.0734
N 258 258 258 258 258
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23
LL -539.9 -536.3 -530.4 -528.4 -525.6
Intercept+Slope:SW 0.7342 0.8651 0.6868 0.8634 0.9171
Intercept+Slope:NW 0.0097*** 0.0086*** 0.0227** 0.0205** 0.016**
Intercept+Slope:NE 0.0090*** 0.0224** 0.0423** 0.0018 0.0046***
Table B.1: Censored regression estimates of determinants of number of Report-
edCalculations
1
1Model 1 as specified by Equation 2.15, Model 2 incorporates the variable Male, Model 3
incorporates other subject responses, Model 4 uses Equation 2.15 and Equation 2.16 for het-
eroskedasticity, Model 5 incorporates the variable Male
173
CorrectCalculations < 10 CorrectCalculations ≥ 10
Treatment Intercept Slope Intercept Slope






















Table B.2: Calculated coefficient values for censored regression
FullFalse PartialFalse






































































































Pseudo R2 0.15 0.21
LL -227.5 -209.1
Table B.3: Multinomial logistic estimates of False reporting
2
























Table B.4: Post-estimation contrast of the propensity to report a FullFalse value























Table B.5: Post-estimation contrast of contrast in the propensity to report a Cor-
























Table B.6: Post-estimation contrast of contrast in the propensity to report a Par-





C.1.1 Experiment - Student Instructions
Instructions
Welcome to the experiment.
This is an experiment into economic decision making. Please read the instruc-
tions carefully, as your payment will be a function of your decisions. There are no
right or wrong decisions.
You will be paid a base fee of £3 for taking part in this experiment and may
have the opportunity to earn a bonus fee through your choices in the experiment.
This experiment is in three parts. In the first part you will be asked a series of
questions by the computer for which you will need to make a number of selections.
The second part of the experiment will present you with a task that you must
complete to qualify for the third section of the experiment. The details of the sec-
ond part of the experiment will be given after you have completed the questions in
the first part. The instructions for the third part of the experiment will be presented
to you only after you have qualified for the third section.
When you are ready to begin, please click on the button below to start the first
part of the experiment.
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Question
Please let us know your gender
Please let us know your age
Please let us know your course of study
C.1.2 Experiment Part 1: Task 1
Note: The third question (Please let us know your course of study) was replaced
by the question Please let us know your nationality for the Amazon Mechanical
Turk sample
Below are five pairs of descriptions. Circle one point on each scale to indicate
how much you think each description sounds like you. For example:
If a pair of descriptions describe you equally well, then mark the centre of the
scale
If you are slightly more like description 1 than description 2, then mark the
scale slightly closer to description 1
If description 2 is exactly right and description 1 is not like you at all, then mark
the scale right next to description 2
C.1.3 Experiment Part 1: Task 2
Note: The £ sign was replaced by the $ sign for the Amazon Mechanical Turk
sample
Please consider the following hypothetical investment.
This investment has a 50/50 chance of success. If successful, any amount in-
vested will return 2.5 times the value invested. However, if not successful then it
will return nothing. For example, if all £10 were to be invested, then if it is suc-
cessful, it will return £25, but if unsuccessful it will return £0.
You may invest any portion of the £10 (from 0 to 10), and keep the remainder.
To fix ideas, consider the following hypothetical examples:
Suppose you invested £3, and kept the remaining £7.
If the investment is successful, then you will receive £7.50 from the investment,
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Description 1 Description 2
Someone who is talkative, outgoing,
is comfortable around people, but
could be bossy and attention seeking
Someone who is a reserved, private
person, doesn’t like to draw attention
to themselves and can be shy around
strangers
Someone who is a reserved, private
person, doesn’t like to draw attention
to themselves and can be shy around
strangers
Someone who is generally trusting
and forgiving, is interested in people,
but can be taken for granted and finds
it difficult to say no
Someone who is sensitive and ex-
citable, and can be tense
Someone who is relaxed, unemo-
tional rarely gets irritated and seldom
feels blue
Someone who likes to plan things,
likes to tidy up, pays attention to de-
tails, but can be rigid or inflexible
Someone who doesn’t necessarily
work to a schedule, tends to be flex-
ible, but disorganised and often for-
gets to put things back in their proper
place
Someone who is a practical person
who is not interested in abstract ideas,
prefers work that is routine and has
few artistic interests
Someone who spends time reflecting
on things, has an active imagination
and likes to think up new ways of do-
ing things, but may lack pragmatism
plus £7 that you kept for a total of £14.50. However, if the investment is not
successful, then you will receive nothing from the investment and only retain the
amount you kept for a total of £7.
Suppose you invested £8 and kept the remaining £2.
If the investment is successful, then you will receive £20 from the investment, plus
£2 that you kept for a total of £22. However, if the investment is not successful,
then you will receive nothing from the investment and only retain the amount you
kept for a total of £2.
How much of the £10 would you invest?
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Option 1 £100.00 in thirteen months’ time
Option 2 £101.50 in thirteen months’ time
Option 3 £103.00 in thirteen months’ time
Option 4 £104.50 in thirteen months’ time
Option 5 £106.00 in thirteen months’ time
Option 6 None of the above
C.1.4 Experiment Part 1: Task 3
Note: The £ sign was replaced by the $ sign for the Amazon Mechanical Turk
sample
In this section you are asked to choose from a list of hypothetical options
corresponding to different amounts of money to be paid in the future. What is the
lowest amount you would prefer to have instead of £100 in one month’s time?
So if the first option you would prefer is £104.50 in thirteen months’ time to
£100 in one month’s time, (such that you would not have preferred £100, £101.50
or £103.00 in thirteen months’ time), you would select option 4.
Please select which option you would choose.
C.1.5 Experiment Part 2 Instructions
Experiment Part 2 - Instructions
In this second part of the experiment you will engage in a computerised task.
The task requires that you re-position sliders that will be presented on the screen.
There will be 48 sliders, each of which will initially be positioned at the left hand
side of the bar, at position 0. Your task is to position as many of these sliders as
possible in the centre of the bar, at position 50, in 100 seconds.
The image below shows how the screen will look once the experiment has
started with the slider in the top left hand corner having been moved to the centre
position.
We will conduct three practice rounds to allow you to gain familiarity and some
practice with the task before moving onto a final round that will be used to deter-
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mine if you qualify for the final part of the experiment. You must re-position 15 of
the 48 sliders to the centre of the bar the final round of this task to qualify for Part
3 of the experiment.
C.1.6 Experiment Part 3 Instructions
Experiment Part 3 - Instructions
In this, final, part of the experiment you may have the opportunity to increase
your payment from today’s experiment.
The computer will perform a lottery by drawing a random whole number from
1 to 100, with all numbers having the same probability of being selected, that is
the chance of the value 12 being drawn is 1-in-100, as is the chance of the value
77 being drawn.
You will be randomly partnered with another subject in the experimental ses-
sion who has also qualified for part 3 of the experiment to form a pair. The other
person in your pair has a lottery value of their own, which is independent of the
the lottery value you receive. Your task in this part of the experiment is to report
a value of the lottery to the person you have been paired with. The other person
will be presented with the same set of instructions and asked to make the same
choices.
Once the experimental session is over, one of the members of your pair will
be randomly chosen by the computer to be a type A, whereas the other will then
be classed as a type B. The computer will calculate your payment based on the
type you are assigned to and the appropriate choices made.
For the person selected to be type A, the payment will be 5 pence times the
value they report
For the person selected to be type B, the payment will be 5 pence times the
value the type A person they were paired with reports
The following table presents 4 examples of outcomes. In each case the lottery
produces the same values for the two players (You and your paired other). The
differences arise from the values chosen and the random selection of who is
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You Other You Other You Other You Other
Value Drawn 30 60 30 60 30 60 30 60
Report if A 30 60 30 60 80 20 80 20
Report if B 30 60 30 60 20 70 20 70
Type Assigned A B B A A B B A
Payment 1.50 1.50 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.000 1.00 1.00
assigned to type A and who is assigned to type B.
Only the value you choose to report for the type you are selected to be will
be shown to the experimental participant you are paired with. Only the corre-
sponding value chosen by the subject you are paired with will be shown to you.
The selections not used and the actual values drawn in the lottery will not be
revealed.
As you will not know what type you will be allocated before you make your
choices, we will ask you to make the choice as to what message you would send
to the other person in your pair if you were of type A.
Your assigned type, payment and the value reported by the participant you
were paired with will be available online after the experiment has finished. These
details will also be sent to you in an e-mail.
Payment will be made through the student expenses claim system. We will
request that the appropriate payment is made to you. To ensure that you receive
this payment, you will need to register the appropriate bank account details in the
student record system. failure to register the correct bank details in the student
record system will lead to a delay in your payment. Further details on how to
ensure your bank details are registered will be included in the e-mail that will
detail your payment.
C.1.7 Experiment Part 3 Quiz
Experiment Part 3 - Quiz
We will now ask a number of simple questions to check your understanding
of the experiment. These questions are shown below. Once you have correctly
answered the questions below, you will be shown your value for the lottery and
asked to make your decisions.
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Number Question
1 Will you be able to know the value of lottery draw for the person you
are paired with?
2 How many choices will you be required to make in this part of the
experiment?
3 If you are selected to be a type B person, how many times the value of
your lottery draw that you report will you be paid?
4 If you are selected to be a type A person, how many times the value of
the lottery draw you report will the person you are paired with be paid?
5 What is the maximum payment available for this part (part 3) of the
experiment?
6 What is the minimum payment available for this part (part 3) of the
experiment?
C.1.8 Experiment Part 3 - Lottery Choice
Your value for the lottery draw is 12. Please indicate the values you would like to
report to experimental participant you will be paired with in the case where you
are selected to be type A.
In the case where I am assigned to type A, I will report a value of:
C.1.9 Experiment Part 3 - Payment
Experiment - Complete
Thank you completing this experiment. You have now been randomly matched
with another participant from this experimental session. You have been assigned
to type A.
The value you declared as a type A was 100.
Your payment for today’s experiment will therefore be £8.00.
Please ensure that your bank account details in the Student Record System
are correct. Failure to enter correct details into SRS will delay any payment due to
you. You can access the student record system through exhub or directly through
SRS.
C.1.10 Experiment - Mechanical Turk Workers Recruitment
We are conducting an academic study about individual decision making. We
would like to invite you to take part in our study, in which you will have to make
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a number of choices, some of which may give you the opportunity to make addi-
tional earnings from participating.
This study should take 30 minutes to complete.
You will be paid $3 for doing this study.
You may earn more depending on the decisions that you make during the
experiment. Any extra amount you earn will be paid as a bonus.
If you wish to complete the study, please copy and past the link below into a
new web browser window or tab. At the end of the study, you will receive a code
to paste into the box below to receive your payment.
Make sure to leave this window open as you complete the survey. When you
are finished, you will return to this page to paste the code into the box.
C.1.11 Experiment - Mechanical Turk Workers Pre-instruction
Page
The purpose of the study
The purpose of this study is to understand individual decisions. The study is
being conducted by Prof. Miguel A. Fonseca, and Shaun Grimshaw
Participation and withdrawal
<p>Participation in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to with-
draw from this study at any time without prejudice or penalty. If you wish to with-
draw, simply stop completing the task and close your browser. If you do withdraw
from the study, the materials that you have completed to that point will be deleted
and will not be included in the study.
What is involved?
We will present you with a series of decisions which may carry financial con-
sequences to you and, depending on the decision, to someone else. Participation
in this study will take approximately 15 minutes and you will be paid $1 for taking
part, and possibly more depending on your decisions.
Risks
Participation in this study should involve no physical or mental discomfort, and
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no risks beyond those of everyday living. If, however, you should find any question
or procedure to be invasive, you are free to omit answering or participating in that
aspect of the study.
Confidentiality and security of data
All data collected in this study will be stored confidentially. All data is anony-
mous, and cannot be linked to you. The data you provide will only be used for the
specific research purposes of this study.
Ethics Clearance and Contacts
This study has been cleared in accordance with the ethical review processes
of the University of Exeter Business School. You are free to discuss your partici-
pation with project staff (m.a.fonseca@exeter.ac.uk ; sbg203@exeter.ac.uk). Al-
ternatively, you may leave a message with the Research Team at the University of
Exeter (business-school-research-office@exeter.ac.uk). By proceeding with the
experiment, you provide consent that you understand the information provided
and agree to participate in this study. You also understand that your participation
is voluntary and you may withdraw at any time.
Please click next below for further instructions about the experiment.
C.1.12 Experiment - Mechanical Turk Workers Instructions
Instructions
Welcome to the experiment.
This is an experiment into economic decision making. Please read the instruc-
tions carefully, as your payment will be a function of your decisions. There are no
right or wrong decisions.
You will be paid a base fee of $3 for taking part in this experiment and may
have the opportunity to earn a bonus fee through your choices in the experiment.
At the end of the experiment you will be given a code to enter into mechanical
turk to claim your base fee.
This experiment is in three parts. In the first part you will be asked a series of
questions by the computer for which you will need to make a number of selections.
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The second part of the experiment will present you with a task that you must
complete to qualify for the third section of the experiment. The details of the sec-
ond part of the experiment will be given after you have completed the questions in
the first part. The instructions for the third part of the experiment will be presented
to you only after you have qualified for the third section.
When you are ready to begin, please click on the button below to start the first


































































































































































N 461 461 461
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.10 0.20
LL -418.8 -407.0 -359.2
Table C.1: Multinomial logistic estimates of the classification of subject choices into UpLie, Honest and DownLie
1




χ2 p χ2 p
0 6.56 0.0104 6.2 0.0128
10 6.99 0.0082 7.09 0.0077
20 7.18 0.0074 7.7 0.0055
30 7.04 0.008 7.35 0.0067
40 6.32 0.0119 5.56 0.0183
50 4.61 0.0317 3.29 0.0697
60 2.31 0.1289 1.67 0.1958
70 0.65 0.4208 0.8 0.37
80 0.01 0.911 0.38 0.5393
90 0.43 0.5104 0.17 0.6796
100 2.27 0.132 0.07 0.7898
Table C.2: Post-estimation contrast of the propensity to report a UpLie between
student and AMT subjects
LotteryDraw BASE SKEW
χ2 p χ2 p
0 4.09 0.043 5.27 0.0217
10 3.85 0.0497 5.54 0.0186
20 3.34 0.0676 5.37 0.0205
30 2.57 0.1092 4.46 0.0346
40 1.56 0.2117 2.83 0.0926
50 0.54 0.4613 1.21 0.2717
60 0.03 0.873 0.29 0.5927
70 0.05 0.8163 0.01 0.9357
80 0.04 0.8419 0.07 0.7932
90 0.09 0.7698 0.27 0.6048
100 0.83 0.3625 0.5 0.4817
Table C.3: Post-estimation contrast of the propensity to report a Honest value
between student and AMT subjects
LotteryDraw BASE SKEW
χ2 p χ2 p
0 4.36 0.0368 0.76 0.3836
10 6.04 0.014 0.94 0.3313
20 8.61 0.0033 1.19 0.2763
30 12.47 0.0004 1.47 0.2254
40 17.15 0 1.73 0.1889
50 18.5 0 1.84 0.175
60 11.62 0.0007 1.76 0.1841
70 3.53 0.0602 1.58 0.2083
80 0.15 0.7007 1.4 0.2375
90 0.51 0.477 1.25 0.2644
100 1.98 0.1594 1.14 0.2858
Table C.4: Post-estimation contrast of the propensity to report a DownLie between
student and AMT subjects
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FullLie PoisitvePartialLie DownLie











































































































































































































































N 461 461 461
Psudeo R2 0.07 0.10 0.20
LL -568.1 -522.5 -490.9
Table C.5: Multinomial logistic estimates of the classification of subject choices into FullLie, PositivePartialLie, Honest and DownLie
2




χ2 p χ2 p
0 1.37 0.2414 0 0.955
10 1.52 0.2176 0.16 0.6907
20 1.58 0.2093 0.93 0.3349
30 1.39 0.239 2.51 0.1134
40 0.91 0.3392 4.45 0.0349
50 0.41 0.522 5.74 0.0166
60 0.1 0.7511 5.91 0.015
70 0 0.9874 5.37 0.0205
80 0.08 0.7755 4.61 0.0318
90 0.36 0.5501 3.88 0.0489
100 0.72 0.3963 3.26 0.0712
Table C.6: Post-estimation contrast of the propensity to report a FullFalse value
between BASE and SKEW treatments
LotteryDraw BASE SKEW
χ2 p χ2 p
0 0.41 0.5197 7.6 0.0058
10 1.05 0.3049 7.76 0.0053
20 2.22 0.1365 7.12 0.0076
30 3.74 0.0531 4.8 0.0284
40 4.65 0.0311 2.14 0.1439
50 4.2 0.0405 0.68 0.4091
60 3.03 0.0819 0.14 0.7062
70 1.9 0.1681 0 0.9497
80 1.05 0.3067 0.03 0.866
90 0.41 0.5199 0.12 0.728
100 0.03 0.8601 0.24 0.6257
Table C.7: Post-estimation contrast of the propensity to report a PositivePartial-



















Lotteryinstructions 7.897 < 0.001
Slider -4.039 < 0.001
Sliderinstructions 4.052 < 0.001
Time 9.956 < 0.001
Investment 4.898 < 0.001
Personality 6.753 < 0.001
Instructions 3.475 0.0005
Pretime 4.657 < 0.001
Total 4.41 < 0.001
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